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Abstract 
Health care decision-makers face several uncertainties regarding pharmaceutical 
products. For new and expensive drugs, the performance outside of clinical trials could 
be uncertain. For old and low-profit pharmaceutical products, the supply could be 
uncertain, causing drug shortages. In three essays, I study mitigating strategies to deal 
with different types of uncertainties associated with pharmaceutical products.  
In the first essay, I compare two types of pharmaceutical reimbursement contracts 
to mitigate the uncertainties associated with new and expensive drugs. I construct a 
game-theoretic model to analyze the interactions between a pharmaceutical manufacturer 
and a payer. The payer’s reimbursement of a drug is either related to the cost-
effectiveness or the sales volume of the drug in the two contracts, respectively. I find key 
factors that determine the two parties’ preferences for the two contracts. I also find 
conditions under which each type is preferred by both parties and can achieve a Pareto 
improvement.  
In the second essay, I study mitigating strategies for drug shortage, which has 
become a serious problem in many countries in recent years. I construct a multi-period 
supply chain model to analyze the interactions between a representative hospital and an 
unreliable pharmaceutical manufacturer. The hospital owns an in-house manufacturer and 
can procure the drug from the two manufacturing facilities. I also assume that the hospital 
can make emergency production. I study the two parties’ procurement and production 
decisions and examine the impacts of the hospital’s optimal decisions on the external 
manufacturer’s profit.  
In the third essay, I study mitigating strategies for drug shortages from the 
governments’ perspective. I construct a game-theoretic model consisting of a 
pharmaceutical manufacturer, a wholesaler, and a government. I compare two types of 
mitigating strategies that the government can implement: providing subsidies to the 
wholesaler, or using a government-owned manufacturer. I identify key factors for the 
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government’s preference over the two strategies and examine the impact on the private 
sector.  
The three essays have theoretical contributions to game theory and supply chain 
risk management literature and have policy implications for policymakers to manage 
drug supply and patient access to drugs. 
Keywords 
Healthcare Policies, Pharmaceutical, Uncertainties, Game Theory, Supply Chain 
Management, Pharmaceutical Reimbursement Contracts, Risk-Sharing Agreements, Drug 
Shortages, Dual-Sourcing, Contingent Sourcing, Subsidy  
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Summary for Lay Audience 
Health care decision-makers face several uncertainties regarding pharmaceutical products 
when making decisions. For new and expensive drugs, their performance in the real-
world could be uncertain. For old and low-price drugs, there could be manufacturing 
problems, which may cause drug shortages. In this thesis, I study strategies to deal with 
different types of uncertainties associated with pharmaceutical products.  
In the first essay, I compare two types of drug reimbursement contracts. I assume 
a drug company is selling a new and expensive drug to treat patients with a disease. A 
payer (e.g., government drug benefit programs or insurance companies) is considering 
covering the drug so that patients do not need to pay from their own pockets. However, 
the payer may have two concerns: 1) the health benefit that the drug can provide to the 
general patients may be lower than that in the clinical trials; and 2) more drugs may be 
sold than originally estimated, causing a higher expenditure to the payer. Therefore, the 
payer is considering two reimbursement contracts in which the payment to the 
manufacturer is linked to either the health benefit or the sales volume of the drug. We 
identify circumstances in which both the manufacturer and the payer prefer the same type 
of contract, which can achieve a win-win situation.  
In the second essay, I study mitigating strategies for drug shortages, which has 
become a serious problem in many countries in recent years. Due to the prevalence of 
drug shortages of many common drugs, several US hospitals allied and established a 
manufacturer to produce certain generic drugs to make the drugs more available for 
patients. Motivated by this initiative, I analyze when the hospitals would benefit from 
owning a drug manufacturer, and what are the impacts on the external manufacturers. 
In the third essay, I study government interventions on mitigating drug shortages. 
I compare two types of government interventions: providing subsidies or using a public 
manufacturer. I find that the government should provide subsidies to inexpensive but 
critical generic drugs without alternatives, and it should use a public manufacturing 
facility to produce expensive lifesaving drugs. 
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Chapter 1  
1 Introduction 
Health care decision-makers face several uncertainties regarding pharmaceutical 
products. For new and expensive drugs, the performance outside of clinical trials could 
be uncertain. For example, in real clinical practice, the effectiveness of new drugs could 
be lower than the efficacy observed in clinical trials. This is because clinical tries usually 
have targeted patients with higher adherence levels (Adamski et al., 2010). Sales volume 
could be larger than originally anticipated due to factors such as poor forecasts, off-label 
usage, expansion of indication, and marketing effort by the manufacturers (Zhang et al., 
2011). Many payers use a formulary (a list of drugs that will be reimbursed by the payer) 
to manage and control pharmaceutical spending. However, the uncertainties add 
significant risks to the payers when making formulary decisions.  
To better control pharmaceutical expenditure and manage patient access to drugs 
in the presence of various uncertainties, there emerged “risk-sharing agreements” 
between payers and pharmaceutical companies in recent years (Adamski et al., 2010). 
Under a risk-sharing agreement, the reimbursement price of a drug is related to its 
performance in the real world. For example, Price-Volume Agreements (PVAs) are 
widely used in many European counties to deal with sales uncertainties and control 
financial expenditure. Under a PVA, the manufacturer receives partial or no payment for 
sales that exceed a pre-agreed volume threshold (Zhang and Zaric, 2015; Zhang et al., 
2011). To deal with uncertainty in the effectiveness of new drugs, outcome-based 
schemes are adopted by payers and health systems. For example, in 2002, the National 
Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) in UK established an outcome-based 
contract with pharmaceutical manufacturers for beta interferon to treat multiple sclerosis. 
According to the agreement, drug manufacturers have to pay refunds to NICE if the cost-
effectiveness of the drugs exceeds a threshold value of £35,000/ quality-adjusted life year 
(QALY) gained (Adamski et al., 2010).   
In addition, many old and low-profit drugs, such as generic drugs, are vulnerable 
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to to supply uncertainties caused by manufacturing problems (e.g., quality problems, 
production technology malfunction, and production delays) due to low profit margins, 
complex production processes, and high market concentration (Jia and Zhao, 2017; 
Malacos, 2019; Woodcock and Wosinska, 2013). For example, saline, the most widely 
used fluid in medical facilities and hospitals, has experienced several shortages in the US 
since 2014. Due to the low profit margin, manufacturers’ pursuit of economies of scale, 
and market consolidation, there are only three major saline manufacturers in the US. 
Most shortages are caused by manufacturing problems such as recalls due to quality 
issues, and manufacturing delays due to natural disasters at the overseas facilities (Mazer-
Amirshahi and Fox 2018). Shortages not only have clinical consequences such as inferior 
outcomes, increased morbidity and mortality, but also add significant costs to health care 
systems due to replacement cost and staff time (Alevizakos et al., 2016; Fox et al., 2014; 
Hedman, 2016). In order to reduce shortages, government agencies, such as the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) in the US, are taking actions to collaborate with the 
pharmaceutical industry by sharing information, searching for alternative manufacturers, 
or importing critical drugs in shortage directly from other overseas manufacturers (Food 
and Drug Administration, 2018). However, drug shortages are still prevalent. For 
example, in June 2018, the US experienced shortages for 182 drugs and pharmaceutical 
supplies, affecting all common drug classes (Hoffman, 2018).  
To mitigate supply uncertainties, several US hospitals allied and established a not-
for-profit pharmaceutical company named “Civica Rx” in 2018 to produce certain drugs 
(Kodjak, 2018; Tirrell, 2018). By July 2020, more than 50 health systems are members of 
Civica RX, representing more than 1,200 US hospitals and over 30 percent of all licensed 
US hospital beds (Civica Rx, 2020). Governments are also important stakeholders in 
managing drug supply and patient access to drugs. Policymakers proposed various 
government interventions to mitigate drug shortages such as maintaining public lists of 
essential drugs with limited supply or expected supply shortages, providing subsidies to 
those drugs, and producing those drugs at public manufacturers.  (MacLeod, 2020; 
McGinley, 2019; Milne et al., 2017).  
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In this thesis, I study the optimal policies on managing drug supply and patient 
access to drugs in the presence of various uncertainties. Using a game-theoretic approach, 
I study the dynamics of key stakeholders’ optimal decisions, and the impacts of the 
interactions on their welfare. I analyze the efficiency of different drug reimbursement 
schemes between payers and pharmaceutical companies when the performance of the 
drug in the real-world is uncertain. I study the efficiency of strategies to mitigate drug 
shortages from hospitals and governments’ perspective, respectively, when the 
manufacturing process is subject to supply uncertainties. In three essays, I analyze 
policymakers’ optimal policy decisions under different circumstances and the impact of 
each policy on the benefit of other parties such as the pharmaceutical manufacturers and 
wholesalers.  
Overview of Three Essays 
In the first essay, I compare two types of risk-sharing agreement to mitigate uncertainties 
in new and expensive drugs. Previous studies have investigated the performance of 
financial-based risk-sharing agreements (Zaric and O'Brien, 2005; Zhang and Zaric, 
2015; Zhang et al., 2011) and outcome-based risk-sharing agreements (Antonanzas et al., 
2011; Barros, 2011; Mahjoub et al., 2014). There are limited studies that compared 
different types of risk-sharing agreements. For example, Zaric and Xie (2009) compared 
two outcome-based agreements, and Levaggi (2014) compared the welfare of a listing 
process through uncertain bargaining and a value-based pricing agreement with risk-
sharing. However, none of these studies compared a financial-based risk-sharing 
agreement with an outcome-based risk-sharing agreement.  
To fill this gap, I construct a game-theoretic model consisting of a payer and a 
pharmaceutical company to compare a volume-based risk-sharing agreement (PVA) with 
a value-based risk-sharing agreement (based on the cost-effectiveness of the drug). There 
are two sequential decisions in the model. First, the payer selects from the two risk-
sharing agreements to determine how a new drug will be reimbursed. Next, the 
pharmaceutical company decides its level of marketing effort that can affect both sales 
volume and cost-effectiveness of the drug. This study captures two types of uncertainties 
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that may affect the performance of a new drug: 1) uncertainties in patients’ health 
benefits from the drug, which reflects patients’ heterogeneity in response to the same 
drug; and 2) heterogeneity in physicians’ prescribing behavior that can be caused by 
differences in interpreting clinical guidelines for patient treatment eligibility.  
I find that each risk-sharing agreement may or may not be able to align the 
incentives of the two parties, depending on different circumstances. Under some 
circumstances, none of the two agreements can be mutually preferred by payers and 
manufacturers, which may explain the resistance from one party during the 
implementation, as observed in reality. For example, if the drug price is either low or 
high, then neither of the risk-sharing agreements could be mutually preferred by the two 
parties. Under some other circumstances, a properly selected risk-sharing agreement can 
be mutually preferred by the two parties,  which creates a “win-win situation and leads to 
a smooth implementation. For example, if the drug price is intermediate, then the two 
parties may prefer the same agreement depending on patient treatment eligibility for the 
drug (specified in clinical guidelines). Specifically, if a relatively large proportion of 
patients are eligible for the drug, then both parties may prefer a volume-based policy. If a 
relatively small portion of patients are eligible for the drug, then a volume-based policy 
may be mutually preferred by the two parties. Therefore, neither risk-sharing agreement 
is a universal solution that can be applied in all situations, and payers should not always 
stick to one type of agreement. For example, some payers prefer to use a volume-based 
agreement for ease of negotiation and implementation, and this study indicates that 
payers may be better off by applying a value-based risk-sharing agreement in some cases.  
In the second essay, I study the hospital’s sourcing strategy and inventory 
management policies to mitigate drug shortage. Several previous studies investigated 
sourcing strategies to mitigate supply uncertainties from a single firm’s perspective 
(Tomlin, 2006; Xanthopoulos et al., 2012), and some studies analyzed the interactions 
between buyer(s) and supplier(s) under supply uncertainty with a single-period setting 
(He and Zhang, 2008; Keren, 2009; Li et al., 2010; Wang et al., 2010). In this study, I 
construct a multi-period supply chain model to analyze the interactions between a 
representative hospital and an unreliable pharmaceutical manufacturer (the external 
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manufacturer). The hospital owns an in-house manufacturer and can procure the drug 
from the two manufacturing facilities. I assume the hospital also has a second chance to 
make emergency production at the in-house producer. I assume the manufacturing 
process has a random yield rate to capture the main cause of drug shortages, which is 
manufacturing problems. I analyze the hospital’s ordering and production decisions, and 
the external manufacturer’s production decision. First, I analytically characterize the 
optimal solutions in a single-period setting and generate insights into the structures of the 
long-term procurement decisions for each party. Next, I propose two long-term inventory 
management policies and evaluate the performance of the two policies in the multi-period 
setting with a heuristic.  
There are several findings. I find that the expected shortage amount can be 
reduced if the hospital operates an in-house producer as its regular source or contingent 
source, indicating the importance of the establishment of additional drug suppliers such 
as Civica Rx. The hospital would benefit from using the in-house manufacturer to make 
regular production if the in-house production cost is low, the external manufacturer’s 
yield rate is low, or the external manufacturer’s yield is highly uncertain. The hospital 
should make use of emergency production at the in-house producer if the emergency 
production cost is relatively low compared with the revenue of the drug and the shortage 
cost.   
The analysis also shows that the two long-term inventory management policies 
have comparable and relatively high performance for the hospital, indicating that the 
hospital can use either policy for its long-term inventory management practice. However, 
the manufacturer’s yield rate has a large impact on its performance if one of these 
inventory management policies is used, indicating that it is beneficial for the 
manufacturer to make investments on improving its reliability. 
In the third essay, I study mitigating strategies for drug shortages from the 
governments’ perspective. I construct a game-theoretic model consisting of a private 
manufacturer, a wholesaler, and a government. The wholesaler procures the drug from 
the manufacturing facilities and sells it to the downstream demand, such as hospitals and 
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pharmacies. I consider two types of government interventions to mitigate drug shortages: 
establishing a public manufacturer, or providing subsidies to the wholesaler. I construct 
three models corresponding to three strategies that can be implemented by the 
government: 1) a basic model (the status quo), in which the government does not 
intervene; 2) a dual sourcing model, in which the government operates public 
manufacturer, and the wholesaler can procure the drug from the two manufacturing 
facilities; and 3) a subsidy model, in which the government provides subsidies based on 
the wholesaler’s unit procurement cost or its unit selling price. I analytically characterize 
the optimal decision for the three parties and compare their welfare under different 
strategies. 
I show the advantages and disadvantages of each strategy. An advantage of both 
mitigating strategies is that the shortage amount can be reduced by either strategy 
compared with the status quo, indicating the positive effect of the two strategies on 
mitigating shortages. An advantage of a subsidy strategy is that it can align the incentives 
of all three parties and achieve an “all-win” situation. However, a disadvantage is that the 
supply chain remains a sole sourcing situation under a subsidy strategy, and is thus more 
vulnerable to supply uncertainties compared to supply chains with multiple suppliers. In 
contrast, an advantage of a dual sourcing strategy is that it adds a supplier of the drug, 
which eases the market concentration and makes the supply chain more reliable and 
resilient to supply uncertainties. A disadvantage is that a dual sourcing strategy cannot be 
mutually preferred by all three parties, because the private manufacturer is no better off 
compared with the status quo. In some circumstances, the wholesaler may prefer to 
procure everything from the public manufacturer, and the private manufacturer is not 
making any profit. In this situation, the private manufacturer may exit the market, leaving 
the public manufacturer the sole supplier of the drug. Therefore, the government and/or 
the wholesaler may need to provide incentives to the private manufacturer to keep it in 
the market and maintain the dual-sourcing situation in the long term. I also provide 
analysis regarding governments' optimal policies to mitigate drug shortages under 
different circumstances, which has implications for policymakers. 
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Chapter 2  
2 Essay 1: Value or Volume? A Comparison of Two Risk 
Sharing Approaches 
 Introduction 
The large proportion of pharmaceutical spending in both health expenditures and gross 
domestic product is a big concern in many countries. For example, 20% of health 
expenditures were spent on pharmaceuticals in Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) countries in 2013 (Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development, 2015). Many payers use a formulary (a list of drugs that will be 
reimbursed by the payer) to manage and contain pharmaceutical spending (Zaric and Xie, 
2009).  
However, when making formulary listing and reimbursement decisions, there are 
several uncertainties such as the sales volume or the effectiveness of new drugs. Sales 
volumes could be larger than originally anticipated due to factors such as poor forecasts, 
off-label usage, expansion of indication, and marketing effort by the manufacturers 
(Zhang et al., 2011). The effectiveness of new drugs in real clinical practice could be 
lower than the efficacy in clinical trials, which usually have targeted patients with higher 
adherence levels (Antonanzas et al., 2011). To deal with these uncertainties, many payers 
have adopted risk-sharing agreements under which the reimbursement for a 
pharmaceutical product is related to its performance in real-world settings (Adamski et 
al., 2010). 
Although the uncertainties in both sales volume and health outcome co-exist in 
many situations, we are not aware of any direct theoretical comparisons between sales 
volume-based and health outcome-based contracts. Our study intends to fill an important 
gap by comparing the performance of a sales volume-based agreement and a cost-
effectiveness-based agreement to provide theoretical foundations for selection and 
decision making in the future. We focus on the comparison between a sales volume-based 
agreement and a value-based cost-effectiveness rebate. 
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To control financial expenditure, a price-volume agreement (PVA) uses a sales 
threshold, and manufacturers must pay a partial or full rebate to payers for excessive 
sales over the threshold. These contracts are widely used in Australia and many European 
countries (Adamski et al., 2010). To manage the uncertainties in health outcomes, a 
value-based cost-effectiveness rebate (CER) specifies a cost-effectiveness threshold and 
manufacturers pay rebates to payers if the drug fails to meet the benchmark (Adamski et 
al., 2010). A well-known example of this type of plan was in the listing for Multiple 
Sclerosis drugs in the UK (Palace et al., 2015). These risk-sharing agreements are 
expected to help payers control pharmaceutical spendings, increase “value for money”, 
and also facilitate earlier patient access to breakthrough drugs and treatments. 
Several studies have investigated the performance of a PVA (Zaric and O'Brien, 
2005; Zhang and Zaric, 2011, 2015; Zhang et al., 2011) and some examined the 
efficiency of a CER (Antonanzas et al., 2011; Barros, 2011). Limited studies compared 
different types of risk-sharing agreements. For example, Zaric and Xie (2009) compared 
two cost-effectiveness-based agreements and showed that the optimal agreements for the 
two parties depend on several factors and neither of them is always preferred by either 
party. (Levaggi, 2014) compared the welfare of a listing through an uncertain bargaining 
process and a value-based pricing agreement with risk sharing, and showed that the total 
welfare is always better under a value-based pricing scheme but the distribution of the 
benefits between consumers and the manufacturer depends on the rebate rate. 
We are not aware of any direct comparisons between a sales volume-based and a 
health outcome-based agreement. In this study, we construct a game-theoretical model 
consisting of a manufacturer and third-party payer to compare the desirability of a PVA 
and a CER by the two parties. It should be noted that the two contracts under comparison 
are not always applicable in reality. For example, a CER is not an option when outcome 
is not measurable. However, our study intends to provide insights into situations where 
both contracts are available options and need to be compared. We model the 
manufacturer’s marketing efforts explicitly as it can significantly affect both the cost-
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effectiveness and the sales volume of a new drug. To our knowledge, our study is the first 
modelling paper on the theoretical comparison of the two risk-sharing approaches. 
 Literature Review 
We first survey theoretical studies on health-outcome based risk-sharing agreements. Zaric 
and Xie (2009) compared two risk-sharing agreements (a delisting scheme and a rebate 
scheme) based on the effectiveness of a new drug by modelling a manufacturer’s optimal 
decisions on the drug price and marketing effort. The authors reported that the performance 
of the two schemes depends on several factors and none of them is always preferred by the 
manufacturer or the payer. Two studies (Antonanzas et al., 2011; Barros, 2011) analyzed 
the performance of health-outcome based risk-sharing agreements based on patient level 
effectiveness. Barros (2011) modeled the interaction between a manufacturer and a payer 
with and without a risk-sharing agreement. the manufacturer decides the drug price 
whereas the payer decides patient eligiblity for a new drug through a cutoff threshold on 
the effectiveness of the drug. The author found that too many patients may be treated under 
a risk-sharing agreement, and social welfare may decrease if the manufacturer anticipates 
a future risk-sharing agreement while deciding the drug price. Antonanzas et al. (2011) 
constructed a Nash-bargaining game with risk-sharing agreement in which the price of a 
new drug is negociated between a manufacturer and a payer depending on their bargaining 
power. The authors found that fewer patients are treated under a risk-sharing agreement, 
which is in contrast to the results in Barros (2011). The authors also concluded that the 
optimal contract depends on factors such as monitoring costs, the marginal production cost, 
etc. However, none of the above studies on health-outcome based risk-sharing agreements 
considered comparison with financial-based risk-sharing agreements, leaving an important 
theoretical gap. 
 Next, we investigate non-modeling literature on success factors, challenges, 
barriers, and other aspects of risk-sharing agreements. Several studies constructed 
taxonomy to categorize existing risk-sharing agreements (Adamski et al., 2010; Carlson et 
al., 2010; Garrison et al., 2013; Towse and Garrison, 2010). Some studies summarized 
challenges of risk-sharing agreements such as high administration cost, low transparency, 
lack of data collecting infrastructure, the additional burden to the existing health care 
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systems, and conflict of interests (Adamski et al., 2010; McCabe et al., 2010; Stafinski et 
al., 2010; Towse and Garrison, 2010).  
 Our study extends the literature by comparing the performance of two different 
types of risk-sharing agreements while taking into account the manufacturer’s decision on 
marketing effort after a reimbursement scheme is signed. To our knowledge, our study is 
the first theoretical comparison between a financial-based risk-sharing agreement with a 
health-outcome based risk-sharing agreement, which fills an important gap in the existing 
literature. 
 Model 
We construct a game-theoretic model to analyze the interactions between a payer and a 
pharmaceutical manufacturer (referred to as the manufacturer). We assume that the 
manufacturer received regulatory approval to sell a new drug, and the payer is 
considering listing the drug on its formulary. To manage the uncertainties in the sales 
volume and cost-effectiveness of the new drug, the payer is considering choosing from 
two risk-sharing agreements: a price-volume agreement (referred to as PVA, and a value-
based cost-effectiveness rebate (referred to as CER). Let 𝑖 be the index for the two risk-
sharing agreements, 𝑖 ∈ {𝑃𝑉𝐴, 𝐶𝐸𝑅}. All model notation is summarized in Table 2.1. 
We normalize the size of the patient population to one. Let 𝛽 ≥ 0 be the 
incremental health benefit for a patient using the new drug compared with the current 
standard of treatment. The units of 𝛽 could be quality-adjusted life years (QALYs), life 
years (LYs) or any other units that the payer cares about. We assume that 𝛽 is a random 
variable distributed on the interval [𝛽, 𝛽], according to a probability density function 
(PDF) 𝑓(∙) and a cumulative distribution function (CDF) 𝐹(∙). The randomness of 𝛽 
captures patients’ heterogeneity in the incremental health benefit that may be attributed to 
patient characteristics (e.g., age, gender, health condition) or other factors. Let 𝜆 be the 
payer’s willingness to pay for each unit of the incremental health benefit. 
We assume that the payer applies a threshold policy to determine the treatment 
eligibility (i.e., the prescribing criteria) for the new drug: there is a threshold of the  
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incremental health benefit (referred to as the treatment eligibility threshold), 𝑦, such that 
all patients with 𝛽 ≥ 𝑦 will be treated with the new drug, and patients with 𝛽 < 𝑦 will be 
treated with the current standard of treatment. We assume that the treatment eligibility 
threshold is specified in a clinical guideline that has been determined by a third-party 
organization, which is exogenous to our model and does not depend on other parameters. 
For example, in the risk-sharing agreement for four Multiple Sclerosis (MS) drugs in the 
UK established in 2002, the government agreed to fund the drugs to treat MS patients 
according to the guideline set by the Association of British Neurologists (ABN) in 2001 
(Adamski et al., 2010). According to the ABN guideline, up to 30% of the MS patients 
could be eligible for the drugs (Sudlow and Counsell, 2003), i.e., not all patients with a 
Table 2.1: Summary of notation 
Decisions  
       𝑚 The manufacturer’s marketing effort 
         𝑖 The payer’s choice of the risk-sharing agreement, 𝑖 ∈ {𝑃𝑉𝐴, 𝐶𝐸𝑅} 
Random Variable 
𝛽 Incremental health benefit per patient under the new drug compared with the 
current standard treatment 
𝜖 Heterogeneity in doctors’ prescribing behavior 
Parameters 
      𝛽, 𝛽 Lower bound and upper bound of 𝛽 
𝑓(∙), 𝐹(∙)  PDF and CDF of 𝛽 
𝜆   Payer’s willingness to pay threshold 
𝑦  Treatment eligibility threshold of the new drug, i.e., the lower bound of 
incremental health benefit for patients who are eligible for the new drug  
      𝜖, 𝜖 Lower bound and upper bound of 𝜖 
𝑔(∙), 𝐺(∙)  PDF and CDF of 𝜖 
𝑘  Parameter of the efficiency of the marketing effort in the cost function 
𝑝  List price of the new drug  
𝑐𝑀  Manufacturer’s marginal production cost per unit of drug 
𝑐𝑃  Payer’s non-drug related cost per unit of drug 
𝑎𝑃
𝑖   Payer’ implementation cost of contract 𝑖 per unit of drug  
𝑥  Volume threshold for rebate in a PVA 
Calculated Quantities 
𝑄  Expected total sales of the new drug. 
𝐵  Expected total health benefit of the new drug 
𝑆𝑖  Expected total rebate in contract 𝑖 
𝜋𝑀
𝑖   Manufacturer’s expected profit 
𝜋𝑃
𝑖   Payer’s expected payoff 
Other notation 
∗  Superscript for optimal value  
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positive incremental health benefit are eligible for the new drugs. According to the 
appraisal by National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE), the drugs are not 
cost-effective based on the ABN guideline, i.e., the ABN guideline is focused on clinical 
benefits instead of the cost-effectiveness or the price of the drugs. 
We assume that physicians can observe the incremental health benefit for each 
patient (i.e., the realization of 𝛽) prior to the prescribing decision through diagnostic tests 
or observations. However, two factors may affect the actual patient eligibility, i.e., 
whether a patient will be treated with the new drug or not. The first factor is 
heterogeneity in physicians’ prescribing decisions, which can be caused by differences in 
physicians’ interpretations of clinical guidelines, situations that are not adequately 
captured by clinical guidelines, and physicians’ attitudes to risks and benefits 
(Lugtenberg et al., 2009; Multiple Sclerosis Trust, 2019; Riggs and Ubel, 2015). 
Therefore, some physicians may prescribe the new drug to patients who are not eligible 
according to the clinical guideline, whereas others may prescribe the new drug more 
strictly. Let a random variable 𝜖 capture the heterogeneity in physicians’ prescribing 
behavior, which is distributed on the interval [𝜖, 𝜖], 𝜖 ≥ 0, according to a PDF 𝑔(∙) and a 
CDF 𝐺(∙). 
The second factor that may affect the actual patient eligibility is the 
manufacturer’s marketing effort, 𝑚 > 0. Typical marketing effort includes physician 
detailing, direct-to-consumer advertising, and professional meetings (Hébert and 
Stanbrook, 2007; Mizik and Jacobson, 2004). The marketing effort incurs a cost 𝑘𝑚2, 
where 𝑘 is the efficiency parameter of the marketing effort. Similar to some other studies 
(Tirole, 1990; Zhang and Zaric, 2015), the cost function in our study has the following 
properties: 1) the marketing effort can only increase sales; 2) there are diminishing 
marginal returns in the marketing effort; and 3) no cost will occur without any marketing 
effort.  
Without any marketing effort, patient treatment eligibility, 𝑦 + 𝜖, is a random 
variable subject to heterogeneity in physicians’ prescribing behavior. The manufacturer’s 
marketing effort shifts the patient treatment eligibility from 𝑦 + 𝜖 down to 𝑦 −𝑚 + 𝜖, 
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causing physicians to prescribe the new drug to some patients who are not eligible 
according to the original clinical guideline. In other words, the marketing effort only 
affects the mean of the physicians’ prescribing behavior, but it does not change the 
variance of the physicians’ prescribing behavior. Let 𝜃 = min {max {𝑦 − 𝑚 + 𝜖, 𝛽} , 𝛽 }. 
Let 𝑞 and 𝑏 be the total sales and total health benefit of the drug subject to the random 𝜖, 
respectively, where 𝑞 = ∫ 𝑓(𝛽)𝑑𝛽
𝛽 
𝜃
 and 𝑏 = ∫ 𝛽𝑓(𝛽)𝑑𝛽
𝛽
𝜃
. Let 𝐸𝜖 denote the expected 
value over 𝜖. The expected total sales volume 𝑄 = 𝐸𝜖[𝑞] and the expected total health 
benefit of the drug is 𝐵 = 𝐸𝜖[𝑏]. We assume that each patient consumes one unit of the 
new drug if prescribed. 
Let 𝑝 and 𝑐𝑀, 𝑝 > 𝑐𝑀 > 0, be the price and the manufacturer’s marginal 
production cost per unit of the drug, respectively. Let 𝑐𝑃 be the payer’s non-drug-related 
incremental cost per unit of the drug, which could be positive or negative. A negative 
𝑐𝑃 indicates that the new drug causes a reduction in non-drug healthcare expenditures. 
For example, the drug may prevent or delay expensive surgeries or prevent infections that 
are expensive to treat. A positive 𝑐𝑃 indicates that the new drug causes an increase in 
non-drug healthcare expenditures. For example, it may be necessary to administer the 
drug in a hospital or spend time in a hospital to treat a drug reaction. Let 𝑎𝑃
𝑖  be the 
administration cost for implementing contract 𝑖, which is assumed to be fully borne by 
the payer. The payer’s monetary benefit is 𝑀𝐵 = 𝜆𝑏 − (𝑝 + 𝑐𝑃 + 𝑎𝑃
𝑖 )𝑞. The first term 𝜆𝑏 
denotes the monetary value that the payer attached to the total incremental health benefit 
of the new drug. The second term (𝑝 + 𝑐𝑃 + 𝑎𝑃
𝑖 )𝑞 is the total costs incurred to the payer. 
Let 𝑠𝑖 be the rebate from the manufacturer to the payer under contract 𝑖. In a 
PVA, a sales volume threshold 𝑥 is predetermined in the contract, and we assume that the 
manufacturer must pay a full rebate to the payer for the excess of sales, i.e. 𝑆𝑃𝑉𝐴 =
max{0, 𝑝(𝑞 − 𝑥)}. In a CER, there is no rebate when 𝑀𝐵 ≥ 0, and the manufacturer 
must fully compensate the payer’s loss if 𝑀𝐵 < 0, i.e. 𝑠𝐶𝐸𝑅  = max{0, (𝑝 + 𝑐𝑃 +
𝑎𝑃
𝐶𝐸𝑅)𝑞 − 𝜆𝑏}. Let 𝑆𝑖 be the expected value of 𝑠𝑖 over 𝜖, i.e., 𝑆𝑖 = 𝐸𝜖[𝑠𝑖]. 
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Let 𝜋𝑃
𝑖  and 𝜋𝑀
𝑖  be the payer’s and the manufacturer’s expected payoff under 
contract 𝑖, which are calculated as follows. 
 𝜋𝑃
𝑖 = 𝜆𝐵 − (𝑝 + 𝑐𝑃 + 𝑎𝑃
𝑖 )𝑄 + 𝑆𝑖 (2.1) 
 𝜋𝑀
𝑖 = (𝑝 − 𝑐𝑀)𝑄 − 𝑘𝑚
2 − 𝑆𝑖 (2.2) 
We assume that the payer first chooses the risk-sharing agreement 𝑖 to maximize 
her expected payoff, and then the manufacturer chooses the marketing effort, 𝑚, to 
maximize his expected payoff. The payer will choose a PVA if her expected payoff in a 
PVA is greater than the payoff in a CER, i.e. 𝑖𝑃
∗ = 𝑃𝑉𝐴 if 𝜋𝑃
𝑃𝑉𝐴∗ ≥ 𝜋𝑃
𝐶𝐸𝑅∗, and vice versa. 
Similarly, the manufacturer prefers a PVA if the expected payoff in a PVA is greater than 
the payoff in a CER, i.e. 𝑖𝑀
∗ = 𝑃𝑉𝐴 if 𝜋𝑀
𝑃𝑉𝐴∗ > 𝜋𝑀
𝐶𝐸𝑅∗, and vice versa.  We do not 
consider any participation constraint for the payer as her payoff is always non-negative in 
a CER according to the setup of the rebate, and therefore 𝜋𝑃
𝐶𝐸𝑅 could be considered as the 
reservation payoff for the payer. 
 Analysis 
In this section, we analytically characterize the optimal decision and payoff for each 
party. We assume that 𝛽 is uniformly distributed on the interval [0,1] and ϵ is uniformly 
distributed on the interval [−𝜖, 𝜖], 𝜖 > 0. We also verify that the main results hold with 
other distributions such as normal distributions and beta distributions. We assume that the 
rebate threshold in a PVA is exogenously set equal to the expected sales (i.e. 𝑥 = 𝑄) 
because many PVAs in reality set the volume limit based on anticipated expenditure 
(sales) (Adamski et al., 2010).  
We first derive the closed-form solutions of the manufacturer’s optimal marketing 
effort and the optimal payoff for the two parties under each risk-sharing agreement. Next, 
we examine the optimal risk-sharing agreement with respect to some key parameters. We 
also show the manufacturer’s preference for the risk-sharing agreement, which may 
impact the implementation of the scheme in reality. Due to the complex expression of the 
optimal payoffs, we show the preferred risk-sharing agreement for the two parties using 
numerical examples.  
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Let superscript ∗ denote the optimal solutions. The closed-form solutions for the 
manufacturer’s optimal marketing effort (𝑚∗) and the optimal payoff for the two parties 
under agreement 𝑖 ∈ {𝑃𝑉𝐴, 𝐶𝐸𝑅} (i.e., 𝜋𝑃
𝑖∗ and 𝜋𝑀
𝑖∗) are summarized in Table A.1 and 
Table A.2 in the appendix.  
Next, we show the preferred risk-sharing agreement for the two parties 
numerically using parameter values 𝜆 = 50000, 𝜖 = 0.1, 𝑐𝑀 = 5000, 𝑐𝑃 = 500, 𝑎𝑃
𝑃𝑉𝐴 =
200, 𝑎𝑃
𝐶𝐸𝑅 = 1000 and 𝑘 = 10000. We also perform robustness checks using different 
values of the administration costs, which are one of the major concerns of implementing 
a risk-sharing agreement (Adamski et al., 2010), and our results are qualitatively robust 
over a wide range of values.  
Preliminary analysis demonstrates that the optimal solutions are sensitive to the 
drug price (𝑝) and the treatment eligibility threshold (𝑦). Therefore, we shows a two-way 
policy graph of the risk-sharing agreement preferred by the two parties with respect to 𝑝 
and 𝑦 in Figure 2.1. Figure 2.1 indicates that with a sufficiently low drug price, the payer 
prefers a PVA, but the manufacturer prefers a CER (Region A). When drug price is 
Figure 2.1: Policy graph of the risk-sharing agreement preferred by the payer and the 
manufacturer. In each region, the first row is the payer’s preferred risk-sharing 
agreement, and the second row is the manufacturer’s preferred risk-sharing 
agreement. 𝑦𝐿 and 𝑦𝐻 represent a board treatment eligibility and a targeted treatment 
eligibility, respectively, which are used in Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.3. 
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sufficiently high, the payer prefers a CER, but the manufacturer prefers a PVA (Region 
D). When drug price is intermediate, the two parties may prefer the same risk-sharing 
agreement. For example, both parties prefer a PVA when treatment eligibility is broad 
(i.e., 𝑦 is low; Region C); and both parties prefer a CER when treatment eligibility is 
targeted (i.e., 𝑦 is high; Region B).  
To explain the logic behind Figure 2.1, we present additional details in Figure 2.2 
and Figure 2.3 with different values of 𝑦 (i.e., 𝑦𝐿 and 𝑦𝐻  in Figure 2.1). Figure 2.2 shows 
the optimal values for the manufacturer’s marketing effort (𝑚∗) and several calculated 
quantities (𝑄𝑖∗, 𝐵𝑖∗ and 𝑆𝑖∗, 𝑖 ∈ {𝑃𝑉𝐴, 𝐶𝐸𝑅}) with respect to the drug price (𝑝). Figure 
2.2.a and b show that with both broad (𝑦 is small) and targeted (𝑦 is large) treatment 
eligibilities, the optimal marketing effort in a PVA is greater than that in a CER 
(𝑚𝑃𝑉𝐴∗ > 𝑚𝐶𝐸𝑅∗), the optimal marketing effort in a PVA is increasing in the drug price, 
and the optimal marketing effort in a CER is non-monotonic (increasing then decreasing) 
in the drug price. Figure 2.2.c to f show that the optimal total sales (𝑄𝑖∗) and health 
benefit (𝐵𝑖∗) of the new drug have the same trend as the optimal marketing effort.  
Figure 2.2.g and h show that the optimal rebate in a PVA is always positive 
(𝑆𝑃𝑉𝐴∗ > 0). This is because the manufacturer pays a rebate to the payer when there are 
excessive sales, but it does not receive any reward from the payer if the total sales is 
below the volume threshold. The optimal rebate in a CER is zero (𝑆𝐶𝐸𝑅∗ = 0) when drug 
price is sufficiently low, and it is positive (𝑆𝐶𝐸𝑅∗ > 0) and increasing rapidly in drug 
price when drug price is sufficiently high. This is because when drug price is low, there is 
a higher chance that the monetary value of the total health benefit exceeds the payer’s 
costs (𝜆𝑏 > (𝑝 − 𝑐𝑃 − 𝑎𝑃
𝐶𝐸𝑅)𝑞) so that the manufacturer does not pay a rebate. In other 
words, the optimal rebate in a PVA is less than that in a CER (𝑆𝑃𝑉𝐴∗ < 𝑆𝐶𝐸𝑅∗) when drug 
price is low, and the optimal rebate in a PVA is greater than that in a CER (𝑆𝑃𝑉𝐴∗ >
𝑆𝐶𝐸𝑅∗) when drug price is high. Because the rebate can be considered as the payer’s 
revenue and the manufacturer’s cost, the payer prefers a PVA and the manufacturer 
prefers a CER when drug price is low, and the payer prefers a CER and the manufacturer 
prefers a PVA when drug price is high (this can be seen from Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.3). 
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𝒚 is Small 𝒚 is Large 
𝒎𝒊∗ 
  
 (a) (b) 
𝑸𝒊∗ 
  
 (c) (d) 
𝑩𝒊∗ 
  
 (e) (f) 
𝑺𝒊∗ 
  
 (g) (h) 
  
Figure 2.2: Optimal values with respect to the drug price (𝑝). (a), (c), (e) and (g): the 
treatment eligibility (𝑦) is small, i.e., 𝑦 = 𝑦𝐿 in Figure 2.1; (b), (d), (f) and (h): 𝑦 is 
large, i.e., 𝑦 = 𝑦𝐻 in Figure 2.1. 
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Figure 2.3 shows the optimal payoff for the two parties (𝜋𝑃
𝑖∗ and 𝜋𝑀
𝑖∗) with respect 
to the drug price. Let 𝑝𝑃 be the payer’s switching price where the payer’s preferred 
contract switches from a PVA to a CER. Let 𝑝𝑀 be the manufacturer’s switching price 
where the manufacturer’s preferred contract switches from a CER to a PVA. Define 
switching patients as patients who are not eligible for the new drug according to the 
clinical guideline but are treated with the new drug due to marketing effort, i.e., patients 
with an incremental health benefit 𝛽 ∈ [𝑦 − 𝑚, 𝑦). With a broad treatment eligibility, the 
total incremental health benefit from the switching patients is small, which reduces the 
manufacturer’s switching price and creates a range for a PVA to be preferred by the two 
parties. With a targeted treatment eligibility, the total incremental health benefit from the 
switching patients is large. This allows a health outcome-based contract to be preferred 
 𝒚 is Small 𝒚 is Large 
𝝅𝑷
𝒊∗ 
  
 (a) (b) 
𝝅𝑴
𝒊∗  
  
 (c) (d) 
  
Figure 2.3: The optimal profits for the two parties (𝜋𝑃
𝑖∗ and 𝜋𝑀
𝑖∗, 𝑖 ∈ {𝑃𝑉𝐴, 𝐶𝐸𝑅}) with 
respect to the drug price 𝑝. (a) and (c): the treatment eligibility (𝑦) is small, i.e., 𝑦 = 𝑦𝐿 
in Figure 2.1; (b) and (d): 𝑦 is large, i.e., 𝑦 = 𝑦𝐻 in Figure 2.1. 
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by the manufacturer up to a higher switching price, which creates a range for a CER to be 
preferred by the two parties.  
We perform robustness checks on the assumptions made for model tractability. 
When relaxing the assumption on a bounded uniform distribution and assuming a normal 
distribution for 𝛽 and 𝜖, the general insights are the same as presented here. If the 
administration cost is sufficiently high, then there is no region where both parties prefer a 
PVA, and the general insights for the other three regions remain the same. 
 Discussion 
In this article, we compare the performance of a sales volume-based agreement and a 
cost-effectiveness-based contract between a payer and a manufacturer as uncertainties in 
sales volume and cost-effectiveness co-exist in many situations. We find the conditions 
under which the two parties agree or disagree on the preferred contract. Our study 
suggests that neither of the two risk-sharing agreements is always preferred by both 
parties. In general, the payer prefers a PVA but the manufacturer prefers a CER when 
price is much lower than the payer’s willingness to pay. With a sufficiently high drug 
price, the payer prefers a CER but the manufacturer prefers a PVA. When price is 
intermediate, the two parties may prefer the same contract depending on the 
combinations of parameters. For example, both parties may prefer a CER with a broad 
treatment eligibility and prefer a PVA with a targeted treatment eligibility.  
As observed, the two parties may prefer the same contract under certain 
circumstances. When choosing properly under these circumstances, a risk-sharing 
agreement can re-distribute risks between the two parties and create an all-win situation: 
for the payer, both the total health benefit and the cost to the health care system are taken 
into consideration and maximized; for the manufacturer, market access is accelerated, 
profit and the resulting incentives for future investment in new drug development are 
protected; for the patients, as some payer may only list a drug on the formulary with a 
risk-sharing agreement (Morgan, Thomson, Daw, & Friesen, 2013) due to unforeseeable 
risks and health budget constraints, such a contract also accelerates patients’ access to 
new drugs and improve patients’ welfare. 
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An important policy implication is that neither risk-sharing agreement is a 
universal solution that can be applied in all situations, and payers should not always stick 
to one type of agreement. For example, some payers prefer to use a volume-based 
agreement for ease of negotiation and implementation, and this study indicates that 
payers may be better off by applying a value-based risk-sharing agreement in some cases. 
There are some limitations to this study. We compare a value-based risk-sharing 
agreement (a CER) and a volume-based risk-sharing agreement (a PVA). Future studies 
may consider other types of risk-sharing agreements to increase options for the two 
parties. We assume the price is set exogenously, but it could be negotiated between the 
two parties or a decision variable of either party depending on their power. We assume all 
parameters are publicly known and did not consider any information asymmetry. 
However, some key parameters of the health benefit could be one party’s private 
information. For example, the manufacturer may have a better knowledge of the type of 
distribution of health benefit through clinical trials, or the payer may have a better 
knowledge of the information through investigation or research. We assume the sales 
limit in a PVA is set equal to the expected sales. Future studies may consider other forms 
or treat it as either party’s decision. We assume that the treatment eligibility is set in 
clinical guidelines by a third-party organization and it is an exogenous parameter that 
does not depend on other parameters. One possible extension is to assume that the 
treatment eligibility threshold depends on the drug price or to endogenize the treatment 
eligibility threshold as the payer’s decision.  
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Chapter 3  
3 Essay 2: Mitigating Drug Shortages: Should Hospitals 
Use Their Own Drug Manufacturer? 
 Introduction 
Drug shortages are a significant problem in many countries in recent years (Hall et al., 
2013). In 2018, the FDA in the US stated that there is an increase in drug shortage 
occurrences as well as a spike in the intensity and duration of each shortage (Brennan, 
2018), and the American Medical Association (AMA) declared that drug shortages pose 
an urgent public health crisis (American Medical Association, 2018). According to the 
American Society of Health-System Pharmacists, the US experienced shortages for 182 
drugs and pharmaceutical supplies in June 2018, including IV bags, injectable 
painkillers, anesthetics, and cancer drugs. Drug shortages not only have clinical 
consequences such as inferior outcomes, increased morbidity and mortality, but can also 
add significant costs to health care systems due to replacement cost and staff time 
(Alevizakos et al., 2016; Fox et al., 2014; Hedman, 2016).  
 Shortages are caused by a variety of factors, such as manufacturing problems 
(e.g., quality problems, production delays), natural disasters, difficulties in acquiring raw 
materials, sudden increases in demand, and discontinuation by a manufacturer (De 
Weerdt et al., 2015; Fox et al., 2014; Malacos, 2019). According to the University of 
Utah Drug Information Service, among all the drug shortages in the United States in 
2018, 51% of the causes are unknown, 30% of shortages are caused by manufacturing 
reasons, and other direct causes account for smaller proportions ranging from 1% to 10% 
(Malacos, 2019). Shortages may also be caused by underlying factors such as low-price 
and low-profit margin (e.g., generic drugs), production difficulties, regulatory issues, and 
high market concentration (Blank, 2018; Chabner, 2011; Jia and Zhao, 2017; Woodcock 
and Wosinska, 2013).  
 To mitigate drug shortages, government agencies, such as the FDA in the US, are 
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taking actions to collaborate with the pharmaceutical industry by sharing information, 
searching for alternative manufacturers, or importing critical drugs in shortage directly 
from other overseas manufacturers (Food and Drug Administration, 2018). However, 
drug shortages are still prevalent, even for some commonplace generic drugs and 
lifesaving drugs. Several US health organizations have formed an alliance and 
established a not-for-profit generic drug company named “Civica Rx” 
(https://civicarx.org/) in 2018, to manufacture certain generic medicines (Kodjak, 2018; 
Tirrell, 2018). In December 2019, 18 Civica Rx medications are in production, and more 
than 45 health systems are members of Civica Rx, representing more than 1,200 US 
hospitals and over 30 percent of all licensed US hospital beds (Civica Rx, 2019, 2020). 
This might be a potential way to ease the market concentration on the generic drug 
market and serve as an additional source or redundancy for drug supply. 
 Motivated by this initiative, our research investigates circumstances under which 
hospitals would benefit from owning an in-house pharmaceutical manufacturer, and the 
impacts on the external manufacturers. We formulate the problem using a supply chain 
management framework. We assume that drug shortages are a result of supply 
uncertainty at manufacturing facilities, since manufacturing problems are a major cause 
of drug shortages. We focus on hospital’ sourcing strategies to mitigate drug shortages. 
There has been substantial research on mitigating supply disruptions with 
different sourcing strategies in both pharmaceutical and non-pharmaceutical supply 
chains. However, the majority of studies have focused on buyers’ decisions, and ignore 
the interactions between suppliers and buyers. In the setting of the establishment of 
Civica Rx, due to the large number of hospitals in the alliance and their potential 
influential power in the supply chain, we decide to construct a model to analyze the 
interactions between the hospitals and the external pharmaceutical manufacturers. In our 
model, we assume that a hospital, representing the alliance of all hospitals who 
established Civica Rx, could procure a drug through two sources (dual-sourcing): an 
external pharmaceutical manufacturer, and a hospital-owned manufacturer (referred to as 
the in-house producer). We also assume that the hospital has a second chance to make 
emergency production (contingent sourcing) if needed. Our assumption on a single 
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external pharmaceutical manufacturer is due to the high market concentration on the 
generic drug market, and often there are very few or even a single manufacturer 
producing a particular generic drug in the US market (Blank, 2018).  
We analyze the hospital’s ordering and production decisions and the external 
manufacturer’s production decision with the presence of supply uncertainty. We first 
solve a single-period model analytically. We then propose two long-term inventory 
management policies (a Target Inventory Policy and a Scale Factor Policy), and we 
evaluate the performance of the two policies in the multi-period setting with a heuristic.  
Our study reveals several findings. First, the hospital would benefit from using an 
in-house manufacturer to make regular production if the in-house production cost is low, 
the external manufacturer’s yield rate is low, or the external manufacturer’s yield is 
highly uncertain. Second, the hospital should make use of emergency production at the 
in-house producer, if the emergency production cost is relatively low compared with the 
revenue of the drug and the shortage cost. Third, we show that the expected shortage 
quantity can be reduced if the hospital operates an in-house producer as her regular 
source and/or contingent source. 
In addition, the analysis shows that the two inventory management policies (the 
Target Inventory Policy and the Scale Factor Policy) have a comparable performance for 
the hospital. Both policies perform well under different parameters of the yield rate, 
indicating that the hospital can use either policy as the long-term inventory management 
policy. In contrast, the manufacturer’s yield uncertainty has a larger impact on its own 
profit than that on the hospital’s profit in the long term. If the yield rate decreases (i.e., 
the mean of yield rate decreases) or the yield uncertainty increases (the variance of yield 
rate increases), then the manufacturer’s long-term profit under each inventory 
management policy decreases more rapidly than the hospital’s profit does. This means 
that it is beneficial for the manufacturer to make investments in improving his yield rate 
and reliability.  
Our study has important implications for hospitals’ drug procurement practices. 
Our analysis indicates that hospitals should trade-off between the procurement cost and 
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other factors (e.g., shortage cost of the drug, and reliability of different suppliers), instead 
of focusing only on procurement costs to choose the cheapest supplier, as observed in 
drug procurement practices in reality. Considering the long-term impact on the external 
manufacturers and the drug supply chain, hospitals should also procure drugs from both 
the internal and external manufacturers to avoid driving out the external manufacturers 
from the market. 
 Literature Review 
Many early studies (e.g., Gerchak et al. (1988) and Henig and Gerchak (1990)) showed 
that the optimal periodic review policy in the presence of yield uncertainty is non-order-
up-to type, which requires different analysis from the models in which only demand is 
uncertain. Therefore, we investigate studies explicitly dealt with supply uncertainties. We 
survey three streams of literature: (1) mitigating supply uncertainty with lot sizing and 
sourcing strategies; (2) supply uncertainty with multiple decision-makers; (3) drug 
shortages from a pharmaceutical supply chain perspective. Literature that falls in two or 
more categories will be included in the most relevant category.  
3.2.1. Mitigating supply uncertainty with lot sizing and sourcing 
strategies  
Yano and Lee (1995) provided a comprehensive review of lot-sizing problems with yield 
uncertainty, including different types for yield randomness (binomial, stochastically 
proportional, and interrupted geometric, etc.) and different time horizons (single-period, 
multi-periods). Khouja (1999) summarized extensions for single period newsvendor 
problem (random demand) in 11 categories, including extensions to random yields. 
Agrawal and Nahmias (1997) studied the optimal order size and the optimal number of 
suppliers under deterministic demand and yield uncertainty. Their model addressed a key 
trade-off: small order from many suppliers can reduce yield uncertainty, but fixed costs 
associated with each supplier provides a penalty for having a large number of suppliers.  
 Inderfurth (2004) studied a single-period inventory problem with random yield 
and random demand, and the author derived analytical solutions with uniform 
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distributions. The study found that depending on the parameter combinations, the optimal 
policy can be a non-linear type. Rekik et al. (2007) extended Inderfurth (2004) by 
considering two types of errors: additive errors and multiplicative errors. The authors 
stated that results in earlier literature are only valid for a certain range of parameters, and 
they derived closed-form solutions for all values of parameters with the uniform 
distribution. Tomlin (2006) studied a firm’s optimal sourcing strategy for mitigating 
supply disruption, which is similar to our study and will be elaborated in section 3.2.4.  
Li et al. (2010) studied a single period supply chain with a single retailer and two 
suppliers with supply disruption. This study is also similar to our study and will be 
elaborated on in section 3.2.4. Xanthopoulos et al. (2012) studied a single-period 
newsvendor-type (stochastic demand) model with dual-sourcing supply chain with or 
without service level constraints. The authors studied a retailer’s optimal sourcing 
strategy from two suppliers both of whom are susceptible to supply disruption risk and 
examined both risk neutral and risk-averse decision-makers. Hou et al. (2017) studied a 
single period model consists of a buyer, a main supplier and a backup supplier. The main 
supplier is prone to supply disruption, and the buyer could sign a capacity reservation 
contract with the backup supplier to mitigate supply risk. This study also has the feature 
of multiple decision-makers. 
3.2.2. Supply uncertainty with multiple decision-makers 
Many studies on supply uncertainty focus on the optimal decision(s) by a single decision-
maker. Since we study the interaction between a hospital and an external manufacturer in 
our model, we also survey supply uncertainty with multiple decision-makers. He and 
Zhang (2008) studied supply chain with one supplier and one retailer under random yield 
and random demand. The authors proposed several risk-sharing contracts and found that 
under certain conditions, random yield may enhance the supply chain performance and 
decrease the double marginalization effect. Keren (2009) studied a two-tier supply chain 
with one retailer and one supplier with supply uncertainty, which will be discussed and 
compared with our study in section 3.2.4.  
32 
 
 Güler and Keskin (2013) analyzed supply chain coordination under random yield 
and random demand. They found that the randomness in the yield does not change the 
coordination ability of the contracts, including wholesale price, buy-back, revenue share, 
quantity discount, and quantity flexibility, but affects the values of the contract 
parameters. Chen and Yang (2014) studied a supply chain in which a buyer procures 
from a supplier with a random yield and has an opportunity to source from an emergency 
backup supplier. The authors developed two Stackelberg games: a buyer-Stackelberg 
model (the buyer moves first) and a supplier-Stackelberg model (the supplier moves 
first).  
 Cai et al. (2017) studied contracts to coordinate a vendor-managed inventory 
(VMI) supply chain with one retailer and one unreliable supplier. The authors compared 
two contracts: an option contract, and a subsidy contract. Cai et al. (2019) studied supply 
chain coordination with yield uncertainty and downside risk aversion. The authors 
examined a supplier led supply chain, and a buyer led supply chain and shown that a 
revenue-sharing contract can coordinate both supply chains.  
3.2.3 Drug shortages from a supply chain perspective 
Chick et al. (2008) studied an influenza vaccination supply chain with a government and 
a manufacturer under random yield. The authors constructed a joint epidemic and supply 
chain model and proposed a variant of the cost-sharing contract, which could coordinate 
the supply chain and hence improve the supply of vaccines. Two studies investigated 
inventory management strategies for an integrated pharmaceutical supply chain 
consisting of a hospital and a pharmaceutical company, both assuming that the 
pharmaceutical company and the hospital cooperate and jointly derive a coordinated 
supply chain decision system (Priyan and Uthayakumar, 2014; Uthayakumar and Priyan, 
2013).  
Taylor and Xiao (2014) investigated a donor’s optimal subsidy decision to 
improve the availability and affordability of recommended malaria drugs provided by the 
private-sector in some developing countries. The authors found that the donor should 
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only subsidize the purchases of retailers for malaria drugs and should not subsidize their 
sales. Saedi et al. (2016) presented a stochastic optimization model (a continuous time 
Markov chain model) to find a hospital’s optimal stock levels and order quantity levels 
that minimize the impact of drug shortages in the presence of supply disruptions and 
stochastic demand. The authors analyzed the balance point among substitutable drugs, 
considering important factors (e.g., the space occupied by an item, disruption rates, and 
recovery rate), and shown that the proposed scheme outperforms the current policies in 
many key aspects.  
Jia and Zhao (2017) developed a model to capture the objectives of key supply 
chain parties, and investigated Pareto-improving contracts through price increases paired 
with strengthened failure-to-supply clauses. The authors verified the model results using 
real data of several drugs undergoing shortages. Tucker et al. (2019) constructed a multi-
stage stochastic program model to study a pharmaceutical company’s optimal decision 
on vulnerable or resilient supply chains under supply disruption and studied the impacts 
of proposed drug shortage mitigating policies on the supply chain decisions. The authors 
found that it may be optimal for pharmaceutical companies to keep vulnerable supply 
chains for certain types of low profit margin drugs, and redundancy regulations would be 
at least as efficient as market-based solutions. 
3.2.4. The Contribution of this Research 
Our research is most similar to three previous studies, but with important differences. 
Table 3.1 categorizes the three similar studies and our study along two important 
dimensions: the number of decision-makers and the number of sources. Tomlin (2006) 
studied a firm’s optimal sourcing strategy for mitigating supply disruption. The author 
considered an infinite-horizon, periodic-review inventory system with stochastic demand, 
Table 3.1: Comparison of our study with similar literature discussed in section 3.2.4 
 Single sourcing Multiple sourcing 
Single decision-maker 
 
Tomlin (2006) 
Multiple decision-makers Keren (2009)  Li et al. (2010); Our study 
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and studied a dual-sourcing strategy in which a firm could source from two suppliers: an 
unreliable but cheaper supplier, and a reliable but more expensive supplier. Their study 
and our study are similar in terms of the number of suppliers. However, the firm is the 
only decision-maker in Tomlin (2006), whereas we construct a game-theoretic model 
consisting of two interactive decision-makers.  
Keren (2009) studied a two-tier supply chain with one supplier and one retailer, 
using a single-period model with deterministic demand and random supply. Keren (2009) 
and our study are similar in terms of the multi-decision-maker setting (game-theoretic 
model). However, the main difference is that Keren (2009) considered a single source of 
supply, whereas our study considers a dual sourcing strategy. Another difference is that 
Keren (2009) only considered a single-period model, whereas our study analyzes both a 
single-period setting and a multi-period setting.  
Li et al. (2010)  constructed a supply chain consisting of one retailer, two 
suppliers unreliable supply, and one spot market for emergency replenishment. The multi 
decision-maker setting in their study is similar to our model. However, a major 
difference is that   Li et al. (2010) focused on the pricing strategies of suppliers, whereas 
our study focuses on the production decisions of the suppliers (manufacturing facilities) 
and we assume that all prices are exogenous. Another difference is that Li et al. (2010) 
constructed a single-period model, whereas our study analyzes both a single-period 
setting and a multi-period setting. 
In summary, our study differs from existing literature by analyzing a hospital’s 
dual sourcing strategy and contingent sourcing strategy on mitigating drug shortages, 
while taking into consideration the interactions between the hospital and the 
manufacturer and capturing the multi-period feature of many drug supply chains. 
 Model 
We develop a multi-period model to analyze the interaction between a hospital (H, she) 
and an external pharmaceutical manufacturer (M, he). Let 𝑖 be the index for the two 
decision-makers, 𝑖 = 𝐻,𝑀. We adopt the convention that the notation 𝐴+ = max{0, 𝐴}, 
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and 𝐸[∙] denotes the expected value. The terms “increasing” and “decreasing” are used in 
a weak sense, i.e., “increasing” indicates “non-decreasing” and “decreasing” indicates 
“non-increasing”. All model notation is summarized in Table 3.2.  
Let 𝑇 be the total number of periods, and 𝑡 = 1,… , 𝑇 be the index for each 
period. We assume the hospital has a deterministic and static demand in each period (i.e., 
the same constant demand in each period), 𝐷. This is because for many pharmaceutical 
Table 3.2: Summary of notation 
Symbol Description 
Decisions  
𝑞𝑀𝑡 The hospital’s order quantity from the manufacturer M in period 𝑡 
𝑞𝑅𝑡 The hospital’s in-house production quantity in the regular procurement 
phase in period 𝑡 
𝑞𝐸𝑡 The hospital’s in-house production quantity in the emergency 
procurement phase-in period 𝑡 
𝑥𝑀𝑡 The manufacturer’s planned production quantity in period 𝑡 
Random Variable 
𝑢𝑡 The manufacturer’s random yield rate in period 𝑡  
Parameters  
𝑖 Index for the players and systems: 𝑖 = 𝑀 for the manufacturer; 𝑖 = 𝐻 
for the hospital; 𝑖 = 𝐶  for the centralized system; 𝑖 = 𝑇  for the total 
system in a decentralized setting  
𝑡 Index for the time periods, 𝑡 = 1,… , 𝑇 
𝑇 Total number of time periods 
𝑎, 𝑏 The lower and upper bounds of 𝑢𝑡 
𝑓(∙), 𝐹(∙) PDF and CDF of 𝑢𝑡 
𝜇 The mean of 𝑢𝑡 
𝜎2 The variance of 𝑢𝑡 
𝐷 The hospital’s deterministic and static demand for the drug 
𝑧𝑖𝑡 The initial inventory level of player 𝑖 at the beginning of period 𝑡  
𝑟 The hospital’s unit revenue  
𝑐𝑅 The hospital’s unit regular in-house production cost 
𝑐𝐸 The hospital’s unit emergency in-house production cost 
𝑐𝑀 The manufacturer’s unit production cost 
𝑤 The manufacturer’s unit wholesale price 
ℎ𝑖 The unit holding cost of player 𝑖 
𝑠𝑖 The unit shortage cost of player 𝑖 
Calculated Quantities 
𝑦𝑡 Quantity delivered from M to H in period 𝑡 , 𝑦𝑡 = min{𝑞𝑀𝑡, 𝑧𝑀𝑡 +
𝑢𝑡𝑥𝑀𝑡}  
𝛱𝑖𝑡 The expected profit of player 𝑖 in period 𝑡 
𝛤𝑖𝑡 The optimal expected total profit of player 𝑖 from period 𝑡 onward 
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products, the demand generally remains stable over time, and changes in demand have 
not been identified as a major contributing factor for drug shortages (Fox et al., 2014). 
We assume the hospital uses a dual-sourcing strategy, making use of an in-house 
producer who is reliable, and the external manufacturer (the manufacturer hereafter) who 
is subject to a random yield. 
We assume the manufacturer faces stochastically proportional yield in each 
period with rates 𝑢1, … , 𝑢𝑇, which are continuous random variables independent and 
identically distributed (i.i.d.) between 𝑎 and 𝑏, 0 ≤ 𝑎 < 𝑏 ≤ 1, with a probability density 
function (PDF) 𝑓(∙) and a cumulative distribution function (CDF) 𝐹(∙). This assumption 
is commonly used in studies involving manufacturing yields such as Inderfurth (2004) 
and Keren (2009). 
Since one important reason why the hospital owns an in-house producer is to 
produce the drug in a more reliable way, we assume the in-house producer has a perfect 
yield rate in the basic model. For example, some manufacturers produce drugs using 
equipment that is more than 50 years old, which are vulnerable to manufacturing 
problems (Woodcock and Wosinska, 2013), and the hospital’s newly established in-
house producer may have a better yield rate than the manufacturer because of the 
advanced technology, better maintenance, or newer equipment. We also solve two 
extensions in which the in-house producer has a constant yield loss and a random yield 
rate, respectively. We assume the wholesale price of the drug is exogenous and fixed. 
Although drug prices may increase after a drug shortage (Alevizakos et al., 2016), our 
model applies to the situation where drug price is regulated and is not likely to be a 
decision or change in the short run, which is the case in many countries (Hou et al., 
2017). 
Let 𝑧𝑖𝑡 be the initial inventory of player 𝑖 at the beginning of period 𝑡, which 
equals the leftover stock at the end of the previous period, with 𝑧𝑖1 = 0, 𝑖 = 𝐻,𝑀. In 
each period, the hospital has two procurement phases: a regular procurement phase 
followed by an emergency procurement phase. We define three decision making stages 
from stage 1 to stage 3 in each period. At the beginning of stage 1 in period 𝑡, the 
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hospital makes two decisions: the in-house production quantity, 𝑞𝑅𝑡, and the order 
quantity from the manufacturer, 𝑞𝑀𝑡. At the beginning of stage 2, for a given 𝑞𝑀𝑡, the 
manufacturer chooses his planned production quantity 𝑥𝑀𝑡. The two manufacturing 
facilities then produce, and the manufacturer’s yield rate is realized. Let 𝑐𝑅 and 𝑐𝑀 be the 
unit production cost for the planned production quantity in the regular procurement phase 
for the hospital and the manufacturer, respectively. At the end of stage 2, the hospital 
receives regular replenishment from the two manufacturing facilities: the in-house 
producer delivers 𝑞𝑅𝑡 units; the manufacturer delivers 𝑦𝑡 units,𝑦𝑡 = min{𝑞𝑀𝑡, 𝑧𝑀𝑡 +
𝑢𝑡𝑥𝑀𝑡}, and charges a fixed wholesale price 𝑤 > 𝑐𝑀. For any unfulfilled order quantity 
(𝑞𝑀𝑡 − 𝑧𝑀𝑡 − 𝑢𝑡𝑥𝑀𝑡)
+, the manufacturer incurs a unit shortage cost, 𝑠𝑀 ≥ 0. The 
shortage cost may include penalty costs, loss of reputation, or loss of future sales to the 
hospital (Keren, 2009). For any leftover quantity (𝑧𝑀𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡𝑥𝑀𝑡 − 𝑞𝑀𝑡)
+, the 
manufacturer incurs a unit holding cost, ℎ𝑀 > 0 (ℎ𝑀 < 0 may present a unit salvage 
value, if there exists a secondary market). To avoid infinite profit, we assume that 𝑐𝑀 >
−ℎ𝑀 (the salvage value is less than the production cost). 
At the end of the regular procurement phase, the hospital may still be in short 
supply of the drug. We assume that the in-house producer can make emergency 
production for the hospital if needed because the hospital’s main motivation to own the 
in-house producer is to mitigate drug shortages and the in-house producer may be more 
willing to allocate emergency capacity for the hospital. At the beginning of the 
emergency production phase, the hospital chooses the emergency production quantity 𝑞𝐸𝑡 
(stage 3). Emergency production occurs at a unit production cost 𝑐𝐸, and the hospital 
receives emergency replenishment from the in-house producer. Finally, demand occurs, 
which will be satisfied with the hospital available inventory, and all revenue and costs 
are realized.  
We assume 𝑐𝐸 > 𝑐𝑅 since emergency production may require overtime working 
hours and/or expedited delivery of raw materials. Note that we do not impose any 
assumptions on the relationship between 𝑤 and the hospital’s in-house production costs 
(𝑐𝑅 and 𝑐𝐸) since the hospital may or may not have advantages in the production cost 
depending on the specific drug. For drugs with a low price and low profit margin for the 
38 
 
manufacturer, the hospital’s in-house production cost may be higher than the 
manufacturer’s wholesale price. For drugs with a high price and high profit margin for 
the manufacturer, the hospital may have an advantage in the in-house production cost. 
At the end of the emergency procurement phase, the hospital incurs a unit 
shortage cost 𝑠𝐻 ≥ 0 for unfulfilled demand. The shortage cost 𝑠𝐻  should include all 
costs caused by the unavailability of the drug that the hospital cares about. For example, 
if an alternative drug is available, then the difference in drug price and related service 
fees between the alternative drug and the original drug should be included in 𝑠𝐻. If there 
is no alternative drug and a shortage of the drug leads to canceled surgeries, then 𝑠𝐻 
should include the fees for the surgery and subsequent hospital stay. 𝑠𝐻 should also 
include staff time on searching for alternative drugs, communicating with patients, and 
other activities for managing shortages. Therefore, 𝑠𝐻 can be very high, even 
significantly higher than the hospital’s unit revenue for the drug, 𝑟. The unit revenue is 
the amount that patients are billed for receiving the drug in the hospital. The hospital 
incurs a unit holding cost ℎ𝐻 > 0 for leftover stocks (ℎ𝐻 < 0 may present a unit salvage 
value if there is a secondary market). To avoid infinite profit, we assume 𝑤 and 𝑐𝑅 are 
each greater than −ℎ𝐻. To avoid a trivial solution, we assume that at least one of 𝑤 and 
𝑐𝑅 are less than 𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻, otherwise, the hospital would never procure or produce the drug. 
We assume that all parameters are known by all parties. The sequence of events is 
illustrated in Figure 3.1. Let 𝛱𝑖𝑡 be the expected profit of player 𝑖 in period 𝑡, which is 
calculated as follows. 
𝛱𝐻𝑡(𝑞𝑀𝑡, 𝑞𝑅𝑡, 𝑞𝐸𝑡)
= 𝐸[𝑟min{𝐷, 𝑧𝐻𝑡 + 𝑞𝑅𝑡 + 𝑦𝑡 + 𝑞𝐸𝑡} − 𝑤𝑦𝑡 − 𝑐𝑅𝑞𝑅𝑡 − 𝑐𝐸𝑞𝐸𝑡
− ℎ𝐻(𝑧𝐻𝑡 + 𝑞𝑅𝑡 + 𝑦𝑡 + 𝑞𝐸𝑡 −𝐷)
+
− 𝑠𝐻(𝐷 − 𝑧𝐻𝑡 − 𝑞𝑅𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡 − 𝑞𝐸𝑡)
+] 
 
(3.1) 
𝛱𝑀𝑡(𝑥𝑀𝑡) = 𝐸[𝑤𝑦𝑡 − 𝑐𝑀𝑥𝑀𝑡 − ℎ𝑀(𝑧𝑀𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡𝑥𝑀𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡)
− 𝑠𝑀(𝑞𝑀𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡)] 
(3.2) 
The hospital’s expected profit (Equation 3.1) includes the revenue from the drug, 
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the procurement cost paid to the manufacturer, the in-house regular production cost, the 
emergency production costs, the shortage cost, and the holding cost. The manufacturer’s 
profit function (Equation 3.2) includes the revenue, the production cost, the holding cost, 
and the shortage cost.  
Let 𝛤𝑖𝑡(𝑧𝑖𝑡) be the optimal total expected profit of player 𝑖 from period 𝑡 onward 
(i.e., the value function) for any initial inventory 𝑧𝑖𝑡, which is formulated as follows. 
 𝛤𝐻𝑡(𝑧𝐻𝑡) = max 
𝑞𝑅𝑡,𝑞𝑀𝑡,𝑞𝐸𝑡≥0
𝛱𝐻𝑡(𝑧𝐻𝑡, 𝑞𝑅𝑡, 𝑞𝑀𝑡 , 𝑞𝐸𝑡) + 𝛿𝐸(𝛤𝐻𝑡+1(𝑧𝐻𝑡+1))   (3.3) 
𝛤𝑀𝑡(𝑧𝑀𝑡)  = max
𝑥𝑀𝑡≥0
𝛱𝑀𝑡(𝑧𝑀𝑡, 𝑥𝑀𝑡) + 𝛿𝐸(𝛤𝑀𝑡+1(𝑧𝑀𝑡+1)) (3.4) 
Where 𝛿 is a discount factor for the value of time. The initial inventory of player 𝑖 
in period 𝑡 + 1 is the leftover inventory in period 𝑡, i.e., 𝑧𝐻𝑡+1 = (𝑞𝑅𝑡 + 𝑦𝑡 + 𝑞𝐸𝑡 −𝐷)
+, 
and 𝑧𝑀𝑡+1 = (𝑧𝑀𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡𝑥𝑀𝑡 − 𝑞𝑀𝑡)
+.  
Our model is a multi-stage stochastic programming, with the two parties’ 
sequential and iterative decision-making process in each period. Although this model 
setting captures the important features of a pharmaceutical supply chain, we are not able 
to solve it analytically in the original multi-period setting. Therefore, we first solve a 
single-period model and obtain closed-form solutions to generate insights into the 
structure of the two player’s optimal production plans. We then propose two long-term 
inventory management policies and evaluate the performance of the two policies using a 
heuristic in the multi-period setting.  
Figure 3.1: The sequence of events in period 𝑡 
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 Single-Period Analysis 
We first solve a single-period model. We drop the subscript for the time period, 𝑡, in this 
section. Similar to other studies (Keren, 2009; Li et al., 2012), we assume that the 
manufacturer’s yield rate 𝑢 is uniformly distributed between 𝑎 and 𝑏. This assumption 
allows us to derive close-form solutions and examine some main properties of the 
hospital’s optimal procurement plan. We also verified that the main results hold under 
other distributions, such as beta distributions and truncated normal distributions. 
Therefore, our main results are robust and not distribution specific. We first solve a 
centralized system with dual sourcing as the benchmark for the best case. Next, we solve 
a decentralized system with dual sourcing.  
3.4.1 Centralized System with Dual Sourcing  
In a centralized system with dual sourcing (Model C, the centralized system), we 
envision a single integrated system (Figure 3.2) consisting of the hospital and the two 
manufacturing facilities. We continue to refer to the two manufacturing facilities as the 
manufacturer and the in-house producer in this section, even though they are part of an 
integrated system. A central planner makes decisions to maximize the total profit in this 
system. 
The centralized system differs from the decentralized system in several aspects. 
Figure 3.2: A schematic illustration of the centralized system 
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The first difference is the decision variables in each system. The decision variables in the 
centralized system are 𝑞𝑅 , 𝑥𝑀 and 𝑞𝐸. 𝑞𝑀 is no longer a decision because it is used to 
determine the transfer payment between players within the system. The second difference 
is the sequence of decisions. Under a centralized system, the order of decision sequence 
does not matter because the decisions are made by the same decision-maker. Therefore, 
the central planner chooses 𝑞𝑅 and 𝑥𝑀 simultaneously in the regular procurement phase, 
and he chooses the emergency production quantity 𝑞𝐸 in the emergency procurement 
phase. 
Several parameters are also different in the two systems. Let 𝑧𝐶 = 𝑧𝐻 + 𝑧𝑀 be the 
total initial inventory in the centralized system, which can be accessed by the central 
planner at the beginning of the period. Let 𝑠𝐶 = 𝑠𝐻 be the unit shortage cost for the 
centralized system for unfulfilled demand. This is because 𝑠𝑀 can be interpreted as the 
manufacturer’s loss of reputation and future sales to the hospital, which is within the 
integrated system. Let ℎ𝐶 = min{ℎ𝐻, ℎ𝑀} be the holding cost in the centralized system, 
i.e., the leftover stocks will be stored in the less expensive facility. All other parameters 
and sequence of events are the same as the decentralized system. 
Let 𝛱𝐶 be the expected profit for the centralized system. Unlike the centralized 
system in much of the supply chain literature, the profit in our integrated system is not 
simply the sum of the two parties’ profit functions. This is because the central planner’s 
production quantities at the two manufacturing facilities are embedded in the min and 
max functions in 𝛱𝐶, which cannot be obtained by summing up the hospital and the 
manufacturer’s profit functions together. 𝛱𝐶  is given by: 
𝛱𝐶(𝑞𝑅 , 𝑥𝑀 , 𝑞𝐸) = 𝐸[𝑟min{𝐷, 𝑧𝐶 + 𝑞𝑅 + 𝑢 𝑥𝑀 + 𝑞𝐸} − 𝑐𝑀𝑥𝑀 − 𝑐𝑅𝑞𝑅 − 𝑐𝐸𝑞𝐸
− ℎ𝐶 (𝑧𝐶 + 𝑞𝑅 + 𝑢 𝑥𝑀 + 𝑞𝐸 − 𝐷)
+
− 𝑠𝐻(𝐷 − 𝑧𝐶 − 𝑞𝑅 − 𝑢 𝑥𝑀 − 𝑞𝐸)
+] 
 
(3.5) 
The expected profit in the centralized system includes the revenue, the regular 
production costs at the two manufacturing facilities, the emergency production cost, the 
holding cost, and the shortage cost. The central planner’s problem can be formulated as 
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follows. 
  max
𝑞𝑅,𝑥𝑀
𝛱𝐶 (3.6) 
s.t.  𝑞𝐸 = argmax𝛱𝐶 |𝑞𝑅 , 𝑥𝑀 (3.7) 
 𝑞𝑅 , 𝑥𝑀, 𝑞𝐸 ≥ 0 (3.8) 
Let 𝐿𝐶 = 𝑧𝐶 + 𝑞𝑅 + 𝑢𝑥𝑀 be the central planner’s inventory level at the beginning 
of the emergency procurement phase. Let ?̃?𝐸
𝐶 be the best response function for Equation 
(5), which is summarized in Lemma 3.1. 
Lemma 3.1: In Model C, the best response function for the emergency production 
quantity for any given 𝑞𝑅 and 𝑥𝑀 is as follows. 
 ?̃?𝐸
𝐶  = {
0, 𝑖𝑓 𝑐𝐸 ≥ 𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻          
(𝐷 − 𝐿𝐶)
+, 𝑖𝑓 𝑐𝐸 <  𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻
 
Lemma 3.1 indicates that if 𝑐𝐸 is sufficiently high (𝑐𝐸 ≥ 𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻), then the central 
planner will not make any emergency production, even if there is a shortage. If 𝑐𝐸 is 
sufficiently low (𝑐𝐸 < 𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻), then the central planner will set the emergency 
production quantity equal to the shortage quantity at the beginning of the emergency 
replenishment phase. In Lemma 3.1, the threshold for 𝑐𝐸 is 𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻, indicating that the 
hospital should consider both the revenue and the shortage cost of the drug when 
determining whether to make emergency production or not. 
Let superscript 𝐶 denote the optimal solutions in the centralized system. Let 𝑄𝐸
𝐶 =
𝐸[𝑞𝐸
𝐶] be the optimal expected emergency production quantity. Proposition 3.1 
summarizes the central planner’s optimal decisions about 𝑞𝑅
𝐶  and 𝑥𝑀
𝐶 , as well as the 
resulting expected emergency production quantity, 𝑄𝐸
𝐶. 
 Proposition 3.1: The optimal production plan in the centralized system is one of the 
following: 
a. If 𝑧𝑇 ≥ 𝐷, then 𝑞𝑅
𝐶 = 0, 𝑥𝑀
𝐶 = 0 and 𝑄𝐸
𝐶 = 0 
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b. If 𝑧𝑇 < 𝐷: 
I. 𝑞𝑅
𝐶 = 𝐷 − 𝑧𝐶 > 0, 𝑥𝑀
𝐶 = 0 and 𝑄𝐸
𝐶 = 0 if and only if (iff) 𝑐𝑅 ≤ 𝑐𝑅
𝐶
 
II. 𝑞𝑅
𝐶 = 0 and 𝑥𝑀
𝐶 = 𝐴𝐶(𝐷 − 𝑧𝐶), iff 𝑐𝑅 > 𝑐𝑅
𝐶
 
i. 𝑄𝐸
𝐶 > 0 iff 𝑐𝐸 <  𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻 
ii. 𝑄𝐸
𝐶 = 0 iff 𝑐𝐸 ≥  𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻 
where 𝑐𝑅
𝐶
= (
√ℎ𝐶+𝜙√−2𝑎𝑐𝑀+𝑏(2𝑐𝑀+𝑏ℎ𝐶)+𝑎2𝜙−𝑏ℎ𝐶−𝑎𝜙
𝑏−𝑎
)
+
, 𝜙 = min{𝑐𝐸 , 𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻},  
and 𝐴𝐶 =
√ℎ𝐶+𝜙(𝐷−𝑧𝐶)
√−2𝑎𝑐𝑀+𝑏(2𝑐𝑀+𝑏ℎ𝐶)+𝑎2𝜙
. 
Proposition 3.1 indicates that the central planner will not produce anything if the 
demand can be satisfied by the initial inventory. Otherwise, the central planner’s optimal 
production plan is depending on the production costs at the manufacturing facilities. If 
the hospital’s regular production cost is sufficiently low (𝑐𝑅 ≤ 𝑐𝑅
𝐶
), then the central 
planner prefers to produce at the hospital’s in-house producer in the regular procurement 
phase, and the production quantity is the difference between the demand and the initial 
inventory. If the hospital’s regular production cost is sufficiently high (𝑐𝑅 > 𝑐𝑅
𝐶
), then the 
central planner will produce at the manufacturer during the regular procurement phase, 
and the production quantity is the product of the adjustment factor 𝐴𝐶  and the quantity 
still in short (𝐷 − 𝑧𝐶). If the emergency production cost is sufficiently low, then the 
central planner will make emergency production. Otherwise, he will not produce 
anything during the emergency procurement phase, regardless of shortages. The optimal 
solutions in the centralized system provide a benchmark for the best case, and we 
compare it with the decentralized system in section 3.4.3. 
3.4.2 Decentralized System with Dual Sourcing 
In this section, we solve the decentralized system with dual sourcing (Model D, the 
decentralized system). The problem is formally formulated as follows. 
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 max
𝑞𝑅,𝑞𝑀
𝛱𝐻 (3.9) 
s.t.   𝑥𝑀 = argmax𝛱𝑀 |𝑞𝑀 (3.10) 
 𝑞𝐸 = argmax𝛱𝐻 |𝑞𝑅 , 𝑞𝑀, 𝑥𝑀 (3.11) 
 𝑞𝑅 , 𝑞𝑀, 𝑥𝑀 , 𝑞𝐸 ≥ 0 (3.12) 
Equation 3.9 is the hospital’s problem of choosing 𝑞𝑅 , and 𝑞𝑀 in stage 1. 
Equation 3.10 is the manufacturer’s optimal decision of 𝑥𝑀 in stage 2, for any given 𝑞𝑀. 
Equation 3.11 is the hospital’s optimal decision of 𝑞𝐸 in stage 3, for any given 𝑞𝑀, 𝑞𝑅, 
and 𝑥𝑀. Inequality 3.12 is the non-negativity constraint for all decision variables. 
Let superscript ∗ denote the optimal solutions in Model D. Define 𝐿 as the 
hospital’s inventory level at the beginning of stage 3, where 𝐿 = 𝑧𝐻 + 𝑦 + 𝑞𝑅. Let ?̃?𝐸 be 
the hospital’s best response function for her emergency production quantity. Lemma 3.2 
shows the expression of ?̃?𝐸.  
Lemma 3.2: In Model D, the hospital’s best response function for the emergency 
production quantity for any given 𝑞𝑅 and 𝑥𝑀 is as follows. 
 ?̃?𝐸  = {
0, 𝑖𝑓 𝑐𝐸 ≥ 𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻          
(𝐷 − 𝐿)+, 𝑖𝑓 𝑐𝐸 <  𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻
 
?̃?𝐸 has a similar expression and intuition with ?̃?𝐸
𝐶 in Model C. ?̃?𝐸 can be obtained 
by replacing 𝐿𝐶 in ?̃?𝐸
𝐶 with 𝐿.  
Let ?̃?𝑀 be the manufacturer’s best response function for Equation 8. Before 
discussing ?̃?𝑀, we present a condition under which the manufacturer will not produce 
anything, regardless of the value of 𝑞𝑀.  
Lemma 3.3: If 𝑐𝑀 > (
𝑎+𝑏
2
) (𝑤 + 𝑠𝑀), then 𝑥𝑀
∗ = 0 ∀ 𝑞𝑀. 
The manufacturer’s production decision is based on the trade-off between the cost 
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and benefit of production. In Lemma 3.3, the left-hand side of the inequality is the 
manufacturer’s production cost if he plans to produce one unit of drug. The right-hand 
side is the manufacturer’s expected benefit if he plans to produce one unit of the drug, 
which is the product of his expected yield rate (
𝑎+𝑏
2
), and the benefit of selling one unit of 
drug. 
𝑎+𝑏
2
 is the mean of the uniformly distributed yield rate based on our assumption, 
and we numerically verified that it can be replaced by the mean of the yield rate with 
other distributions. The benefit of selling one unit of drug includes the unit revenue from 
selling the drug and the unit shortage cost that he can avoid (𝑤 + 𝑠𝑀). If the production 
cost outweighs the expected benefit, then the manufacturer will not produce anything, 
regardless of the order quantity from the hospital. In other words, there is no interaction 
between the two parties in this situation. To guarantee the manufacturer’s participation, 
we assume the following assumption holds throughout the rest of the analysis. 
Assumption 3.1: (
𝑎+𝑏
2
) (𝑤 + 𝑠𝑀) > 𝑐𝑀. 
Define 𝐴𝑀 =
√𝑤+ℎ𝑀+𝑠𝑀
√2(𝑏−𝑎)𝑐𝑀+( 𝑠𝑀+𝑤)𝑎2+ ℎ𝑀𝑏2
 as an “adjustment factor” that 
determines how the manufacturer’s production level varies with respect to the hospital’s 
order quantity. Lemma 3.4 summarizes the manufacturer’s best response function ?̃?𝑀, 
i.e., how the manufacturing uses the adjustment factor 𝐴𝑀 to determine his production 
quantity. Lemma 3.5 states a property of 𝐴𝑀.  
Lemma 3.4: The manufacturer’s best response function is given by: 
  ?̃?𝑀 = 𝐴𝑀(𝑞𝑀 − 𝑧𝑀)
+. 
Lemma 3.5: 𝐴𝑀 ≥ 1.  
The manufacturer will not produce anything if his initial inventory can fully 
satisfy the hospital’s order quantity (i.e., 𝑞𝑀 < 𝑧𝑀). Otherwise, he will use the 
adjustment factor 𝐴𝑀 to determine his planned production quantity for any quantity that 
needs to be produced (𝑞𝑀 − 𝑧𝑀). The coefficient 𝐴𝑀 is similar to Equation (6) in Keren 
(2009), but with a difference in the denominator.  
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Lemma 3.5 states that if the manufacturer needs to make production, then he will 
plan to produce no less than the quantity needed. This is intuitive due to the existence of 
his yield uncertainty. 
Proposition 3.2 summarizes the hospital’s optimal production plan.  
Proposition 3.2: The optimal production plan for the hospital in the decentralized 
system with dual sourcing is one of the following. 
a. If 𝐷 ≤ 𝑧𝐻, then 𝑞𝑅
∗ = 0, 𝑞𝑀
∗ = 0 and 𝑄𝐸
∗ = 0 
b. If 𝑧𝐻 < 𝐷 ≤ 𝑧𝑀 + 𝑧𝐻: 
  I. 𝑞𝑅
∗ = 𝐷 − 𝑧𝐻, 𝑞𝑀
∗ = 0, and 𝑄𝐸
∗ = 0 iff 𝑐𝑅 ≤ 𝑤 
 II. 𝑞𝑅
∗ = 0, 𝑞𝑀
∗ = 𝐷 − 𝑧𝐻, and 𝑄𝐸
∗ = 0 iff 𝑐𝑅 > 𝑤 
c. If 𝐷 > 𝑧𝑀 + 𝑧𝐻: 
I. 𝑞𝑅
∗ = 𝐷 − 𝑧𝐻 , 𝑞𝑀
∗ = 0, and 𝑄𝐸
∗ = 0, iff 𝑐𝑅 ≤ 𝑐 𝑅 
II. 𝑞𝑅
∗ = 𝐷 − 𝑧𝐻 − 𝑧𝑀, 𝑞𝑀
∗ = 𝑧𝑀, and 𝑄𝐸
∗ = 0, iff 𝑐 𝑅 < 𝑐𝑅 ≤ 𝑐𝑅 
III. 𝑞𝑅
∗ = 0 and 𝑞𝑀
∗ = 𝑧𝑀 + 𝐴𝐻(𝐷 − 𝑧𝐻 − 𝑧𝑀), iff 𝑐𝑅 > 𝑐𝑅 
i. 𝑄𝐸
∗ = 0 iff 𝑐𝐸 ≥  𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻 
ii. 𝑄𝐸
∗ = ?̂?𝐸 > 0 iff 𝑐𝐸 <  𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻 
where 𝑐 𝑅 = 𝑤, 𝑐𝑅 = (
√(ℎ𝐻+𝜙)((2𝐴𝑏−1)(ℎ𝐻+𝑤)+𝑎2𝐴2(𝜙−𝑤)−𝐴(𝑏ℎ𝐻+𝑎𝜙)
𝐴(𝑏−𝑎)
 )
+
, 𝐴𝐻 =
max {1,
√(𝜙+ℎ𝐻)
√𝐴2𝑎2(𝜙−𝑤)+(2𝐴𝑏−1)(ℎ𝐻+𝑤)
}, and ?̂?𝐸 =
(𝑧𝐻+𝑧𝑀+𝑎𝐴(𝑞𝑀
∗ −𝑧𝑀)−𝐷)
2
2𝐴(𝑏−𝑎)(𝑞𝑀
∗ −𝑧𝑀)
. 
Proposition 3.2.a and b state that the hospital first tries to satisfy the demand 
using the existing inventories. If the existing inventories at the two manufacturing 
facilities are not sufficient, Proposition 3.2.c indicates that the hospital’s production plan 
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depends on the costs of the in-house production and outsourcing. If 𝑐𝑅 is sufficiently low 
(Proposition 3.2.c.I), i.e., the hospital’s in-house production is cheaper and more reliable, 
then the hospital will produce all quantity needed at the in-house producer in the regular 
production phase. If 𝑐𝑅 is intermediate (Proposition 3.2.c.II), then the hospital’s in-house 
production cost is reasonably high which can be justified by the higher reliability than the 
manufacturer. In this case, the hospital will purchase the manufacturer’s initial inventory, 
which does not involve yield risk and is cheaper than the in-house production. The 
hospital will produce the rest of the quantity needed at the in-house producer during the 
regular procurement phase. If 𝑐𝑅 is sufficiently high (Proposition 3.2.c.III), then the 
hospital will only order from the manufacturer in the regular procurement phase. This is 
because 𝑐𝑅 is too high to be justified by the higher reliability. The order quantity includes 
two parts. The first part is the manufacturer’s initial inventory, 𝑧𝑀 which is risk-free and 
does not need any adjustment. The second part involves yield risks and the hospital uses 
a coefficient 𝐴𝐻 to make adjustment. Due to the existence of yield uncertainty, 𝐴𝐻 is no 
less than 1. The hospital’s expected emergency production plan is a direct result of the 
best response function of ?̃?𝐸. For the rest of the analysis, we focus on the non-trivial 
cases in which the demand cannot be satisfied by the existing inventories (Proposition 
3.2.c), and production has to take place.  
𝑐?̅? is an important threshold value that determines whether the hospital will use 
the in-house producer in the regular phase or not. Therefore, we show some properties of 
𝑐?̅? in Proposition 3.3.  
Proposition 3.3: 
 
𝜕𝑐𝑅
𝜕𝑠𝐻
≥ 0; 
𝜕𝑐𝑅
𝜕𝑟
≥ 0; 
𝜕𝑐𝑅
𝜕𝑐𝐸
≥ 0. 
If 𝑠𝐻 or 𝑟 increases, the hospital will be more willing to mitigate drug shortages 
to either avoid a high shortage cost or pursue a high revenue. Therefore, she is more 
likely to use a reliable source, i.e., 𝑐?̅? is increasing in 𝑠𝐻 and 𝑟. If 𝑐𝐸 increases, the 
hospital will be more reluctant to make emergency production. Therefore, she is more 
likely to switch from a reliable source to an unreliable source at a higher threshold of 𝑐𝑅, 
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i.e., 𝑐?̅? is increasing in 𝑐𝐸. 
Let 𝛺 denote the expected shortage amount, i.e., 𝛺 = 𝐸[(𝐷 − 𝑧𝐻𝑡 − 𝑞𝑅𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡 −
𝑞𝐸𝑡)
+]. Lemma 3.6 summarizes the expression of the expected shortage amount under 
the optimal production plan, 𝛺∗. 
Lemma 3.6: The expected shortage amount under the optimal production plan in Model 
D is as follows: 
a.  𝛺∗ =
(𝑞𝑅
∗+𝑧𝐻+𝑧𝑀−𝐷+𝑎𝐴(𝑞𝑀
∗ −𝑧𝑀))
2
2𝐴(𝑏−𝑎)(𝑞𝑀
∗ −𝑧𝑀)
, if 𝑐𝑅 > 𝑐𝑅 and 𝑐𝐸 > 𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻 
b.  𝛺∗ = 0, otherwise. 
Lemma 3.6 states that the establishment of the hospital’s in-house producer can 
mitigate drug shortages, unless both 𝑐𝑅 and 𝑐𝐸 are sufficiently high. If 𝑐𝑅 is low (𝑐𝑅 ≤
𝑐𝑅), then shortages can be mitigated in the regular procurement phase. If 𝑐𝐸 is low (𝑐𝐸 ≤
𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻), then shortages can be mitigated in the emergency procurement phase. If both 𝑐𝑅 
and 𝑐𝐸 are high, then the hospital will not produce anything at the in-house producer, 
which is a sole-sourcing situation. Note that, if the emergency production is not possible 
(e.g., for drugs that need a long lead time or emergency production capacity is not 
available), then we can set 𝑐𝐸 = ∞, and 𝑐𝐸 > 𝑐𝑅 + 𝑠𝐻 is always satisfied so that the 
hospital never make emergency production. 
3.4.3 Numerical Analysis  
In this section, we conduct numerical analysis to analyze and illustrate some results and 
observations. We first analyze Model D. Next, we compare Model D with Model C. 
Table 3.3. Parameter values for numerical analysis 
Parameter 𝑫 𝒂 𝒃 𝒛𝑴 𝒛𝑯 𝒘 𝒄𝑴 𝒉𝑴 
Value 10000 0 1 1000 1000 500 200 50 
Parameter 𝒔𝑴 𝒓 𝒉𝑯 𝒔𝑯 𝒄𝑹 Low 𝒄𝑬 High 𝒄𝑬 
Value 100 1500 100 1800 750 1500 3500 
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Model D 
Depending on the hospital’s optimal ordering decision in the regular procurement phase, 
we refer to the procurement plans in Proposition 3.2.c.I, II, and III as a pure in-house 
production strategy, a mixed procurement strategy, and a pure outsourcing strategy, 
respectively. Depending on the hospital’s emergency production decisions, we refer to 
the procurement plans in Proposition 3.2.c.I.ii as a contingent sourcing strategy in which 
the hospital will make emergency production if needed. 
Figure 3.3 provides a graphical illustration of the hospital’s optimal procurement 
strategy as a function of 𝑐𝑅 and 𝑐𝐸 in the Model D when 𝑧𝐻 < 𝐷 − 𝑧𝑀 (i.e., Proposition 
3.2.c). In Case 1, 𝑐𝑅 is low (𝑐𝑅 ≤ 𝑤), and the hospital prefers a pure in-house production 
strategy. In Case 2, 𝑐𝑅 is intermediate (𝑤 < 𝑐𝑅 ≤ 𝑐𝑅), and the hospital prefers a mixed 
Figure 3.3: Policy graph of the hospital’s optimal procurement strategy in Model D with 
respect to the hospital’s unit regular production cost (𝑐𝑅) and unit emergency production 
cost (𝑐𝐸). In the regular procurement phase, the hospital’s optimal strategy is one of the 
following: pure in-house production (only make in-house production), a mixed strategy 
(procure from both manufacturing facilities), and pure outsourcing (only procures from 
the external manufacturer). Contingent sourcing: the hospital prefers to make emergency 
production at the in-house producer. 
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procurement strategy and she will procure the drug from both manufacturing facilities. 
This is because the hospital will purchase the manufacturer’s initial inventory, which 
does not involve yield uncertainties and is cheaper than the hospital’s in-house 
production. The hospital will produce the rest amount that is needed in the in-house 
producer. In Case 3, 𝑐𝑅 is high (𝑐𝑅 > 𝑐𝑅) and 𝑐𝐸 is low (𝑐𝐸 < 𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻), and the hospital 
prefers a pure outsourcing strategy in the regular phase and a contingent sourcing 
strategy in the emergency procurement phase. In Case 4, both 𝑐𝑅 and 𝑐𝐸 are high (𝑐𝑅 >
𝑐𝑅 , and 𝑐𝐸 > 𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻), and the hospital prefers a pure outsourcing strategy in the regular 
phase, and will not use a contingent sourcing strategy. Note that, in Figure 3.3, the 
hospital does not use a contingent sourcing strategy when 𝑐𝑅 < 𝑐𝑅. This is because we 
assume that the hospital’s in-house producer has a perfect yield rate. If the in-house 
producer also has yield uncertainties, which is highly likely in the real world, then the 
hospital will use a contingent sourcing strategy in Case 1 and Case 2 if 𝑐𝐸 < 𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻. 
Next, we examine some properties of 𝑐𝑅. Let ∆𝑐 be the difference between the 
hospital’s in-house regular production cost and the outsourcing cost, ∆𝑐 = 𝑐𝑅 − 𝑤.  ∆𝑐 
can be interpreted as the hospital’s cost disadvantage if she produces at the in-house 
producer instead of procuring from the manufacturer in the regular phase. Let 𝜇 and 𝜎2 
be the mean and variance of 𝑢, respectively. Figure 3.4 shows 𝑐?̅? as a function of ∆𝑐 with 
different means and variances of 𝑢. The graphs in Figure 3.4.a and b have a fixed mean 
of 𝑢 with different variances (𝑎 and 𝑏 move symmetrically with respect to the mean). 
The graphs in Figure 3.4.c and d have a fixed variance of 𝑢 with different means (𝑎 and 
𝑏 move simultaneously to the same direction). In all four graphs, 𝑐?̅? is decreasing in ∆𝑐, 
indicating that the hospital is more willing to procure from the manufacturer if 𝑐𝑅 is 
higher than 𝑤.  
We then analyze the impact of the parameters of the yield rate on 𝑐𝑅. Figure 3.4 a 
and b show that 𝑐?̅? is sensitive to the variance of the yield rate (𝜎
2), regardless of the 
value of 𝑐𝐸. The impact of 𝜇 on 𝑐𝑅 depends on whether the hospital uses a contingent 
sourcing strategy or not. If the hospital has a second chance to make emergency 
production for any shortfall quantity (i.e., 𝑐𝐸 is low), then 𝑐𝑅 is not affected by 𝜇 very 
much (Figure 3.4 c).  If the hospital does not take advantage of a second chance to make 
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emergency production (i.e., 𝑐𝐸 is high), then the hospital is very cautious when choosing 
the optimal production plan in the regular procurement phase. In this case, even a small 
change in 𝜇 will have a large impact on 𝑐?̅? (Figure 3.4 d).  
In summary, several factors have a large impact on the threshold value 𝑐𝑅, such 
as the hospital’s cost disadvantage (∆𝑐), the emergency production cost 𝑐𝐸, and the 
variance of the manufacturer’s yield rate (𝜎2). 𝑐𝑅is sensitive to the mean of the 
manufacturer’s yield rate (𝜇) only if the hospital does not use a contingent sourcing 
strategy. 
 Different 𝜎2, Fixed 𝜇 Different 𝜇, Fixed 𝜎2 
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Figure 3.4: 𝑐𝑅 as a function of ∆𝑐 = 𝑐𝑅 − 𝑤 with different  μ and 𝜎
2. (a) with different 
𝜎2 and fixed 𝜇, when 𝑐𝐸 is low; (b) with different 𝜎
2 and fixed 𝜇, when 𝑐𝐸 is high; (c) 
with different 𝜇 and fixed 𝜎2, when 𝑐𝐸 is low; (d) with different 𝜇 and fixed 𝜎
2, when 
𝑐𝐸 is high. 
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Model D vs. Model C 
In this section, we compare the performance of Model D and Model C. Recall that we 
assume 𝑠𝐶 = 𝑠𝐻 in Model C, therefore, we let 𝑠𝑀 = 0 for this section for a fair 
comparison between the two systems. Let 𝛱𝑇
∗  be the total optimal profit of the hospital 
and the manufacturer Model D, 𝛱𝑇
∗ = 𝛱𝐻
∗ + 𝛱𝑀
∗ . Let 𝛱𝐶
𝐶 be the optimal profit for the 
integrated system in Model C.  
Figure 3.5 shows the efficiency of Model D compared with Model C (𝛱𝑇
∗/𝛱𝐶
𝐶) as 
a  function of 𝑐𝑅 when 𝑐𝐸 is low. This scenario corresponds to a horizontal line in Figure 
3.3 across Case 1, 2 and 3. Figure 3.5 indicates that Model D has some inefficiencies 
when 𝑐𝑅 is low (𝑐𝑅 ≤ 𝑐 𝑅) and 𝑐𝑅 is high (𝑐𝑅 ≥ 𝑐𝑅
𝐶
). In Model C, the central planner will 
always deplete the existing inventories at both manufacturing facilities (𝑧𝑇), before 
producing anything. However, when 𝑐𝑅 is low (𝑐𝑅 ≤ 𝑐 𝑅), the hospital uses a pure in-
house production strategy in Model D, and she does not purchase anything from the 
manufacturer. Therefore, when 𝑐𝑅 is low, the inefficiencies in Model D are mainly due to 
the waste of the manufacturer’s initial inventory and his holding cost. When 𝑐𝑅 ∈ [ 𝑐𝑅
𝐶
, 
𝑐𝑅], the hospital uses a mixed procurement strategy, and the inefficiencies of Model D 
are due to the decentralized decision-making process. When 𝑐𝑅 > 𝑐𝑅, the hospital uses a 
Figure 3.5: Relevant performance of Model D vs. Model C (𝛱𝑇
∗/𝛱𝐶
𝐶) with respect to 
the hospital’s unit regular production cost (𝑐𝑅) when 𝑐𝐸 is low (𝑐𝐸 < 𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻). 
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pure outsourcing strategy, and the inefficiencies are mainly due to the holding cost. This 
is because the central planner can store the leftover stocks in the cheaper warehouse, 
whereas the two parties in Model D do not have this flexibility.  
When 𝑐𝑅 is between 𝑐𝑅 and 𝑐𝑅
𝐶
, the optimal production plans in the two systems 
are the same. The initial inventories at both manufacturer facilities will be used, and the 
shortfall quantity will be produced at the hospital’s in-house producer. Therefore, when 
the hospital’s in-house regular production cost is either low or high, a decentralized 
system with dual sourcing has inefficiencies compared with a centralized system, and 
other types of coordinating mechanisms could be designed to improve the total supply 
chain performance. 
3.4.4 Extensions 
In this section, we relax the assumption that the hospital’s in-house producer has a 
perfect yield rate. We consider two scenarios. In the first scenario, we assume that the in-
house producer has a constant yield loss. In the second scenario, we assume that the in-
house producer has a random yield rate.  
Extension 1- The In-House Producer Has a Fixed Yield Loss 
Let 𝑢𝐻 be the yield rate at the hospital’s in-house producer. In this extension, we assume 
that 𝑢𝐻 is a constant and 𝑢𝐻 ∈ (0, 1), i.e., the in-house producer has a constant yield loss. 
We analytically characterized the equilibrium solutions in this extension for the case 𝐷 >
𝑧𝑀 + 𝑧𝐻, which are summarized in Proposition 3.4.  
Proposition 3.4: If the hospital’s in-house producer has a constant yield rate ,𝑢𝐻 ∈
(0,1), then the optimal production plan for the hospital when 𝐷 > 𝑧𝑀 + 𝑧𝐻 is one of the 
following. 
I.   𝑞𝑅
∗ =
𝐷−𝑧𝐻
𝑢𝐻
, 𝑞𝑀
∗ = 0, and 𝑄𝐸
∗ = 0, iff 𝑐𝑅 ≤ 𝑢𝐻𝑐 𝑅 
II.  𝑞𝑅
∗ =
𝐷−𝑧𝐻−𝑧𝑀
𝑢𝐻
, 𝑞𝑀
∗ = 𝑧𝑀, and 𝑄𝐸
∗ = 0, iff 𝑢𝐻𝑐 𝑅 < 𝑐𝑅 ≤ 𝑢𝐻𝑐𝑅 
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III. 𝑞𝑅
∗ = 0 and 𝑞𝑀
∗ = 𝑧𝑀 + 𝐴𝐻(𝐷 − 𝑧𝐻 − 𝑧𝑀), iff 𝑐𝑅 > 𝑢𝐻𝑐𝑅 
i. 𝑄𝐸
∗ = 0 iff 𝑐𝐸 ≥ 𝑢𝐻( 𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻) 
ii. 𝑄𝐸
∗ > 0 iff 𝑐𝐸 < 𝑢𝐻( 𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻) 
where 𝑐 𝑅, 𝑐𝑅, and 𝐴𝐻 are the same as defined in Proposition 3.2.  
Proposition 3.4 indicates that the equilibrium solutions in this extension have a 
similar structure with the basic model as indicated in Proposition 3.2 – the threshold 
values for 𝑐𝑅 and 𝑐𝐸 in this extension can be obtained by multiplying the threshold values 
in the basic model by the in-house producer’s yield loss, 𝑢𝐻, and the optimal in-house 
production quantities can be obtained by dividing the corresponding quantities in the 
basic model by 𝑢𝐻. In other words, when the in-house producer is deterministically 
reliable, the constant yield rate only has an scaling effect of boosting up the production 
costs and the production quantities at the in-house producer, but the main structure and 
qualitative properties of the policy graph in Figure 3.3 remain the same.  
Extension 2 – The In-House Producer Has a Random Yield Rate  
In this extension, we assume that the in-house producer’s yield rate (𝑢𝑅) is a random 
variable with a PDF 𝑓𝐻(∙) and CDF 𝐹𝐻(∙). Due to the complexity of the profit functions, 
we are not able to analytically characterize the optimal solutions. Therefore, we analyze 
this extension numerically using the same numerical values in Table 3.3. We follow the 
same assumption that the external manufacturer’s yield rate is uniformly distributed on 
the interval [0,1]. We assume the emergency production has a perfect yield rate. We 
consider the case that the in-house producer’s yield rate in the regular procurement phase 
is stochastically dominated by the external manufacturer’s yield rate. Let 𝑢𝐻 be 
uniformly distributed on the interval [0, 0.8].  
 Figure 3.6 presents a policy graph of the hospital’s optimal procurement plan 
with respect to the unit regular in-house production cost (𝑐𝑅) and the unit emergency 
production cost (𝑐𝐸) in this extension, which is a counterpart of Figure 3.3 in the basic 
model. One major difference between Figure 3.6 and Figure 3.3 is that when 𝑐𝑅 is 
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sufficiently low in this extension, the hospital prefers to procure from both 
manufacturing facilities in the regular procurement phase. In Case 5 and Case 6 in Figure 
3.6, the hospital’s order quantity from the manufacturer is greater than its initial 
inventory (𝑞𝑀
∗ > 𝑧𝑀), i.e., the hospital will order from the manufacturer even if it does 
not have any initial inventory. The hospital does not prefer a pure in-house production 
strategy in this extension due to the low yield rate at the in-house producer. However, the 
hospital still makes in-house production in the regular phase, which is mainly for risk-
pooling purposes. In other words, due to the existence of the random yield rates at both 
manufacturing facilities, the hospital prefers to procure from both sources to mitigate 
supply uncertainties if 𝑐𝑅 is sufficiently low. 
 Multi-Period Analysis 
We are not able to derive closed-form solutions for the multi-period case. Thus, we solve 
Figure 3.6: Policy graph of the hospital’s optimal procurement strategy with respect to 
the hospital’s unit regular production cost (𝑐𝑅) and unit emergency production cost (𝑐𝐸) 
when the in-house producer has a random yield rate (𝑢𝐻). In the regular procurement 
phase, the hospital’s optimal strategy is one of the following: pure in-house production 
(only make in-house production), a mixed strategy (procure from both manufacturing 
facilities), and pure outsourcing (only procures from the external manufacturer). 
Contingent sourcing: the hospital prefers to make emergency production at the in-house 
producer. 
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and analyze the multi-period model using a heuristic. Inventory management policies 
(e.g., order-up-to policy) are widely studied in supply chain management literature (Chao 
and Zipkin, 2008; Chen et al., 2012; Henig and Gerchak, 1990), and they are easy to 
implement by inventory managers. We consider three inventory management policies for 
the hospital in the regular procurement phase: a Target Inventory Policy, a Scale Factor 
Policy, and a Myopic Scale Factor Policy. The inventory management policies are 
inspired by the structures of the single period solutions.  
We make some assumptions in this section to focus our attention on the hospital’s 
optimal procurement decision in the regular procurement phase. First, we assume that 
𝑐𝑅 > 𝑤, i.e., the hospital’s regular in-house production is more expensive than procuring 
from the manufacturer. Otherwise, the hospital will always make in-house production in 
the regular phase, and there is no interaction between the hospital and the manufacturer 
in the multi-period model. Second, we assume that the manufacturer uses the structure of 
his best response function  in the single-period setting (as specified in Lemma 3.4) as his 
production policy in the multi-period setting: in each period, for any given order quantity 
from the hospital, the manufacturer uses the scale factor 𝐴𝑀 to determine the production 
quantity, 𝑥𝑀𝑡 = 𝐴𝑀(𝑞𝑀𝑡 − 𝑧𝑀𝑡)
+. In addition, we assume that the hospital’s emergency 
production quantity in each period follows her best response function in the single-period 
setting as specified in Lemma 3.2.  
The sequence of events under each inventory management policy is as follows. 
At the beginning of the time horizon, the hospital decides the policy parameters (will be 
discussed in section 3.5.1), which will be fixed for the rest of the time horizon. In period 
𝑡 ∈ {1,… , 𝑇}, the hospital and the manufacturer start period 𝑡 with an initial inventory 
𝑧𝑅𝑡 and 𝑧𝑀𝑡, respectively. Let 𝑧𝑀1 = 0 and 𝑧𝑅1 = 0. The sequence of events in each 
period is the same as illustrated in Figure 3.1, where the decision variables are 
determined according to the following rules: in stage 1, the hospital’s order quantities 
from the two manufacturing facilities, 𝑞𝑅𝑡 and 𝑞𝑀𝑡 are determined by 𝑧𝐻𝑡 and the policy 
parameters as described in section 3.5.1; in stage 2, the manufacturing’s order quantity 
𝑥𝑀𝑡 is determined according to Lemma 3.2; and in stage 3, the hospital’s emergency 
production quantity 𝑞𝐸𝑡 is determined according to Lemma 3.4. Figure 3.7 illustrates the 
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sequence of events in the multi-period setting under a TIP as an example. Under a SFP or 
a MSFP, only the policy parameters need to be replaced accordingly at the beginning of 
the time horizon.  
 We discuss the detail of the three inventory management policies in section 
3.5.1. In section 3.5.2, we discuss the solution and evaluation algorithm using the Sample 
Average Approximation (SAA) algorithm (Kleywegt et al., 2002). We then evaluate the 
performance of the three inventory management policies in a multi-period setting in 
section 3.5.3. 
3.5.1 Three Inventory Management Policies 
A Target Inventory Policy 
Under a Target Inventory Policy (TIP), at the beginning of the entire time 
horizon, the hospital chooses two parameters: a target inventory level 𝐼, and an allocation 
factor 𝑘. The target inventory level 𝐼 incorporates the procurement from both the 
manufacturer and the in-house producer, and the hospital uses 𝑘 to allocate the order 
quantities to the two manufacturing facilities. At the beginning of period 𝑡, if the 
hospital’s initial inventory is below 𝐼, then an initial shortfall quantity (𝐼 − 𝑧𝐻𝑡) needs to 
be procured in the regular procurement phase. The hospital’s most preferred source for 
the initial shortfall amount is the manufacturer’s initial inventory because it is cheaper 
than the hospital’s in-house production (recall that we assumed 𝑐𝑅 > 𝑤). If the 
manufacturer’s initial inventory is not sufficient, i.e., 𝑧𝑀𝑡 < 𝐼 − 𝑧𝐻𝑡, then the shortfall 
quantity (𝐼 − 𝑧𝐻𝑡 − 𝑧𝑀𝑡) will be allocated to the two manufacturing facilities using the 
allocation factor 𝑘, where 𝑘(𝐼 − 𝑧𝐻𝑡 − 𝑧𝑀𝑡) will be ordered from the manufacturer, and 
(1 − 𝑘)(𝐼 − 𝑧𝐻𝑡 − 𝑧𝑀𝑡) will be allocated to the in-house producer. For any given pairs of 
Figure 3.7 Sequence of Events in the Multi-Period Setting under a TIP. 
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(𝐼, 𝑘), the hospital’s order quantities from the two manufacturing facilities in period 𝑡 are 
given by: 
𝑞𝑀𝑡 = min{(𝐼 − 𝑧𝐻𝑡)
+, 𝑧𝑀𝑡 + 𝑘(𝐼 − 𝑧𝐻𝑡 − 𝑧𝑀𝑡)
+ } (3.13) 
𝑞𝑅𝑡 = (1 − 𝑘)(𝐼 − 𝑧𝐻𝑡 − 𝑧𝑀𝑡)
+ (3.14) 
A Scale Factor Policy 
Under a Scale Factor Policy (SFP), at the beginning of the entire time horizon, 
the hospital chooses two scale factors, 𝑆𝑀 and 𝑆𝐻, to determine the order quantities from 
the manufacturer and the in-house producer, respectively. At the beginning of period 𝑡, if 
the hospital’s initial inventory cannot fully satisfy the demand (𝑧𝐻𝑡 < 𝐷), then the 
hospital needs to procure an initial shortfall quantity (𝐷 − 𝑧𝐻𝑡) from the two 
manufacturing facilities. The hospital’s first preferred source for the initial shortfall 
quantity is the manufacturer’s initial inventory, as discussed for a TIP. If the 
manufacturer’s initial inventory is insufficient, then the quantity (𝐷 − 𝑧𝐻𝑡 − 𝑧𝑀𝑡) needs 
to be produced by the two manufacturing facilities. The hospital will use 𝑆𝑀 and 𝑆𝐻 to 
determine the allocation of this quantity: 𝑆𝑀(𝐷 − 𝑧𝐻𝑡 − 𝑧𝑀𝑡) will be ordered from the 
manufacturer, and 𝑆𝐻(𝐷 − 𝑧𝐻𝑡 − 𝑧𝑀𝑡) will be ordered from the in-house producer. The 
hospital’s order quantities from the two manufacturing facilities in period 𝑡 are given by: 
𝑞𝑀𝑡 = min{ (𝐷 − 𝑧𝐻𝑡)
+, 𝑧𝑀𝑡 + 𝑆𝑀(𝐷 − 𝑧𝐻𝑡 − 𝑧𝑀𝑡)
+} (3.15) 
𝑞𝑅𝑡 = 𝑆𝐻(𝐷 − 𝑧𝐻𝑡 − 𝑧𝑀𝑡)
+ (3.16) 
A Myopic Scale Factor Policy 
The hospital can apply a myopic policy by using the optimal solution in the 
single-period model. Denote this myopic policy a Myopic Scale Factor Policy (MSFP), 
because it has the same structure as a SFP with different scale factors. Let 𝑆𝑀
𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃 and 
𝑆𝐻
𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃 be the scale factors used in a MSFP, and hospital’s order quantities from the 
manufacturer and the in-house producer in period 𝑡 are given by: 
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𝑞𝑀𝑡 = min{ (𝐷 − 𝑧𝐻𝑡)
+, 𝑧𝑀𝑡 + 𝑆𝑀
𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃(𝐷 − 𝑧𝐻𝑡 − 𝑧𝑀𝑡)
+} (3.17) 
𝑞𝑅𝑡 = 𝑆𝐻
𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃(𝐷 − 𝑧𝐻𝑡 − 𝑧𝑀𝑡)
+ (3.18) 
The hospital’s procurement decisions in the regular phase in period 𝑡, 𝑞𝑀𝑡 and 
𝑞𝑅𝑡, are determined using the same rule as a SFP. However, the optimal values for 
𝑆𝑀
𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃 and 𝑆𝐻
𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃 are not generated using the SAA algorithm as discussed in section 
3.5.2, but a direct application of the single period result. According to Proposition 3.2, 
the parameters in the MSFP are given by 𝑆𝑀
𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃 = 0, and 𝑆𝐻
𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃 = 1, if 𝑐𝑅 is low, 
𝑆𝑀
𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃 = 𝐴𝐻 and 𝑆𝐻
𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃 = 0, if 𝑐𝑅 is high. The hospital can use a MSFP if she does not 
have sophisticated analytical tools (such as the SAA algorithm) to obtain the optimal 
policy parameters for a TIP or a SFP in a multi-period setting. Therefore, we consider the 
hospital’s profit in this scenario as a lower bound for her expected profit in the multi-
period model.  
3.5.2 Solution and Evaluation Algorithm   
Refer (𝐼, 𝐾), (𝑆𝑀, 𝑆𝐻), and (𝑆𝑀
𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃 , 𝑆𝐻
𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃) as the policy parameters in a TIP, a SFP and a 
MSFP, respectively. Let 𝑗 be the index for the three inventory management policies, 𝑗 ∈
{𝑇𝐼𝑃, 𝑆𝐹𝑃,𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃}. We calculate the approximate optimal values for the policy 
parameters and the two parties average profit over 𝑇 periods under each inventory policy 
using the Sample Average Approximation (SAA) algorithm (Kleywegt et al., 2002). We 
use the same parameter values as indicated in Table 3.3. 
Figure 3.8 illustrates the implementation of the SAA algorithm. The algorithm 
consists of three main steps: optimization, solution evaluation, and bound calculation. 
We elaborate on each step as follows. 
Optimization 
In the optimization step, we solve the optimal parameters for the three inventory 
management policies. For a TIP and a SFP, the policy parameters need to satisfy the 
following feasibility constraints: 𝐼 > 0, 0 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 1, 𝑠𝐻 ≥ 0, and 𝑠𝑀 ≥ 0, respectively. 
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For a MSFP, the candidate for the policy parameters are limited to two sets of values: 
(𝑆𝑀
𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃 , 𝑆𝐻
𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃) = (0,1) and (𝑆𝑀
𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃 , 𝑆𝐻
𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃) = (𝐴𝐻 , 0), which are the single period 
solutions. We first generate one realization of the manufacturer’s random yield rate in 
each period, and define this sample set of yield rates as ?̂?. Next, for policy 𝑗, we compute 
the optimal policy parameters that maximize the hospital’s average profit over 𝑇 periods 
with the sample set ?̂?, ?̂?𝑖
𝑗
=
1
𝑇
∑ ?̂?𝑖𝑡
𝑗𝑇
𝑡=1 , where ?̂?𝑖𝑡
𝑗
 is the hospital’s profit in period 𝑡 with 
sample ?̂?𝑡 . We record the optimal policy parameters, (𝐼, ?̂?) for a TIP, (?̂?𝑀, ?̂?𝐻) for a SFP,  
1. Optimization 
For 𝑡 = 1,… , 𝑇, generate a realization of the manufacturer’s yield rate, ?̂?𝑡, from 
i.i.d. uniform distribution 𝑈𝑡(𝑎, 𝑏), and define the set of these samples of yield rates 
as ?̂?. 
a. Compute the optimal policy parameters that maximize the hospital’s average 
profit over 𝑇 periods with the sample set ?̂?, ?̂?𝐻
𝑗
=
1
𝑇
∑ ?̂?𝐻𝑡
𝑗𝑇
𝑡=1 , 𝑗 ∈
{𝑇𝐼𝑃, 𝑆𝐹𝑃,𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃}, where ?̂?𝐻𝑡
𝑗
 is the hospital’s profit in period 𝑡 with sample 
?̂?𝑡 .  
b. Record the following optimal values: 
I. The optimal policy parameters: (𝐼, ?̂?), (?̂?𝑀, ?̂?𝐻), and (?̂?𝑀
𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃 , ?̂?𝐻
𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃). 
II. The manufacturer’s average initial inventory under the optimal policy 
parameters, ?̂?𝑀
𝑗
=
1
𝑇
∑ ?̂?𝑀𝑡
𝑗𝑇
𝑡=1 , 𝑗 ∈ {𝑇𝐼𝑃, 𝑆𝐹𝑃,𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃},  where ?̂?𝑀𝑡
𝑗
 is the 
manufacturer’s initial inventory in period 𝑡 with sample ?̂?𝑡. 
2. Evaluation 
For 𝑡 = 1,… , 𝑇, generate another realization of the manufacturer’s yield rate, ?̌?𝑡,  
from i.i.d. uniform distribution 𝑈𝑡(𝑎, 𝑏), and define the set of these samples as ?̌?. 
a. Fix (𝐼, 𝐾) = (𝐼, ?̂?) for a TIP, (𝑆𝑀, 𝑆𝐻) = (?̂?𝑀, ?̂?𝐻) for a SFP,  and 
(?̂?𝑀
𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃 , ?̂?𝐻
𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃) for a MSFP, respectively. 
b. Compute and record the hospital and the manufacturer’s average profit over 𝑇 
periods with the sample set ?̌? in the following two scenarios: 
Scenario 1: The hospital knows ?̌?𝑀𝑡. Compute and record ?̌?𝑖
𝑗
. 
Scenario 2: The hospital does not know ?̌?𝑀𝑡, and she uses ?̂?𝑀
𝑗
 as her 
belief in each period. Compute and record ?̌?𝑖
𝑗′
,  𝑖 ∈
{𝐻,𝑀} and 𝑗 ∈ {𝑇𝐼𝑃, 𝑆𝐹𝑃,𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃}. 
3. Computation of the lower and upper bounds 
a. Lower bound: compute the hospital and manufacturer’s average profit over 𝑇 
periods under a MSPF, ?̌?𝑖
𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃 . 
b. Upper bound: compute 𝛱𝑖 in which case the manufacturer has a perfect yield 
rate,  𝑖 ∈ {𝐻,𝑀}. 
Figure 3.8: Implementation of SAA 
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and (?̂?𝑀
𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃 , ?̂?𝐻
𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃) for a MSFP, respectively. 
We also record the manufacturer’s average initial inventory under the optimal 
policy parameters, ?̂?𝑀
𝑗
=
1
𝑇
∑ ?̂?𝑀𝑡
𝑗𝑇
𝑡=1 ,  where ?̂?𝑀𝑡
𝑗
 is the manufacturer’s initial inventory in 
period 𝑡 with sample ?̂?𝑡. 
Solution Evaluation 
In the evaluation step, we evaluate the optimal policy parameters obtained in the 
optimization step. We first generate another realization of the manufacturer’s yield rate 
in each period, and define the set of these samples as ?̌?. We fix the policy parameters at 
the optimal values obtained from the optimization step, i.e., fix (𝐼, 𝐾) = (𝐼, ?̂?) in a TIP, 
(𝑆𝑀, 𝑆𝐻) = (?̂?𝑀, ?̂?𝐻) in a SFP, and (𝑆𝑀
𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃 , 𝑆𝐻
𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃) = (?̂?𝑀
𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃 , ?̂?𝐻
𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃) in a MSFP. Next, 
we compute and record the hospital and the manufacturer’s average profit over 𝑇 periods 
with the sample set ?̌? and the optimal policy parameters. In reality, the hospital may not 
know the manufacturer’s actual initial inventory in each period. Therefore, we consider 
two scenarios with different assumptions regarding the hospital’s knowledge about the 
manufacturer’s initial inventory in each period. In Scenario 1, the hospital knows the 
manufacturer’s initial inventory in period 𝑡, ?̌?𝑀𝑡. We compute and record the two parties’ 
average profit ?̌?𝑖
𝑗
, 𝑖 ∈ {𝐻,𝑀} and 𝑗 ∈ {𝑇𝐼𝑃, 𝑆𝐹𝑃,𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃}. In Scenario 2, the hospital does 
not know ?̌?𝑀𝑡, and she uses ?̂?𝑀
𝑗
 (the manufacturer’s average initial inventory solved in the 
optimization step) as her belief in each period. We compute and record the two parties’ 
average profit in this scenario, ?̌?𝑖
𝑗′
. Scenario 2 corresponds to the situation in which the 
hospital estimates the manufacturer’s average inventory level using analytical approaches 
and uses the result to guide her future actions.  
Bound Calculation   
To evaluate the hospital’s performance under a TIP and a SFP, we define two 
benchmark values for the worst case and the best case, respectively.  
Lower bound: 
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As discussed previously, in the worst-case scenario, the hospital applies a myopic 
policy by using the optimal solutions in the single-period model. We consider the profits 
in this scenario as the lower bound for the hospital’s average expected profit. Let 𝛱𝑖 
denote the lower bound on the profit of player 𝑖, 𝛱𝑖 = ?̌?𝑖
𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃, 𝑖 ∈ {𝐻,𝑀} 
Upper Bound: 
In the best-case scenario, the manufacturer has a perfect yield rate. Let 𝛱𝑖 be the 
average profit of player 𝑖 over 𝑇 periods in the best-case scenario, which is considered as 
an upper bound on the optimal profit of player 𝑖, 𝑖 ∈ {𝐻,𝑀} 
3.5.3 Performance Evaluation 
 Let 𝑅𝑖
𝑗
= ?̂?𝑖
𝑗
/𝛱𝑖 be the relative performance of player 𝑖 under inventory management 
policy 𝑗 compared with the best-case scenario, 𝑖 ∈ {𝐻,𝑀, } and 𝑗 ∈ {𝑇𝐼𝑃, 𝑆𝐹𝑃,𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃}. 
We present the relative performance 𝑅𝑖
𝑗
 when the yield rate changes in three ways. First, 
we fix the upper limit of the yield rate, 𝑏, and only change the lower limit, 𝑎 (Figure 3.9 
and Figure 3.10). Next, we isolate the effect of the mean and the variance of the yield 
rate, by changing the mean with a fixed variance (Figure 3.11 a and b), and changing the 
variance with a fixed mean (Figure 3.11 c and d), respectively. We also present the 
impact of 𝑐𝑅 on the relative performance 𝑅𝑖
𝑗
 by considering a low value of 𝑐𝑅 (𝑐𝑅 =
1.1𝑤, Figure 3.10) and a high value of 𝑐𝑅 (𝑐𝑅 = 1.5𝑤, Figure 3.9 and Figure 3.11).  
Table 3.4 summarizes the main differences among the parameter values for the figures 
Table 3.4: Summary of figures presented in subsection 3.5.3 
 Mean of 
 𝒖𝑴𝒕 
Variance of 
𝒖𝑴𝒕 
Knowledge 
about 𝒛𝑴𝒕 
Value of  
𝒄𝑹  
Figure 3.7 a and b Changing Changing Known High 
Figure 3.7 c and d Changing Changing Unknown High 
Figure 3.8 Changing Changing Known Low 
Figure 3.9 a and b Changing  Constant Known High 
Figure 3.9 c and d Constant Changing  Known High 
Low 𝑐𝑅: 𝑐𝑅 = 1.1𝑤. High 𝑐𝑅: 𝑐𝑅 = 1.5𝑤 
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presented in this section.  
 Refer to the TIP and the SFP as the long-term inventory management policies as 
opposed to the myopic policy (MSFP). We discuss some observations as follows. First, 
the graphs when 𝑧𝑀𝑡 is known are very similar to those when 𝑧𝑀𝑡 is unknown (Figure 3.9 
a and b vs. c and d), indicating that the hospital’s knowledge of the manufacturer’s initial 
inventory does not have a significant impact on the performance of the inventory 
management policies. This may be because the manufacturer’s average initial inventory 
solved in the optimization step is low. For all combinations of parameters considered in 
this section, ?̂?𝑀
𝑗
 is less than 10% of the total demand. This feature can also be observed 
when 𝑐𝑅 is low (the counterpart of Figure 3.8 when 𝑧𝑀𝑡 is unknown), and different 
combinations of 𝑎 and 𝑏 (the counterpart of Figure 3.9 when 𝑧𝑀𝑡 is unknown), which 
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Figure 3.9: The relative performance of player 𝑖 under inventory management policy 𝑗 
compared with the best-case scenario (𝑅𝑖
𝑗
= ?̂?𝑖
𝑗
/𝛱𝑖) with respect to 𝑎 with fixed 𝑏 =
1, 𝑖 ∈ {𝐻,𝑀}, 𝑗 ∈ {𝑇𝐼𝑃, 𝑆𝐹𝑃,𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃}. 𝑐𝑅 is high (𝑐𝑅 = 1.5𝑤). (a) and (b): 𝑧𝑀𝑡 is 
known to the hospital. (c) and (d): 𝑧𝑀𝑡 is unknown to the hospital. 
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graphs are not presented in this paper due to repetitiveness. Therefore, we conclude that 
the implementation of the two long-term inventory management policies does not require 
the hospital to know the manufacturer’s exact initial inventory in each period, as long as 
the hospital could come up with a reasonable estimation of the manufacturer’s average 
inventory using analytical approaches. Another consideration is to let the manufacturer 
have a certain level of safety stocks, and verify whether this property still holds, which 
can be a future extension to this study. 
Second, 𝑅𝑖
𝑗
 is low if the manufacturer’s yield rate is low (either 𝑎 is low with a 
constant 𝑏 as shown in Figure 3.9 and Figure 3.10, or the mean is low with a constant 
variance as shown in Figure 3.11 a and b), or the yield is highly uncertain (towards the 
left of Figure 3.11 c and d where the variance is large with a constant the mean). In other 
words, the hospital and the manufacturer’s profits are low if the manufacturer’s yield rate 
is low and/or highly uncertain. This result is intuitive, because the lower the reliability of 
the manufacturer (i.e., either the average yield rate is low, or the yield is varying in a 
wide range which is hard to predict and mitigate the risks), the lower the profits that both 
player can receive compared with a perfect yield scenario.  
Third, a TIP and a SFP have similar performance for the hospital, and both 
policies perform well with different parameters of the yield rate and the hospital’s regular 
 
(a)  
 
(b)  
 
Figure 3.10:  The relative performance of player 𝑖 under inventory management policy 
𝑗 compared with the best-case scenario (𝑅𝑖
𝑗
= ?̂?𝑖
𝑗
/𝛱𝑖) with respect to 𝑎 with fixed 𝑏 =
1, 𝑗 ∈ {𝑇𝐼𝑃, 𝑆𝐹𝑃,𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃}. 𝑐𝑅 is low (𝑐𝑅 = 1.1 𝑤)  and 𝑧𝑀𝑡 is known. 
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production cost. For example, when 𝑐𝑅 is high, the hospital’s relative performance under 
a TIP or a SFP compared with the best case scenario, 𝑅𝐻
𝑗
, is close to or greater than 80% 
(Figure 3.9 a and c, and Figure 3.11 a and c). When 𝑐𝑅 is low, Figure 3.10 a shows that 
𝑅𝐻
𝑗
 is greater than 90%. The graphs for a TIP and for SFP are very close to each other in 
these figures, indicating a comparable performance of the two policies for the hospital.  
In addition, the manufacturer’s relative performance is lower than the hospital’s 
relative performance (𝑅𝑀
𝑗
< 𝑅𝐻
𝑗
) for any given yield rate and inventory management 
policy, indicating that the impact of the yield uncertainty on the manufacturer’s relative 
performance is larger than that on the hospital’s relative performance. For example, 
Figure 3.9 a and b show that 𝑅𝑀
𝑗
< 𝑅𝐻
𝑗
 holds in all regions. And when 𝑎 = 0 and 𝑏 = 1, 
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Figure 3.11: The relative performance of player 𝑖 under inventory management policy 
𝑗 compared with the best-case scenario (𝑅𝑖
𝑗
= ?̂?𝑖
𝑗
/𝛱𝑖), 𝑗 ∈ {𝑇𝐼𝑃, 𝑆𝐹𝑃,𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃}. 𝑐𝑅 is 
high (𝑐𝑅 = 1.5𝑤), and 𝑧𝑀𝑡 is known to the hospital. (a) and (b): with respect to 𝜎
2 
with fixed 𝜇. (c) and (d): with respect to 𝜇 with fixed 𝜎2.  
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the relative performances of the hospital and the manufacturer are approximately 90% 
and 10%, respectively, under both a TIP and a SFP. The relationship that 𝑅𝑀
𝑗
< 𝑅𝐻
𝑗
, 𝑗 ∈
{𝑇𝐼𝑃, 𝑆𝐹𝑃}, can also be observed when 𝑐𝑅 is low (Figure 3.10 a and b), and with 
different combinations of parameters for the yield rate (Figure 3.11). This property may 
be because the hospital moves first, i.e., the hospital takes into consideration the yield 
uncertainty and the manufacturer’s best response function when choosing the policy 
parameters which determines her procurement quantities in each period. This property 
means the manufacturer may benefit more from improved yield rate and/or lower 
variability in his yield rate than the hospital does. 
Note that the manufacturer’s relative performance is zero under two 
circumstances. First, the hospital chooses a pure in-house production plan and does not 
purchase anything from the manufacturer because the benefit of a reliable source 
outweighs the benefit of a cheap but unreliable source. This situation is more likely to 
occur if 𝑐𝑅 is low (for the same parameter regions 𝑎 ∈ [0, 0.2], 𝑅𝑀
𝑗
> 0 in Figure 3.9 b 
with a high 𝑐𝑅, and 𝑅𝑀
𝑗
= 0 in Figure 3.10 b with a low 𝑐𝑅), or the yield rate is highly 
uncertain. Another situation under which  𝑅𝑀
𝑗
= 0 is when the mean of the yield rate is 
sufficiently low such that the it is not profitable for the manufacturer to make any 
production regardless of the order quantity from the hospital. This observation is 
consistent with Lemma 3.3 in the single-period setting, because Lemma 3.3 can be 
rewritten as: if  
𝑎+𝑏
2
<
𝑐𝑀
𝑤+𝑠𝑀
, then 𝑥𝑀
∗ = 0 ∀ 𝑞𝑀. For example, Figure 3.11 b shows that 
𝑅𝑀
𝑗
= 0 when 𝑎 ≤ 0.36 and 𝑏 ≤ 0.46, and  𝑅𝑀
𝑗
> 0 when 𝑎 > 0.36 and 𝑏 > 0.46. Thus, 
there is a jump in the hospital’s relative performance at 𝑎 = 0.36 and 𝑏 = 0.46 in Figure 
3.11 a, which is caused by the change of the manufacturer’s decision on whether to make 
production or not.  
Moreover, the performance loss caused by a myopic policy compared with either 
a TIP or a SFP (i.e., 𝑅𝑖
𝑗
− 𝑅𝑖
𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃, 𝑖 ∈ {𝐻,𝑀} and 𝑗 ∈ {𝑇𝐼𝑃, 𝑆𝐹𝑃}) depends on several 
parameters. The performance loss caused by a myopic policy is big if the yield rate is 
highly uncertain (Figure 3.9, Figure 3.10, and Figure 3.11 c and d). The performance loss 
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caused by a myopic policy is smaller (bigger) for the hospital (manufacturer) if 𝑐𝑅 is 
lower (compare Figure 3.10 with Figure 3.9 and Figure 3.11 c and d). If the yield rate is 
less uncertain (with a small and constant variance), then a myopic policy may perform 
closely to a TIP and a SFP. This can be observed from Figure 3.11, in which the graphs 
for a MSFP are very close to the graphs for a TIP and a SFP. 
Comparison of single-period vs. multi-period solutions 
The comparison between a MSFP with the two long-term inventory management 
policies shows some commonalities and differences between the single-period and the 
multi-period solutions. One common feature for both the single-period and multi-period 
models is that if 𝑐𝑅 is low, the yield rate is low or is highly uncertain, then the hospital 
prefers a pure in-house production plan (e.g., Figure 3.10 b, where 𝑅𝑀
𝑗
= 0, 𝑗 ∈
{𝑇𝐼𝑃, 𝑆𝐹𝑃,𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃}); if 𝑐𝑅 is high, the yield rate is high or is less uncertain, then the 
hospital prefers a pure-outsourcing plan (e.g., Figure 3.10 b, where 𝑅𝑀
𝑗
 changes smoothly 
in the region 𝑎 > 0.4 for 𝑗 ∈ {𝑇𝐼𝑃, 𝑆𝐹𝑃,𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃}, and the region 𝑎 > 0.6 for 𝑗 = 𝑀𝑆𝐹𝑃, 
respectively). 
One major difference is whether the hospital will use a mixed strategy or not. 
Under a MSFP, the hospital will only use a pure procurement strategy (either a pure in-
house production or a pure outsourcing strategy). Whereas under either a TIP or SFP, the 
hospital may use a pure procurement strategy or a mixed procurement strategy (procuring 
from both the manufacturer and the in-house producer). According to the single period 
solution, when the benefit of a reliable source (the in-house producer) outweighs the 
benefit of the cheaper but unreliable source (the manufacturer) (we characterize this 
situation by 𝑐𝑅 < 𝑐?̅?) , the hospital will only purchase the manufacturer’s initial 
inventory which is cheaper and without any yield risk, but she will not order any 
additional quantities from the manufacturer. However, if the manufacturer starts a period 
without any initial inventory, then the hospital will not purchase anything from the 
manufacturer. This does not provide incentives to the manufacturer to make production 
when he is also using a myopic policy as assumed. Therefore, the hospital ends up using 
a pure in-house production plan. On the other hand, under a long-term inventory 
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management policy, the hospital chooses the policy parameters by considering the 
advantages and disadvantages of each source over the long term. If the advantages of one 
source significantly outweigh the other, then the hospital will use a pure strategy. 
Otherwise, she will use a mixed strategy to balance the advantages and disadvantages of 
each source.  
One more difference is that the hospital is more likely to procure from the 
manufacturer in a long-term inventory management policy than in a myopic policy. 
Figure 3.10 b shows that the manufacturer’s profit remains zero for a larger region under 
a MSFP than under a TIP or a SFP.  
The differences between the long-term policies and the myopic policy have 
important implications. For example, in the range 𝑎 ∈ [0.2, 0.4] in Figure 3.10 b, the 
hospital’s optimal policy parameters under a TIP or a SFP will result in a mixed 
procurement strategy, under which both the hospital and the manufacturer will receive 
positive profit and stay in the supply chain for a long term. Whereas the hospital’s 
optimal policy parameters under a MSFP will result in a pure in-house production plan, 
under which the manufacturer may exit the supply chain eventually due to the lack of 
incentives, leaving the hospital’s in-house producer the only source of the drug. This is 
not a favorable situation for a resilient drug supply chain to mitigate shortages. As 
previously discussed, a MSFP causes performance loss for both the manufacturer and the 
hospital. These indicate the importance of implementing an inventory management 
policy from a long-term perspective.   
 Discussion 
Drug shortages are a serious problem threatening patients’ safety and adding a significant 
financial burden to many health care systems. Several US hospitals created a generic 
drug manufacturer to mitigate drug shortages. Our study investigates circumstances 
under which the hospitals would benefit from owning an in-house manufacturer, and we 
examine the impact on the external pharmaceutical manufacturers.  
 Our study has theoretical contributions to the existing literature of supply chain 
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risk management. We creatively integrate a game-theoretic model with a multi-stage 
stochastic programing model to analyze the interactions between a hospital and an 
external manufacturer. We analyze the hospital’s optimal ordering decisions from two 
sources (the external manufacturer, and an in-house manufacturer) under the presence of 
yield uncertainty. We analytically characterize the optimal decisions and profits for the 
hospital and the external manufacturer in a single-period model setting.  Based on the 
insights from the single period solutions, we then propose two long-term inventory 
management policies (a Target Inventory Policy and a Scale Factor Policy) and evaluate 
the performance of the two inventory management policies in a multi-period setting 
using a heuristic.  
Our study also provides managerial insights into the hospital’s optimal sourcing 
strategies and inventory management policies. We show that the hospital would benefit 
from using an in-house manufacturer to make regular production if the in-house 
production cost is low, the external manufacturer’s yield rate is low, or the external 
manufacturer’s yield is highly uncertain. The hospital can also benefit from making 
emergency production at the in-house manufacturer, if the emergency production cost is 
lower than the sum of the drug revenue and the shortage cost caused by the unavailability 
of the drug. Drug shortages can be mitigated if the hospital operates an in-house 
manufacturer as her regular source or contingent source, which confirms the value of the 
establishment of Civica Rx on mitigating drug shortages. 
The two long-term inventory management policies that we proposed have 
comparable and good performance for the hospital, indicating that the hospital can use 
either policy for the long-term inventory management practice. The manufacturer’s yield 
uncertainty has a larger impact on his own long-term profit than that on the hospital’s 
profit, indicating that it is beneficial for the manufacturer to make investment in 
improving his reliability.  
In addition, this study has important implications for hospitals’ drug procurement 
practice. Our analysis indicates that hospitals should trade-off between the procurement 
cost and other factors (e.g., shortage cost of the drug, and reliability of different 
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suppliers), instead of focusing only on procurement costs to choose the cheapest supplier, 
as observed in drug procurement practices in reality. Considering the long-term impact 
on the external manufacturers and the drug supply chain, hospitals should also procure 
drugs from both the internal and external manufacturers to avoid driving out the external 
manufacturers from the market.  
Our study has several limitations. First, our study focuses on drugs shortages 
caused by manufacturing reasons, which is the major cause of drug shortages. Future 
studies can incorporate other causes, such as supply disruptions due to natural disasters 
and unavailability of raw material. Another cause is that Pharmaceutical companies may 
deliberately create shortages by stopping production or discouraging sales for a cheaper 
form to favor a newer and more profitable form sold by themselves or their parent 
companies (Palmer, 2014). Future studies may analyze the impact of this business 
decision on drug shortages. Second, we assume that there is only one external 
manufacturer if the hospital does not operate an in-house producer. A direction to extend 
our study is to consider multiple external manufacturers and to analyze the dynamics of 
their interactions with the hospital.  
In addition, we assume all information is publicly known. However, the hospital 
and the manufacturer may hold private information about some parameters such as the 
production cost, and the yield rate. Another extension to our study is to incorporate 
information asymmetry and to examine the impact on the two parties’ optimal decisions 
and profits. Moreover, our model did not capture the fixed production cost, and may 
overestimate the benefit of a dual-sourcing strategy. Future studies can capture the fixed 
production cost and provide further insights into the value of the establishment of the 
hospital’s in-house producer. Furthermore, our model did not capture the impact on other 
hospitals that do not own an in-house manufacturing facility. It would be interesting to 
analyze the impact of the establishment of a hospital’s in-house producer on other 
hospitals’ benefit.  
Finally, drug shortages are a complex problem, and the solutions from the 
mathematical model should be implemented in the real world with consideration from a 
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systematic and long-term perspective. For example, our model suggests that the hospital 
prefers a pure in-house production strategy if the in-house production cost is low, or the 
external manufacturer’s yield rate is either low or highly uncertain. However, without 
any order quantities from the hospital, the external manufacturer may exit the market, 
leaving the hospital’s in-house producer as the sole source for the drug. This is not a 
favorable situation for mitigating drug shortages. Therefore, future studies can analyze 
mechanisms to incentivize the external manufacturer’s long-term production, which can 
be an extension to our work. 
There are other ways to further extend our study. For example, one could 
endogenize drug price as a decision, which applies to the situation where drug prices are 
not strictly regulated but could be determined or largely influenced by powerful 
pharmaceutical companies. In addition, due to the limited information of Civica Rx at 
present, we are not able to estimate the model parameters using real data. As more 
information becomes available in the future, one could estimate the model parameters for 
specific drugs and perform case studies to validate the results of our model in a more 
realistic manner. Moreover, we did not consider hospital’s strategy of holding safety 
stocks to mitigate shortages. This is mainly because many hospitals are using a just-in-
time purchasing strategy due to expiration date of many pharmaceutical products as well 
as the pressure of reducing carrying cost by keeping the drug inventories lean (Green, 
2015). Future studies may consider a strategy of holding safety stock to examine the 
relative benefit of producing drugs at an in-house manufacturing facility compared with 
carrying sufficient stocks.  
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Chapter 4  
4 Essay 3: Subsidies or Public Provision: Optimal 
Government Interventions on Mitigating Drug Shortages 
 Introduction 
Drug shortages have gained increasing attention from health care policymakers in recent 
years as they are a major challenge faced by many health care systems (MacLeod, 2020; 
McGinley, 2019). To mitigate drug shortages, government agencies such as FDA in the 
US have taken actions to collaborate with the pharmaceutical industry by sharing 
information, searching for alternative manufacturers, and importing critical drugs in 
shortage from other overseas manufacturers (Food and Drug Administration, 2018). The 
health authorities in Canada can also implement an expedited review process to speed up 
patient access to alternative drugs during a shortage, or use special access programs to 
provide physicians access to non-marketed drugs for treating life-threatening conditions 
if conventional drugs are not available (The Multi-Stakeholder Steering Committee on 
Drug Shortages in Canada, 2017).  
However, despite government actions, drug shortages are a persistent problem. 
Many shortages involve older, hard-to-make generic drugs where there are low-profit 
margins and high market concentration (Food and Drug Administration, 2019; McGinley, 
2019). Among them, sole-source drugs (drugs that are produced by a single 
manufacturer) are particularly vulnerable to shortages caused by manufacturing problems 
since the disruption cannot be absorbed by alternative suppliers (Blank, 2018). Due to the 
low profit margin, other manufacturers have little incentives to enter the market. Some 
experts concern that the sole-sourcing situation is not likely to change without any 
interventions (De Weerdt et al., 2015; Dranitsaris et al., 2017; Gagnon, 2012). 
Several policymakers argue that more government interventions are required to 
protect patient safety against drug shortages (MacLeod, 2020; McGinley, 2019; Milne et 
al., 2017). One strategy for government interventions is to provide subsidies. For 
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example, in 2018, the FDA appointed a task force to investigate drug shortages, including 
whether the US should develop a list of “essential drugs” which may get subsidies from 
the government. Another strategy for government intervention is to establish public 
manufacturers to produce certain critical drugs. In 2018, Senator Elizabeth Warren, 
proposed legislation that would create a new office within the Department of Health and 
Human Services to produce certain generic drugs in shortage (McGinley, 2019). Some 
Canadian experts also believe that Canada needs a Crown Corporation to manufacture 
crucial drugs that are not favored by pharmaceutical manufacturers in the private sector 
(MacLeod, 2020; Milne et al., 2017). 
 This study analyzes government interventions to mitigate drug shortages. We 
analyze two mitigating strategies: establishing a government-owned manufacturing 
facility, and providing subsidies. We evaluate the government’s payoff under the two 
strategies and in the status quo, which captures the monetary health benefit and the 
shortage cost of a drug, the cost of public provision, and the cost of subsidies. We 
formulate the problem using a supply chain management approach. We focus on the 
shortages caused by manufacturing problems (e.g., quality issues, manufacturing delays), 
which are a major cause or drug shortages in many counties in recent years (JAVMA 
News, 2019; Malacos, 2019). We model drug shortages as a result of yield uncertainties 
at the manufacturing facilities. 
Pharmaceutical supply chains often have wholesalers (also known as distributors) 
and manufacturers as the primary stakeholders who make procurement or production 
decisions. These decisions have significant impacts on the supply and availability of 
drugs. Wholesalers purchase and distribute a wide variety of pharmaceutical products so 
that hospitals and pharmacies do not need to deal with different manufacturers for 
different drugs (Fein, 2017; Healthcare Distribution Alliance, 2018). Wholesalers can 
increase the efficiency of pharmaceutical supply chains by saving time, effort, and costs 
for hospitals and pharmacies on drug procurement (The Multi-Stakeholder Steering 
Committee on Drug Shortages, 2017). Our study focuses on the situation where a single 
wholesaler is dealing with several hospitals and pharmacies in the jurisdiction of a 
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government. Our study also focuses on the most vulnerable pharmaceutical supply chain 
in which there is only one manufacturer. 
We investigate the following research questions:  
• Whether a government should establish a manufacturing facility to mitigate drug 
shortages? 
• Could the government achieve the same performance level by using subsidies? 
• What are the impacts of government intervention on the private sector? 
We construct a game-theoretic model to analyze the interactions among three players in a 
pharmaceutical supply chain: a wholesaler, a private manufacturer, and a government. 
The wholesaler procures a drug from the manufacturer and sells it to the downstream 
demand, such as hospitals and pharmacies. The manufacturer’s production is subject to 
random yield, which may cause drug shortages. The wholesaler chooses the order 
quantity from the manufacturer, and then the manufacturer chooses the planned 
production quantity. We formulate three individual models depending on the 
government’s actions. The government can either do nothing (basic model/status quo); 
create a manufacturing facility (dual sourcing model); or provide subsidies to the 
wholesaler (subsidy model).  
We assume the government subsidizes the wholesaler for two reasons. First, 
pharmaceutical wholesalers’ profit margin is much lower than pharmaceutical 
manufacturers’ profit margin. For example, US pharmaceutical manufacturers and 
wholesalers’ average profit margin are 50% and 19% for generic drugs, and 76% and 1%  
for branded drugs, respectively (Sood et al., 2017). Second, pharmaceutical 
manufacturers are mainly facing R&D and sales risks, whereas pharmaceutical 
wholesalers are mostly facing inventory risks (Dai and Tayur, 2018; Sood et al., 2017). 
Therefore, we assume the government subsidizes the wholesaler to increase the 
wholesaler’s profit margin and incentivize an increase of the wholesaler’s order quantity 
from the manufacturer.  
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We consider two types of subsidies to the wholesaler: a unit subsidy to its 
procured quantity, and a unit subsidy to its sales quantity, respectively. These two types 
of subsides are studied in previous supply chain literature as incentives provided by 
manufacturers or donors to increase retailers’ order quantity under demand uncertainties 
(Dreze and Bell, 2003; Taylor and Xiao, 2014). In those studies, retailers can be 
considered as intermediaries between manufacturers and consumers. Whereas in our 
study, wholesalers can be considered as the intermediary between the manufacturers and 
the downstream party (hospitals and pharmacies which represent the demand of the 
drug). Therefore, we adopt the same structure of the unit subsidies and analyze whether 
they can effectively mitigate supply side uncertainties.   
We first analytically characterize the optimal values in each of the three models. 
Next, we compare the performance of each mitigating strategy (the dual sourcing strategy 
and the subsidy strategy) with the status quo. This comparison provides insights into the 
situations in which the government prefers one strategy over the other, or only one 
particular strategy is available. We finally compare the three models together and 
examine the government’s optimal choice if both strategies are available options.  
Our study has several interesting findings. An advantage of both mitigating 
strategies is that both a subsidy strategy and a dual sourcing strategy can effectively 
reduce the shortage amounts compared with the status quo. A difference between the two 
mitigating strategies is their abilities to align the incentives of different parties. A subsidy 
strategy can be mutually preferred by the three parties and achieve Pareto improvement, 
whereas a dual sourcing strategy can align the incentives of the government and the 
wholesaler, but the manufacturer is no better off under a dual sourcing strategy compared 
with the status quo. Therefore, under a dual sourcing strategy, the government and/or the 
wholesaler may need to consider incentives to the private manufacturer. Otherwise, the 
private manufacturer may leave the market in the long term, which is not a favorable 
situation in which the public manufacturer became the sole source of the supply chain. 
This study also has policy implications regarding governments’ decisions on the 
types of shortage mitigating policies under different circumstances. For example, we 
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found that if the wholesaler’s profit margin is low and the shortage cost is high, then the 
government should implement a subsidy strategy. The subsidy should be paid to the 
wholesaler based on its unit procurement cost rather than its unit selling price. If the 
wholesaler’s profit margin is intermediate and the shortage cost is high, then the 
government should produce drugs at a public manufacturer. If the shortage cost is low 
and the wholesaler’s profit margin is either low or high, then the government does not 
need to take any actions.  
 Literature Review 
This study is closely related to four streams of literature: (1) supply chain disruptions 
with multiple decision-makers; (2) lot sizing and sourcing strategies to mitigate supply 
chain disruptions; (3) subsidies to mitigate supply chain uncertainties ; (4) mitigating 
strategies for drug shortages from a pharmaceutical supply chain perspective. We 
discussed streams 1, 2 and 4 in the literature review (section 3.2) in Essay 2 and will skip 
them in this Essay to avoid repetition. We discuss stream 3 and the contribution of this 
study as follows.   
Subsidy strategies to mitigate supply uncertainties 
Xia et al. (2011) studied two contract mechanisms (an option contract and a firm order 
contract) to share demand and supply risk between an unreliable supplier and a buyer. 
The authors analyzed two operational strategies that can be used by the buyer to mitigate 
the supply disruption risk: the use of an alternate reliable supplier and to provide 
subsidies to the supplier to improve reliability. The subsidy in their study is a costly 
investment to reduce the probability of disruption, which is a different type of subsidy 
from our study.  
Taylor and Xiao (2014) investigated a donor’s optimal subsidy decision to 
improve the availability and affordability of recommended malaria drugs provided by the 
private-sector in some developing countries. The authors constructed a game-theoretic 
model between a donor and a retailer of a malaria drug subject to demand uncertainties. 
This is the only subsidy study on mitigating demand side uncertainties that we include in 
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this literature review because of the similarity of their subsidies with our study. Their 
study compared two types of subsidies that the donor can provide to the retailer to 
increase the availability of the drug: a per-unit purchase subsidy (paid to the retailer’s 
purchased quantities), and a per-unit sales subsidy (paid to the retailer’s sales quantity). 
The author found that donors should only subsidize retailers’ purchase but not the sales.  
 Raz and Ovchinnikov (2015) analyzed government rebates and subsidies for 
public interest goods with externalities (e.g., electric vehicles and vaccines). The authors 
extended the newsvendor framework with price-dependency to account for externalities. 
Their study found that rebates to consumers are much better than subsidies to 
manufacturers. Cai et al. (2017) studied contracts to coordinate a vendor-managed 
inventory (VMI) supply chain with one retailer and one unreliable supplier under the 
presence of yield uncertainty. The authors compared two contracts: an option contract, 
and a subsidy contract, and they also considered a replenishment tactic. In their subsidy 
contract, the retailer will pay the supplier a unit subsidy for unsold products. Guo et al. 
(2019) studied government subsidy, optimal recovery and production strategies for the 
closed-loop supply chain with supply disruption. The authors constructed a model with a 
manufacturing and a remanufacturing system, and assumed that the buyback cost, return 
rate and remanufacturing cost are function of quality level of returned item. The study 
showed that the government can apply an appropriate subsidy policy to encourage the 
recycling of returned items.  
 Peng and Pang (2019) studied the optimal strategies for an agricultural supply 
chain consisting of three players: a risk-averse farmer who is subject to a yield 
uncertainty, a risk-neutral supplier and a risk-neutral distributor. The authors consider a 
subsidy which can be offered by a government to the farmer in terms of the acreage of 
the farm size. Ye et al. (2020) studied a bioenergy supply chain consisting of a 
government, a bioenergy producer, and 𝑛 risk-averse farmers who grow the biomass 
feedstocks with yield uncertainties. The authors compared two subsides that can be 
provided by the government to mitigate supply uncertainties: a farmer subsidy program 
(subsidy to the farmers per unit acreage) and a bioenergy producer subsidy program 
(subsidy to the bioenergy producer’s per unit of bioenergy produced). They found the 
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conditions under which each subsidy can more effectively increase the reliability of 
feedstocks supply. 
The contribution of this research 
In this research of government mitigating strategies for drug shortages, we make the 
following contributions: 
• We develop a pharmaceutical supply chain model that incorporates interactions 
among three important decision-makers – a manufacturer, a wholesaler, and a 
government. We are not aware of any previous studies that captured the interactions 
among these three parties in a single model to study supply chain risk management in 
either pharmaceutical or non-pharmaceutical settings. Our study incorporates a total 
number of five decisions that are sequentially made by the three parties, and we are 
able to analytically characterize the optimal solutions.    
• We evaluate two strategies which can be implemented by government agencies: 
establishing a public manufacturer, and providing subsides to the wholesaler. We are 
not aware of any existing studies comparing these two types of strategies from the 
government’s perspective. Our study provides economical foundations for the 
advantages and disadvantages of each strategy. It has theoretical contributions to the 
existing literature of mitigating supply disruption, and it also has policy implications 
for government interventions to mitigate shortages.  
 Model 
We develop a pharmaceutical supply chain consisting of three decision-makers: a 
wholesaler (W), a private manufacturer (M, the manufacturer) that is subject to yield 
uncertainty, and a government (G). Let 𝑖 be the index for the three decision-makers, 𝑖 ∈
{𝑊,𝑀, 𝐺}. We consider a single period setting for one drug. We formulate three 
individual models depending on the government’s actions. The government can either do 
nothing (basic model/status quo); operate a government-owned manufacturer (dual 
sourcing model); or provide subsidies to the wholesaler (subsidy model). Figure 4.1 
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schematically illustrates the three models in the pharmaceutical supply chain. We assume 
that all parameters and decisions are publicly known to all parties. We adopt the 
convention that 𝐴+ = max{0, 𝐴}, and 𝐸[∙] denotes the expected value. All model notation 
is summarized in Table 4.1. 
4.3.1 Basic Model 
We first describe the basic model (Model B, denoted by superscript B) in which the  
 
(a) Basic Model 
 
(b) Dual Sourcing Model 
 
(c) Subsidy Model 
 
Figure 4.1: A schematic illustration of the pharmaceutical supply chain. (a) Basic 
Model/Status Quo (b) Dual Sourcing Model. (c) Subsidy Model. 
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government does not take any action to mitigate shortages. We assume that the 
wholesaler is facing a deterministic demand 𝑑 for a drug. This is because a sudden 
increase in demand is typically not a major cause of drug shortages (Malacos, 2019). This 
assumption is also used in other modeling studies on supply uncertainties (e.g., Hou et al. 
(2017) and Tucker et al. (2019)), and it allows us to focus on the supply-side 
uncertainties. The wholesaler procures the drug from the manufacturer at an exogenous 
wholesale price 𝑤𝑀. Although drug prices may increase after a drug shortage (Alevizakos 
et al., 2016), our model applies to the situation in many countries where drug price is 
Table 4.1: Summary of notation 
Symbol Description 
Decisions  
𝑞𝑖 Wholesaler’s order quantity from player 𝑖, 𝑖 ∈ {𝑀, 𝐺} 
𝑥𝑀 Manufacturer’s planned production quantity 
𝑥𝐺  Government’s planned production quantity at the in-house producer 
𝛾𝑤 Government’s s subsidy to the wholesaler’s unit procurement cost  
𝛾𝑝 Government’s s subsidy to the wholesaler’s unit selling price 
Random Variable 
𝑢𝑀 Manufacturer’s random yield rate, 𝑢𝑀 ∈ [𝑢, ?̅?], with a PDF 𝑓(∙), a 
CDF 𝐹(∙), a mean 𝜇, and a variance 𝜎2 
Parameters  
𝑖 Index for the three players, 𝑖 ∈ {𝐺,𝑀,𝑊}. G: government; M: the 
private manufacturer; W: the wholesaler 
𝑗 Index for the models, 𝑗 ∈ {𝐵, 𝑆, 𝐷}. 𝐵: basic model; 𝑆: subsidy 
model; 𝐷: dual sourcing model 
𝑑 Wholesaler’s deterministic demand for the drug  
𝑠𝐺 Government’s unit shortage cost  
𝑐𝑖 Player 𝑖’s unit production cost, 𝑖 ∈ {𝐺,𝑀}  
𝑤𝑖 The drug price that the wholesalers pays to player 𝑖,  𝑖 ∈ {𝐺,𝑀} 
𝑝 Wholesaler’s unit selling price of the drug 
𝑚 The wholesaler’s markup parameter,  𝑚 > 1 .  𝑚 − 1  is the markup 
percentage of the wholesaler’s unit selling price over 𝑤𝑀  i.e., 𝑝 =
𝑚𝑤𝑀 
𝑏 The monetary health benefit of each unit of the drug 
 Calculated quantities 
𝑦𝑖
𝑗
 The delivered quantity from player 𝑖 in Model 𝑗. The expected 
delivered quantity for player 𝑖 is 𝑌𝑖
𝑗
= 𝐸[𝑦𝑖
𝑗
] 
𝛱𝑖
𝑗
 The expected utility function for player 𝑖 
𝑧𝑗 The shortage amount in model 𝑗 . The expected shortage amount is 
𝑍𝑗 = 𝐸[𝑧𝑗]  
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highly regulated and is not likely to be affected by the manufacturer or change in the 
short run (Hou et al., 2017).  
The wholesaler sells the drug to the downstream parties in the drug supply chain 
at an exogenous price 𝑝. The selling price represents a markup over the drug price, i.e., 
𝑝 = 𝑚𝑤𝑀, where 𝑚 > 1 is the wholesaler’s markup parameter which is a constant. This 
is because the fees from wholesaling and distributing services are generally computed as 
a percentage of drugs’ list price (Fein, 2015). The wholesaler’s markup may be affected 
by legislations, therapeutic class, generic vs. brand-name drugs, and many other factors. 
We assume that the manufacturer faces a stochastically proportional yield rate 𝑢𝑀. Let 
𝑢𝑀 be a continuous random variable distributed on the interval [𝑢, ?̅?], 0 ≤ 𝑢 < ?̅? ≤ 1, 
according to a probability density function (PDF), 𝑓(∙), and a cumulative distribution 
function (CDF), 𝐹(∙), with a mean, 𝜇, and a variance 𝜎2. 
Taking into consideration the yield uncertainty, the wholesaler chooses the order 
quantity from the manufacturer, 𝑞𝑀. Next, the manufacturer chooses the production 
quantity, 𝑥𝑀, and produces the drug at a unit production cost 𝑐𝑀 ≤ 𝑤𝑀. The yield 
uncertainty is realized, and the production is completed. The manufacturer delivers 𝑦𝑀
𝐵  to 
the wholesaler, 𝑦𝑀
𝐵 = min{𝑢𝑀𝑥𝑀, 𝑞𝑀} (i.e., the manufacturer will deliver the realized 
production quantity, 𝑢𝑀𝑥𝑀, up to the wholesaler’s order quantity). The wholesaler then 
distributes a total amount of 𝑦𝑊
𝐵  to the downstream parties, 𝑦𝑊
𝐵  = min{𝑑, 𝑦𝑀
𝐵 } (i.e., the 
wholesaler will distribute all available inventories up to the demand for the drug). 
Each unit of the drug has a benefit 𝑏, which could be considered as the expected 
monetary health benefit of consuming one unit of the drug. We assume that the 
government cares about the net monetary health benefit, 𝑏 − 𝑝. This is because of the 
public nature of the government, i.e., the government cares about the purchasing cost to 
achieve the health benefit. This assumption is similar to other modeling studies (e.g., 
Barros (2011) and Mahjoub et al. (2018)).  
The drug is subject to shortages due to yield uncertainty and possible double 
marginalization (i.e., the manufacturer and the wholesaler have different incentives and 
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markups in the supply chain, and this may cause inefficiency of their production 
decisions compared with the social optimal level). The shortage amount is the unfulfilled 
demand, 𝑧𝐵 = 𝑑 − 𝑦𝑊
𝐵 . The government incurs a unit shortage cost for the unfulfilled 
demand, 𝑠𝐺 ≥ 0. This shortage cost should include patients’ welfare loss, staff time on 
searching for alternative drugs, and any other costs that are caused by the unavailability 
of the drug and the government cares about. If the drug enables complex procedures (e.g., 
saline solution, painkillers, and anesthetics required for surgeries) or is a lifesaving drug 
which has a large impact on patients’ welfare, then 𝑠𝐺 can be very high.  
The expected profit for player 𝑖 in the basic model, 𝛱𝑖
𝐵, is calculated as follows.  
 𝛱𝑊
𝐵 (𝑞𝑀) = 𝐸[𝑝𝑦𝑊
𝐵 − 𝑤𝑀𝑦𝑀
𝐵 ] (4.1) 
 𝛱𝑀
𝐵(𝑥𝑀)|𝑞𝑊𝑀 = 𝐸[𝑤𝑀𝑦𝑀
𝐵 − 𝑐𝑀𝑞𝑀] (4.2) 
 𝛱𝐺
𝐵|𝑥𝑀, 𝑞𝑀 = 𝐸[(𝑏 − 𝑝)𝑦𝑊
𝐵 − 𝑠𝐺(𝑑 − 𝑦𝑊
𝐵 )] (4.3) 
The wholesaler’s expected profit function (Equation 4.1) consists of the revenue 
of selling the drug and the procurement cost paid to the manufacturer. The 
manufacturer’s expected profit function (Equation 4.2) consists of the payment received 
from the wholesaler and the production cost. Although the government is not an active 
decision-maker in the basic model, we calculate its expected utility for comparison with 
the other strategies. The government’s expected utility (Equation 4.3) captures the total 
net monetary benefit of the drug and the total shortage cost, which can be considered as 
the patient welfare. The government can be considered as a health authority – it cares 
about patient welfare but does not concern the benefit of the companies (i.e., the 
wholesaler and the manufacturer). 
4.3.2 Dual Sourcing Model 
Under a dual sourcing strategy (Model D, denoted by superscript D), the government 
operates a government-owned manufacturer to provide additional supplies to the 
wholesaler to mitigate shortages. The government makes decisions on behalf of the 
government-owned manufacturer, i.e., they are the same decision unit. To differentiate 
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the two manufacturer facilities, we refer to the private manufacturer as the manufacturer, 
and we refer to the government-owned manufacturer as GM.  
GM produces the drug at a unit production cost 𝑐𝐺 > 𝑐𝑀. We assume that GM is 
perfectly reliable, i.e., it has a perfect yield rate. The reason is three-fold. First, some 
manufacturers produce drugs using decades-old equipment, which are vulnerable to 
manufacturing problems (Woodcock and Wosinska, 2013). The newly established GM 
may be more reliable than the manufacturer because of the newer equipment and 
advanced technology. Second, the government’s main motivation for operating a 
manufacturer is to produce the drug in a more reliable way to mitigate shortages. 
Therefore, GM may have better maintenance and quality control than the manufacturer 
does. Third, GM may still have random yield, but it keeps on working until the planned 
quantity is fully produced, which also explains why its production cost is higher than the 
manufacturer. The assumption of a perfect yield rate for the more reliable supplier is also 
used in other studies on supply disruptions, such as Tomlin (2006) and Chen et al. (2012). 
GM provides the drug to the wholesaler at a wholesale price 𝑤𝐺 > 𝑤𝑀, i.e., the 
more reliable source is more expensive. As in the basic model, 𝑝 still represents a markup 
on 𝑤𝑀, i.e., 𝑝 = 𝑚𝑤𝑀. Note that we do not make any assumption about the relative 
ordering of 𝑤𝐺 and 𝑐𝐺. This is because the government may be willing to provide the 
drug at a price that is lower than its production cost, due to the shortage cost and/or 
benefit of the drug.  
At the beginning of the period, the wholesaler chooses the order quantities from 
the manufacturer and GM, 𝑞𝑀 and 𝑞𝐺, respectively. Next, the manufacturer and GM 
simultaneously choose the production quantities, 𝑥𝑀 and 𝑥𝐺 , respectively. The two 
manufacturing facilities produce the drug, and the yield rate 𝑢𝑀 is realized. The 
manufacturer and GM then deliver 𝑦𝑀
𝐷  and 𝑦𝐺
𝐷 to the wholesaler, respectively.  
We assume that the wholesaler may purchase more than the original order 
quantity from the two manufacturers if needed. To explain this assumption, we imagine 
dividing 𝑦𝑖
𝐷 into two rounds of procurement, 𝑦𝑖1
𝐷  and 𝑦𝑖2
𝐷 , respectively, i.e., 𝑦𝑖
𝐷 = 𝑦𝑖1
𝐷 +
𝑦𝑖2
𝐷 , 𝑖 ∈ {𝑀, 𝐺}. The first round of procurement is based on the order quantities in the 
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original procurement contracts (i.e., 𝑞𝑊𝑀 and 𝑞𝐺). In this first round of procurement, the 
manufacturer and GM deliver up to the original order quantities, 𝑦𝑀1
𝐷 = min{𝑢𝑀𝑥𝑀, 𝑞𝑀} 
and 𝑦𝐺1
𝐷 = min{𝑥𝐺 , 𝑞𝐺}.  
If there is still a shortage after the first round of procurement, then the wholesaler 
can procure the leftover stocks from the two manufacturing facilities in the second round, 
which allows the wholesaler to purchase more than the order quantities indicated in the 
original contract. Because 𝑤𝑀 < 𝑤𝐺, the wholesaler will first exhaust the manufacturer’s 
leftover stock before purchasing any additional unit from GM. Therefore, in the second 
round of procurement, the wholesaler purchases 𝑦𝑀2
𝐷  unit from the manufacturer, where 
𝑦𝑀2
𝐷 = min{(𝑢𝑀𝑥𝑀 − 𝑞𝑀)
+, (𝑑 − 𝑦𝑀1
𝐷 − 𝑦𝐺1
𝐷 )+} . The first term in 𝑦𝑀2
𝐷  is the 
manufacturer’s leftover stock, and the second term is the quantity still short after the first 
round of procurement. The wholesaler then purchases 𝑦𝐺2
𝐷  from GM, where 𝑦𝐺2
𝐷 =
min{(𝑥𝐺 − 𝑞𝐺)
+, (𝑑 − 𝑦𝑀1
𝐷 − 𝑦𝐺1
𝐷 − 𝑦𝑀2
𝐷 )+}. The first term in 𝑦𝐺2
𝐷  is the GM’s leftover 
stock, and the second term is the wholesaler’s shortage quantity after exhausting the 
manufacturer’s leftover stocks. The wholesaler then uses its available stocks to satisfy the 
demand, and its delivered quantity is 𝑦𝑊
𝐷 = min{𝑑, 𝑦𝑀
𝐷 + 𝑦𝐺
𝐷}. Finally, costs and revenues 
are realized. 
Player 𝑖’s expected profit in Model D, 𝛱𝑖
𝐷, is calculated as follows.  
𝛱𝑊
𝐷 (𝑞𝑀, 𝑞𝐺) = 𝐸[𝑝𝑦𝑊
𝐷 − 𝑤𝑀𝑦𝑀
𝐷 − 𝑤𝐺𝑦𝐺
𝐷] (4.4) 
𝛱𝑀
𝐷(𝑥𝑀)|𝑞𝑀, 𝑞𝐺 = 𝐸[𝑤𝑀𝑦𝑀
𝐷 − 𝑐𝑀𝑥𝑀] (4.5) 
𝛱𝐺
𝐷(𝑥𝐺)|𝑞𝑀, 𝑞𝐺 = 𝐸[(𝑏 − 𝑝)𝑦𝑊
𝐷 +𝑤𝐺𝑦𝐺
𝐷 − 𝑐𝐺𝑥𝐺 −  𝑠𝐺(𝑑 − 𝑦𝑊
𝐷 )] (4.6) 
The wholesaler’s profit function (Equation 4.4) captures the revenue and the 
procurement costs paid to the two manufacturing facilities. The manufacturer’s profit 
(Equation 4.5) is the same as in the basic model. The government’s utility (Equation 4.6) 
includes the net monetary benefit, revenue received from the wholesaler, production cost, 
and shortage cost. 
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4.3.3 Subsidy Model 
Under a subsidy strategy (Model S, denoted by a superscript S), the government does not 
own a manufacturing facility. Instead, it uses subsidies to mitigate shortages. As 
discussed in the introduction, we assume that the government provides two types of 
subsidies to the wholesaler. The first type is a unit subsidy to the wholesaler’s unit 
procurement cost (the procurement cost subsidy), 𝛾𝑤 < 𝑤𝑀, which brings the 
wholesaler’s actual unit procurement cost down to 𝑤𝑀 − 𝛾𝑤. The second type is a unit 
subsidy to the wholesaler’s unit selling price (the selling price subsidy), 𝛾𝑝, which brings 
the wholesaler’s actual unit revenue up to 𝑝 + 𝛾𝑝.  
In the subsidy model, the government chooses the value of the subsidy at the 
beginning, and then, the sequence proceeds as described in the basic model. The expected 
utility function for Player 𝑖 in Model S, 𝛱𝑖
𝑆, can be expressed as follows.  
𝛱𝐺
𝑆(𝛾𝑤, 𝛾𝑝) = 𝐸[(𝑏 − 𝑝)𝑦𝑊
𝑆 − 𝑠𝐺(𝑑 − 𝑦𝑊
𝑆 ) − 𝛾𝑤𝑦𝑀
𝑆 − 𝛾𝑝𝑦𝑊
𝑆 ] (4.7) 
𝛱𝑊
𝑆 (𝑞𝑀)|𝛾𝑤 , 𝛾𝑝 = 𝐸[(𝑝 + 𝛾𝑝)𝑦𝑊
𝑆 − (𝑤𝑀 − 𝛾𝑤)𝑦𝑀
𝑆 ] (4.8) 
𝛱𝑀
𝑆 (𝑥𝑀)|𝑞𝑀, 𝛾𝑤, 𝛾𝑝 = 𝐸[𝑤𝑀𝑦𝑀
𝑆 − 𝑐𝑀𝑥𝑀] (4.9) 
Where 𝑦𝑀
𝑆 = min{𝑢𝑀𝑥𝑀, 𝑞𝑀} and. The government’s utility function (Equation 
4.7) includes the net benefit of the drug, the shortage cost, and the subsidy payments. The 
wholesaler’s profit function (Equation 4.8) captures the actual revenue from selling the 
drug and the actual procurement cost, including the subsides. The manufacturer’s profit 
function (Equation 4.9) includes revenue and production costs.  
Let 𝑗 be the index for the superscript for each model, 𝑗 ∈ {𝐵, 𝐷, 𝑆}. Figure 4.2 
summarizes the sequence of events in each model.  
 Structural Results 
In this section, we derive the closed-form solutions and discuss some structural 
properties. In model 𝑗, player 𝑖 makes decision(s) to maximize its expected utility 
according to the game sequence. We solve each model using backward induction. 
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Throughout the analysis, we assume that 𝑢𝑀 is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1, to 
simplify the model and obtain closed-form solutions. This is a commonly used 
assumption (e.g., Keren, 2009 and Li et al., 2010). The terms “increasing” and 
“decreasing” in this section are used in the weak sense (i.e., increasing means non-
decreasing, and decreasing means non-increasing.)  
4.4.1 Model B 
We first solve the manufacturer’s expected profit function and obtain its best response 
function for the production decision, ?̃?𝑀
𝐵 , which is presented in Lemma 4.1. Details of the 
formal proofs are found in the appendix. 
Lemma 4.1: The manufacturer’s best response function for the production decision for 
any given order quantity from the wholesaler is given by:  
a. When 𝜇𝑤𝑀 ≤ 𝑐𝑀, ?̃?𝑀
𝐵 = 0 ∀𝑞𝑀. 
b. When 𝜇𝑤𝑀 > 𝑐𝑀,  ?̃?𝑀
𝐵 (𝑞𝑀) = 𝛼𝑞𝑀, where 𝛼 = √
𝑤𝑀
2𝑐𝑀
> 1.  
Lemma 4.1.a indicates that when the expected revenue of producing the drug 
(𝜇𝑤𝑀) is less than the production cost, then the manufacturer will not produce anything 
regardless of the wholesaler’s order quantity. Therefore, we assume 𝜇𝑤𝑀 > 𝑐𝑀 (i.e., 
𝑤𝑀 > 2𝑐𝑀) throughout the analysis to guarantee the manufacturer’s participation in the 
Figure 4.2: The sequence of events in each model 
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game. Lemma 4.1.b indicates that when 𝜇𝑤𝑀 > 𝑐𝑀, the manufacturer uses a coefficient, 
𝛼, to adjust its planned production quantity for any given order quantity from the 
wholesaler. Based on the assumption that 𝑤𝑀 > 2𝑐𝑀, we know 𝛼 > 1 , i.e., the 
manufacturer’s planned production quantity is always greater than then wholesaler’s 
order quantity. This is an intuitive result due to the existence of the yield uncertainty.  
 Let ∗ be the superscript for the optimal values. We solve the wholesaler’s 
expected profit function and obtain its optimal ordering decision, 𝑞𝑀
𝐵∗, which is 
summarized in Proposition 4.1.  
Proposition 4.1: The wholesaler’s optimal ordering quantity is given by: 
  𝑞𝑀
𝐵∗ = 𝜏𝑑, where 𝜏 = √
𝑚
(2𝛼−1)
. 
Proposition 4.1 indicates that the wholesaler uses a coefficient 𝜏 to adjust its order 
quantity as a function of the demand. Let 𝑆𝑗∗ be the expected shortage amount under 
equilibrium in model 𝑗. We then present the expected shortage amount in Model B, 𝑆𝐵∗. 
Lemma 4.2: The expected shortage amount under the optimal solution in Model B is 
given by  
  𝑆𝐵∗ =
𝑑
2𝛼𝜏
. 
Lemma 4.2 indicates that the expected shortage amount is jointly affected by the 
manufacturer and the wholesaler’s adjustment coefficient 𝛼 and 𝜏. We examine some 
properties of the optimal solutions and shortage amount in Proposition 4.2.  
Proposition 4.2: The optimal solutions and shortage amount in Model B have the 
following properties: 
a. 
𝜕𝑞𝑀
𝐵∗
𝜕𝑚
> 0; 
𝜕𝑥𝑀
𝐵∗
𝜕𝑚
> 0; 
𝜕𝑆𝐵∗
𝜕𝑚
< 0 
b. 
𝜕𝑞𝑀
𝐵∗
𝜕𝑤𝑀
< 0; 
𝜕𝑥𝑀
𝐵∗
𝜕𝑤𝑀
> 0; 
𝜕𝑆𝐵∗
𝜕𝑤𝑀
< 0 
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c. 
𝜕𝑞𝑀
𝐵∗
𝜕𝑐𝑀
> 0; 
𝜕𝑥𝑀
𝐵∗
𝜕𝑐𝑀
< 0; 
𝜕𝑆𝐵∗
𝜕𝑐𝑀
> 0  
Proposition 4.2.a indicates the impact of the wholesaler’s markup (𝑚) on the 
optimal values. As 𝑚 increases, the wholesaler will increase its order quantity to pursue a 
high profit, and the manufacturer will increase its production quantity. As a result, the 
shortage amount will decrease. Proposition 4.2.b indicates that the manufacturer’s selling 
price (𝑤𝑀) has an opposite impact on the wholesaler and the manufacturer’s optimal 
decisions. As 𝑤𝑀 increases, knowing that the manufacturer will increases the adjustment 
factor 𝛼 for any order quantity, the wholesaler will decrease its order quantity 
accordingly. On the other hand, as 𝑤𝑀 increases, the manufacturer will increase its 
production quantity to pursue a higher revenue. As a result, the shortage amount is 
decreasing in 𝑤𝑀. Proposition 4.2.c shows that the manufacturer’s unit production cost 
(𝑐𝑀) has an opposite impact with 𝑤𝑀 on the manufacturer and the wholesaler’s optimal 
decisions as well as the shortage amount. This is because 𝑤𝑀 is the manufacturer’s unit 
revenue, whereas 𝑐𝑀 is its unit production cost.  
4.4.2 Model D  
In Model D, we first solve the manufacturer and the government’s expected utility 
functions simultaneously to generate their best response functions ?̃?𝑀
𝐷  and ?̃?𝐺
𝐷, 
respectively.  
Lemma 4.3: The manufacturer and the government’s best response functions for any 
given order quantities from the wholesaler are given by: 
  ?̃?𝑀
𝐷(𝑞𝑀) = 𝛼𝑞𝑀 
  ?̃?𝐺
𝐷(𝑞𝑀) = (𝑑 − 𝛽𝛼𝑞𝑀)
+ 
Where 𝛼 is as defined in Lemma 4.1 and 𝛽 =
𝑐𝐺
𝑏−𝑝+𝑠𝐺+𝑤𝐺
. 
Lemma 4.3 states the following: the manufacturer’s best response function is the 
same as it in the basic model; GM uses an adjustment factor 𝛽 to adjust the 
manufacturer’s production quantity, and produces the gap between the adjusted quantity 
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(𝛽𝛼𝑞𝑀) and the demand. Note that GM will not produce anything if the adjusted quantity 
𝛽𝛼𝑞𝑀 is greater than the demand, i.e., GM only produces to make up an adjusted 
expected demand shortfall.  
We next solve the wholesaler’s optimal order quantities. Proposition 4.3 
summarizes three possible equilibrium states of the optimal procurement and production 
plans. 
Proposition 4.3: The optimal procurement and production plan of the three players will 
be one of the three following cases:  
a. 𝑞𝑀
𝐷∗ = 𝜃𝑑, 𝑞𝐺
𝐷∗ = 0, 𝑥𝑀
𝐷∗ = 𝑎𝜃𝑑, 𝑥𝐺
𝐷∗ = (1 − 𝑎𝜃𝛽)𝑑, and 𝑆𝐷∗ =
𝛼𝛽2𝜃𝑑
2
 
b. 𝑞𝑀
𝐷∗ = 0, 𝑞𝐺
𝐷∗ = 𝑑, 𝑥𝑀
𝐷∗ = 0, 𝑥𝐺
𝐷∗ = 𝑑, and 𝑆𝐷∗ = 0 
c. 𝑞𝑀
𝐷∗ = 𝜏𝑑, 𝑞𝐺
𝐷∗ = 0, 𝑥𝑀
𝐷∗ = 𝛼𝜏𝑑, 𝑥𝐺
𝐷∗ = 0, and  𝑆𝐷∗ =
𝑑
2𝛼𝜏
 
Where 𝜃 = √
𝑤𝐺
𝛼2𝛽2(𝑝−𝑤𝐺)+𝑤𝑀(2𝛼−1)
, and 𝜏 > 𝜃. 
In plan a, the wholesaler anticipates that GM will produce some backup quantities 
even without any order quantity from the wholesaler at the beginning. Therefore, the 
wholesaler orders everything from the manufacturer at the beginning and takes advantage 
of GM’s produced quantities when the manufacturer’s realized production quantity is 
lower than demand. In plan b, the wholesaler orders everything from the government at 
the beginning. Because GM has a perfect yield rate, both the wholesaler’s order quantity 
and the GM’s production quantity are equal to the demand, whereas the manufacturer 
does not produce anything. Plan c is the same as the basic model: GM does not produce 
anything in both cases. The wholesaler’s adjustment factor for its order quantity from the 
manufacturer in plan c is greater than that in plan a, i.e., 𝜏 > 𝜃, because there are no 
backup quantities available at GM in plan c. 
In Proposition 4.3 we refer plan a as a mixed procurement plan; plan b as a strict 
public procurement plan; and plan c as a strict private procurement plan. We use the 
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term “plan” for the three equilibrium states in Model D (i.e., the wholesaler’s 
procurement plans in Model D), and we use the term “strategy” for the government’s 
interventions (i.e., no intervention, subsidy, and dual sourcing). 
Let 𝛱𝑊
𝐷𝑎, 𝛱𝑊
𝐷𝑏 and 𝛱𝑊
𝐷𝑐 be the wholesaler’s optimal profit in plan a, b and c in 
Proposition 4.3, respectively. Proposition 4.4 provides a pairwise comparison of the 
wholesalers’ optimal profits in the three plans depending on different parameter values. 
Proposition 4.4: The relative values of the wholesaler optimal profits in the three 
procurement plans are as follows: 
a. Comparing 𝛱𝑊
𝐷𝑎 with 𝛱𝑊
𝐷𝑏: 
I. If 𝑐𝐺 ≤ 𝑐𝐺
𝑎𝑏:  𝛱𝑊
𝐷𝑎 > 𝛱𝑊
𝐷𝑏 
II. If 𝑐𝐺 > 𝑐𝐺
𝑎𝑏  
i. If 𝑠𝐺 ≤ 𝑠𝐺
𝑎𝑏: 𝛱𝑊
𝐷𝑎 ≤ 𝛱𝑊
𝐷𝑏 
ii. If 𝑠𝐺 > 𝑠𝐺
𝑎𝑏: 𝛱𝑊
𝐷𝑎 > 𝛱𝑊
𝐷𝑏 
b. Comparing 𝛱𝑊
𝐷𝑎 with 𝛱𝑊
𝐷𝑐: 
I. If 𝑐𝐺 ≤ 𝑐𝐺
𝑎𝑐: 𝛱𝑊
𝐷𝑎 > 𝛱𝑊
𝐷𝑐 
II. If 𝑐𝐺 > 𝑐𝐺
𝑎𝑐   
i. If 𝑠𝐺 ≤ 𝑠𝐺
𝑎𝑐: 𝛱𝑊
𝐷𝑎 ≤ 𝛱𝑊
𝐷𝑐 
ii. If 𝑠𝐺 > 𝑠𝐺
𝑎𝑐: 𝛱𝑊
𝐷𝑎 > 𝛱𝑊
𝐷𝑐 
c. Comparing 𝛱𝑊
𝐷𝑏 with  𝛱𝑊
𝐷𝑐 
i. If 𝑤𝐺 ≤
𝑝
𝑎𝜏
: 𝛱𝑊
𝐷𝑏 ≥ 𝛱𝑊
𝐷𝑐 
ii. If 𝑤𝐺 >
𝑝
𝑎𝜏
: 𝛱𝑊
𝐷𝑏 < 𝛱𝑊
𝐷𝑐 
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where 𝑐𝐺
𝑎𝑏 =
𝑏−𝑝+𝑤𝐺
𝑎
√
𝑎2𝑤𝐺−(2𝛼−1)𝑤𝑀
𝑝−𝑤𝐺
, 𝑠𝐺
𝑎𝑏 = 𝑎𝑐𝐺√
𝑝−𝑤𝐺
𝑎2𝑤𝐺−(2𝛼−1)𝑤𝑀
+ 𝑝 − 𝑏 − 𝑤𝐺, 𝑐𝐺
𝑎𝑐 =
𝑏−𝑝+𝑤𝐺
𝑎
√
(2𝛼−1)𝑤𝑀
𝑤𝐺
, and 𝑠𝐺
𝑎𝑐 = 𝛼𝑐𝐺√
𝑤𝐺
(2𝛼−1)𝑤𝑀
+ 𝑝 − 𝑏 − 𝑤𝐺. 
Proposition 4.4.a summarizes the wholesaler’s preference between a mixed 
procurement plan and a public procurement plan. If GM’s selling price is sufficiently 
low, then the wholesaler always prefers a public strategy to a mixed procurement plan. 
This is because the benefit of a reliable source can justify GM’s higher selling price. 
Otherwise, the wholesaler’s preference between the two procurement plans depends on 
𝑐𝐺 and 𝑠𝐺. If either 𝑐𝐺 is sufficiently low or 𝑠𝐺 is sufficiently high, then GM will be more 
willing to produce some backup quantities even without any order quantities, and the 
wholesaler prefers a mixed procurement plan. This is because the wholesaler can take 
advantage of both the cheaper source and the backup supplier: the wholesaler can first 
procure the drug from the manufacturer and then purchase the drug from GM if the 
manufacturer’s realized quantity is lower than demand.   
Proposition 4.4.b summarizes the wholesaler’s preference between a mixed 
procurement plan and a private procurement plan. In this comparison, the wholesaler only 
orders from the manufacturer at the beginning, and the difference between the two 
procurement plans is whether GM voluntarily produces some backup quantities or not. 
Similarly to the logic explained in the previous paragraph, GM’s decision is depending 
on 𝑐𝐺 and 𝑠𝐺: if either 𝑐𝐺 is sufficiently low or 𝑠𝐺 is sufficiently high, then GM will be 
more willing to produce some backup quantities even without any order quantities from 
the wholesaler. 
Proposition 4.4.c states the wholesaler’s preference between a public procurement 
plan and a private procurement plan. In this comparison, the wholesaler will procure the 
drug only from one source throughout the whole period. The wholesaler’s preference is 
based on the trade-offs between the reliability and procurement cost at the two sources. If 
the wholesaler’s selling price is low, then there is not enough profit margin for it to 
procure the drug from a more expensive source, and it will only procure from the 
manufacturer which is cheaper. If the wholesaler’s selling price and profit margin are 
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high, then it will procure the drug from GM if 𝑤𝐺 is sufficiently low, and it will procure 
from the manufacturer if 𝑤𝐺 is sufficiently high. 
Due to the complicated threshold values in Proposition 4.4, it is difficult to 
provide a clear analytical comparison of the three procurement plans. Therefore, we 
graphically illustrate and discuss the wholesaler’s preference for the three procurement 
plans as a function of different parameter values in Figure 4.3. Figure 4.3.a illustrates the 
wholesaler’s optimal procurement plan with respect to the government’s selling price 
(𝑤𝐺) and the government’s unit shortage cost (𝑠𝐺); If both 𝑠𝐺 and 𝑤𝐺 are small, then the 
wholesaler will choose a public procurement plan. If 𝑠𝐺 is small and 𝑤𝐺 is large, then the 
wholesaler prefers a private procurement plan; otherwise, the supply chain will reach a 
mixed procurement plan. The logic is as follows. If 𝑠𝐺 is small, then the shortage cost is 
not severe enough to incentivize GM to voluntarily produce any backup quantities, and 
the supply chain will reach a pure procurement plan (the wholesaler only procures the 
drug from one manufacturing facility through the entire period). If both 𝑠𝐺 and 𝑤𝐺 are 
small, then GM’s reasonably high price and perfect reliability are more attractive to the 
wholesaler than the unreliable manufacturer. Knowing that GM will not produce anything 
without any order, the wholesaler will order everything from GM. If 𝑠𝐺 is small and 𝑤𝐺 is 
(a) (b) 
  
Figure 4.3. The wholesaler’s optimal procurement plan in Model D. (a): with respect to 
the public manufacturer’s selling price (𝑤𝐺) and the government’s unit shortage cost 
(𝑠𝐺); (b): with respect to the wholesaler’s unit markup (𝑚) and 𝑠𝐺. 
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large, then GM’s selling price is too high for the wholesaler, and the wholesaler will 
order everything from the manufacturer.  
If 𝑠𝐺 is high, then GM will voluntarily produce some backup quantities even 
without any order quantities from the wholesaler at the beginning. Therefore, the 
wholesaler will order from the cheaper supplier (the manufacturer) at the beginning, and 
it will procure from GM if the manufacturer’s realized production quantity is lower than 
the demand. In this scenario, the supply chain is more likely to reach a mixed 
procurement plan. 
Note that in the region where GM’s selling price is less than GM’s unit 
production cost (𝑤𝐺 < 𝑐𝐺) in Figure 4.3.a, the government is willing to produce the drug 
even if GM’s selling price is less than its production cost. This is because the additional 
health benefit and avoided shortage cost from GM’s provision of the drug may justify the 
gap between GM’s price and production cost.   
 Figure 4.3.b illustrates the wholesaler’s optimal procurement plan as a function of 
with respect to the wholesaler’s unit markup (𝑚) and the government’s unit shortage cost 
(𝑠𝐺). We can see that 𝑚 and 𝑤𝐺 have an opposite impact on the wholesaler’s optimal 
plan. This is because 𝑚 determines the wholesaler’s revenue whereas 𝑤𝐺 is a cost for the 
wholesaler. 
4.4.3 Model S 
For ease of implementation, we assume that the government will only choose one type of 
subsidy. Define Model SW and Model SP as two sub-models in which the government 
will only implement a procurement cost subsidy (Model SW) and a selling price subsidy 
(Model SP), respectively (i.e., 𝛾𝑝 = 0 in Model SW, and 𝛾𝑤 = 0 in Model SP). We solve 
Model SW and Model SP separately. 
Because the subsidy is not included in the manufacturer’s profit function, its best 
response function for any given order quantity from the wholesaler has the same form as 
the basic model, ?̃?𝑀
𝑆 (𝑞𝑀) = 𝛼𝑞𝑀, where 𝛼 is the same as defined in Lemma 4.1. We then 
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solve the wholesaler’s best response function for any given subsidy in Model SW and 
Model SP, respectively.   
Lemma 4.4: The wholesaler’s best response functions for any given subsidy in Model SW 
and Model SP are given by 
  ?̃?𝑀
𝑆𝑊 = 𝜏𝑆𝑊𝑑 
 ?̃?𝑀
𝑆𝑃 = 𝜏𝑆𝑃𝑑 
where 𝜏𝑆𝑊 = √
𝑝
(2𝛼−1)(𝑤𝑀−𝛾𝑤)
 and 𝜏𝑆𝑃 = √
𝑝+𝛾𝑝
(2𝛼−1)𝑤𝑀
. 
The wholesaler’s ordering decision in the basic model and that in the subsidy 
model have the same structure. It uses a coefficient to make an adjustment on the demand 
for the drug, and the coefficient in the subsidy model incorporates the subsidies from the 
government. 
 Finally, we solve the government’s optimal subsidy and summarize it in 
Proposition 4.5.  
Proposition 4.5: There exists a unique optimal solution for the government’s subsidy in 
each sub-model, which is given by 
a. In Model SW: 𝛾𝑤
∗ = {
𝑤𝑀 − 𝛾𝑤, 𝑖𝑓 𝑚 ≤
𝑏+𝑠𝐺
3𝑤𝑀
   (𝑖. 𝑒. , 𝑝 ≤
𝑏+𝑠𝐺
3
)
0, 𝑖𝑓 𝑚 >
𝑏+𝑠𝐺
3𝑤𝑀
   (𝑖. 𝑒., 𝑝 >
𝑏+𝑠𝐺
3
)
 
b. In Model SP: 𝛾𝑝
∗ = {
𝛾𝑝 − 𝑝, 𝑖𝑓 𝑝 ≤ 𝛾𝑝 
0, 𝑖𝑓 𝑝 > 𝛾𝑝
 
where the expressions of 𝛾𝑤 and 𝛾𝑝 are defined in the Appendix.  
Proposition 4.5.a indicates that if the government is considering whether to 
provide a procurement cost subsidy, then it should provide the subsidy only if the 
wholesaler’s profit margin (or revenue) is sufficiently low. With this type of subsidy, the 
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wholesaler’s effective procurement cost became 𝛾𝑤. Proposition 4.5.b states that there 
exists a unique effective price (𝛾𝑝) that maximizes the government’s utility. When the 
government is considering whether to use a selling price subsidy, then it should provide 
the subsidy if 𝑝 is sufficiently low, and the subsidy should increase the wholesaler’s 
selling price up to the effective price. 
 Due to the complicated expression of the optimal solutions in Proposition 4.5, we 
are not able to analytically compare the performance of the two subsidies. Therefore, we 
conduct numerical analysis and test a wide range of parameter values. We summarize an 
important observation that holds for all parameter values we tested.  
Observation 4.1: 𝛱𝐺
𝑆𝑊∗ > 𝛱𝐺
𝑆𝑃∗. 
Observation 4.1 indicates that the government always prefers a procurement cost 
subsidy to a selling price subsidy. This is because under a selling price subsidy, the 
wholesaler will not receive the subsidy if it overstocks (i.e., when the manufacturer’s 
delivered quantity is greater than the drug demand). On the other hand, under a 
procurement cost subsidy, the wholesaler can receive the subsidy for all procured 
quantities, which has a larger effect on incentivizing it to increase the order quantity and 
reduce shortages. Because the drug has a positive net health benefit and positive shortage 
cost for the government, a procurement cost subsidy can better mitigate shortages and 
improve the government’s utility than a selling price subsidy. This result is similar to the 
main finding in Taylor and Xiao (2014), which investigated a donor’s optimal subsidy to 
improve the availability and affordability of malaria drugs provided by the private-sector 
and found that the donor should only subsidize the retailers’ purchases and should not 
subsidize their sales. For the rest of the analysis, we only focus on the procurement cost 
subsidy as it is more effective than the selling price subsidy.  
Proposition 4.6 summarizes some properties of the optimal procurement cost 
subsidy. 
Proposition 4.6: The optimal procurement cost subsidy has the following properties  
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𝜕𝛾𝑤
∗
𝜕𝑚
≤ 0, 
𝜕𝛾𝑤
∗
𝜕𝑤𝑀
≥ 0, 
𝜕𝛾𝑤
∗
𝜕𝑏
≥ 0, and  
𝜕𝛾𝑤
∗
𝜕𝑠𝐺
≥ 0 
The optimal procurement cost subsidy is decreasing in 𝑚, because the 
government does not need to pay a large subsidy if the wholesaler already charges a high 
markup. The optimal subsidy increases as the wholesaler’s procurement cost increases. 
The optimal subsidy also increases when the government has a higher incentive to 
mitigate shortages, such as the health benefit or the shortage cost are high.  
 Comparisons of Different Strategies 
With the optimal values obtained in each model, we are able to analyze the government’s 
optimal strategy and examine the impact on the wholesaler and the manufacturer. Based 
on Observation 4.1 (the government always prefers a procurement cost subsidy to a 
selling price subsidy), we only consider a procurement cost subsidy in Model S for the 
rest of the analysis. The government chooses from the three strategies to maximize its 
expected utility, i.e., no intervention (Model B), the subsidy strategy (Model S), and the 
dual sourcing strategy (Model D). The government prefers a strategy if its utility in the 
corresponding model is higher than that in the other two models. We first compare each 
mitigating strategy (Model S and Model D, respectively) with Model B. This comparison 
provides insights into situations in which the government has a preference for one 
strategy over the other, or only one certain type of strategy is available. Next, we 
compare the three models together and examine the government’s optimal strategy if both 
mitigating strategies are available.  
4.5.1 Comparison of Model B with Model S 
We first investigate the government’s preference for whether to provide subsidies to the 
wholesaler. We first summarize some properties of the optimal values in Proposition 4.7. 
Proposition 4.7: The following properties hold when comparing Model B with Model S 
If 𝛱𝐺
𝑆∗ > 𝛱𝐺
𝐵∗, then the following are true: 
𝛱𝑊
𝑆∗ > 𝛱𝑊
𝐵∗, 𝛱𝑀
𝑆∗ > 𝛱𝑀
𝐵∗, 𝑌𝑊
𝑆∗ > 𝑌𝑊
𝐵∗, 𝑌𝑀
𝑆∗ > 𝑌𝑀
𝐵∗, and 𝑆𝑆∗ < 𝑆𝐵∗. 
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Proposition 4.7 indicates that if the government prefers to provide subsidies, then 
the two parties in the private sector have the same preferences as the government, 
indicating that a subsidy strategy can achieve an “all-win” situation compared with the 
basic model in same cases. Because the government decides whether to provide subsidies 
or not, it will be better off if it chooses to provide subsidies instead of no intervention. 
The subsidy increases the wholesaler’s profit margin and incentivizes it to increase its 
order quantity, which in turn increases its profit. As a response to the wholesaler’s 
increased order quantity, the manufacturer will increase the production quantity which in 
turn increase it profit. As a result, when the government use a subsidy strategy, the 
delivered quantity from the manufacturer to the wholesaler increases, and the shortage 
amount decreases, compared with the basic model. 
Next, we show a two-way graph of the government’s optimal choice between 
Model B and Model S with respect to the wholesaler’s markup (𝑚) and the government’s 
unit shortage cost (𝑠𝐺). Figure 4.4 illustrates that when the wholesaler’s profit margin 
(i.e., markup) is low and the shortage cost is high, the government should provide 
subsidies; when the wholesaler’s profit margin is high and the shortage cost is low, the 
government should not provide subsidies. Note that when replacing 𝑠𝐺 with the unit 
monetary health benefit of the drug (𝑏), the two graphs have similar structures. This is 
because the government has a higher incentive to reduce shortages when either 𝑏 or 𝑠𝐺 
Figure 4.4: The government’s preference between Model B (no intervention) and Model 
S (subsidy strategy) with respect to the wholesaler’s markup (𝑚) and the government’s 
unit shortage cost (𝑠𝐺). 
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increases. 
4.5.2 Comparison of Model B with Model D 
We compare the government’s optimal utilities in Model B and Model D to investigate 
the government’s preference on whether to operate GM. Note that, if the government 
implements a dual sourcing strategy, then the wholesaler chooses the optimal 
procurement plans (a mixed plan, a public plan, and a private plan) to maximize its own 
profit. In other words, the optimal procurement plan in Model D is the wholesaler’s 
choice. Therefore, the government’s expected utility under the wholesaler’s optimal 
procurement plan in Model D may be lower than in Model B.  
Proposition 4.8: The following properties hold when comparing Model B with Model D: 
If 𝛱𝐺
𝐷∗ > 𝛱𝐺
𝐵∗, then the following are true: 
𝛱𝑊
𝐷∗ > 𝛱𝑊
𝐵∗, 𝛱𝑀
𝐷∗ ≤ 𝛱𝑀
𝐵∗, 𝑌𝑊
𝐷∗ ≥ 𝑌𝑊
𝐵∗, 𝑌𝑀
𝐷∗ ≤ 𝑌𝑀
𝐵∗, and 𝑆𝐷∗ ≤ 𝑆𝐵∗ 
Proposition 4.8 indicates that if the government prefers Model D to Model B, 
then the wholesaler also has the same preference. This is intuitive, because the wholesaler 
has more flexibility on choosing the suppliers in Model D than in Model B, and it is no 
worse off in Model D. However, the manufacturer is always no better off if the 
government operates GM. This is because the manufacturer faces competitions with GM, 
and some or all of its order quantities will be taken by GM in Model D. If the government 
prefers model D to Model B, i.e., it operates GM, then the wholesaler’s fulfilled demand 
is higher, the manufacturer’s delivered quantity is lower, and the expected shortage is 
lower in Model D then in Model B.  
 Next, we show the government’s choice between Model B and Model D as a 
function of 𝑚 and 𝑠𝐺 in Figure 4.5. Note that, in the region labeled with “Model D 
Private Plan”, the government prefers a public procurement plan, whereas the wholesaler 
prefers not to procure from GM even if GM is available. In contrast, in the region labeled 
with “Model B”, the wholesaler prefers to procure from GM if it is available, whereas the 
government prefers not to produce the drug at GM.  
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If the incentive to mitigate shortages is low, then the government prefers Model B 
to Model D. This is more likely to occur if the government’s shortage cost is low and the 
wholesaler’s profit margin is sufficiently high (the bottom right region labeled with 
“Model B” in Figure 4.5), so that the government would rely on the wholesaler’s ordering 
decision in a sole-sourcing situation rather than operating a GM to mitigate shortages. 
The optimal procurement plan within Model D is the same as discussed in subsection 
4.4.2.  
4.5.3 Comparison of the Three Models 
We finally analyze the government’s optimal strategy when comparing all three models. 
Table 4.2 summarizes the optimal values for all possible equilibrium states in the three 
models. Depending on the different combinations of parameters, the three players will 
follow their respective optimal decisions, and the supply chain will reach one equilibrium 
state in Table 4.2.  
Figure 4.6 shows a two-way graph of the government’s optimal strategy as a function of 
𝑚 and 𝑠𝐺. Recall that, in the region labeled with “Model D Private Plan”, the wholesaler 
prefers not to procure from GM even if GM is available. However, in the region labeled 
with “Model B”, the wholesaler prefers to procure from GM if it is available, whereas the 
government prefers not to produce the drug at GM.  
Figure 4.5: The government’s preference between Model B (no intervention) and Model 
D (dual sourcing strategy) with respect to the wholesaler’s markup (𝑚) and the 
government’s unit shortage cost (𝑠𝐺). 
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If the wholesaler’s profit margin is sufficiently low, then the government’s 
optimal choice is between Model B and Model S. If the shortage cost is sufficiently low, 
then the government does not have enough incentives to implement a subsidy strategy 
(the region labeled “Model B” on the bottom left in Figure 4.6). If the shortage cost is 
high, then a procurement cost subsidy is an effective strategy to mitigate shortages (the 
region labeled “Model S” in Figure 4.6), which also improves the utilities of the three 
players in the pharmaceutical supply chain. 
If the wholesaler’s profit margin is sufficiently high, then Model D dominates 
Model S, and the government’s optimal choice is between Model B and Model D. In this 
comparison, if 𝑚 is sufficiently high and 𝑠𝐺 is sufficiently low, then the government 
prefers not to intervene (the region labeled “Model B” on the bottom right in Figure 4.6).  
Otherwise, the government will use a dual sourcing strategy to mitigate drug shortages. 
When the government uses a dual sourcing strategy, the supply chain will reach a mixed 
procurement plan if 𝑚 is small and 𝑠𝐺 is large (the region labeled “Model D Mixed Plan” 
in Figure 4.6). This is because when 𝑠𝐺 is large, the government will voluntarily produce 
 
Figure 4.6: The government’s optimal strategy among the three policies with respect to 
the wholesaler’s markup parameter (𝑚) and the government’s unit shortage cost (𝑠𝐺). 
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some backup quantities even without any initial orders from the wholesaler. If the profit 
margin is low, then the wholesaler cannot afford sole-sourcing from a more reliable but 
more expensive public supplier. Therefore, the wholesaler will place an initial order from 
the manufacturer which is cheaper, and the wholesaler will take advantage of GM’s 
backup quantities if the manufacturer’s delivered quantity is lower than the demand. If 𝑠𝐺 
is small, as the wholesaler’s profit margin increases, the supply chain will reach a private 
procurement plan (the region labeled “Model D Private Plan” in Figure 4.6). This is 
because the increase of the wholesaler’s profit margin incentivizes a higher order quantity 
which reduces the expected shortage amount, whereas the low shortage cost cannot 
incentivize GM to produce any back up quantities voluntarily. Because the wholesaler 
still cannot afford to procure the drug exclusively from GM in this range of profit margin, 
it will only procure from the manufacturer.  
If 𝑠𝐺 is small and the wholesaler charges a higher markup, then the wholesaler can 
afford to procure from GM exclusively, and the supply chain will reach a public 
procurement plan (the region labeled “Model D Public Plan” in Figure 4.6). However, if 
𝑚 is sufficiently high and 𝑠𝐺 is sufficiently low, the government prefer to rely on the 
wholesaler’s order decision in a sole sourcing situation rather than producing the drug at 
GM to mitigate shortages (“Model B” on the bottom right in Figure 4.6).  
 Discussion 
In this essay, we analyze the governments’ optimal strategy to mitigate drug shortages. 
We construct a pharmaceutical supply chain model consisting of three decision-makers: a 
manufacturer, a wholesaler, and a government. We assume the manufacturing process has 
random yield rate to capture the major known cause of drug shortages, which is 
manufacturing issues. We consider two mitigating strategies that can be implemented by 
the government: providing subsidies to the wholesaler, or establishing a public 
manufacturer. We analytically characterize the optimal decisions for each party in each 
strategy and analyze the government’s optimal strategy under different circumstances. To 
our best knowledge, this paper is the first modeling study that investigates the 
interactions among three key decision-makers in a pharmaceutical supply chain while 
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comparing a subsidy strategy and a dual sourcing strategy to mitigate supply uncertainties 
from a government’s perspective.  
This study shows the advantages and disadvantages of each strategy. An 
advantage for both mitigating strategies is that the expected shortage amount can be 
reduced by either strategy compared with the status quo in which the government does 
not take any intervention. An advantage of a subsidy strategy is that, if the government 
prefers to use a subsidy strategy, then the wholesaler and the manufacturer’s profits with 
subsidies are higher than those without subsidies, indicating a subsidy strategy can 
achieve an all-win situation. However, a disadvantage is that the supply chain remains a 
sole sourcing situation under a subsidy strategy, which is more vulnerable to disruptions 
risks than a supply chain with multiple suppliers.  
In contrast, an advantage of a dual sourcing strategy is that it eases the high 
market concentration by adding a second source of the drug, which makes the supply 
chain more reliable and resilient to supply disruptions. However, a disadvantage is that a 
dual sourcing strategy cannot be mutually preferred by all three parties. If the government 
chooses to establish a public manufacturer, then the wholesale is no worse off, but the 
manufacturer is no better off compared with the status quo. In some circumstances, the 
wholesaler may prefer to procure everything from the public manufacturer, and the 
manufacturer is not making any profit. In these situations, the government and/or the 
wholesaler may need to provide incentives to the manufacturer to keep it in the market in 
the long term. This consideration is similar to the discussion in the previous chapter.  
This study also provides analysis for the government’s optimal strategy under 
different circumstances. We show that governments should always intervene if the 
shortage cost is high (i.e., critical and lifesaving drugs without alternatives). For example, 
if the wholesaler’s profit margin is low, then governments should provide subsidies for 
critical and lifesaving drugs without alternatives to incentivize an increase of the 
wholesaler’s order quantity and reduce shortages. If wholesalers already charge a high 
markup, then governments should produce critical and lifesaving drugs without 
alternatives at public manufacturers to provide additional supplies. The results confirm 
108 
 
the importance of establishing a list of critical drugs and take more government 
interventions to mitigate shortages of the drugs. These analyses along with the 
advantages and disadvantages of each strategy have important policy implications for 
government interventions on mitigating drug shortages.  
This study has several limitations. First, we construct a single-period model with 
zero lead time, mainly due to the complexity of our model. Future studies can extend our 
model to a multi-period setting while considering a positive lead time in drug production 
and distribution. For example, some drugs require a long time for production and 
distribution, which require an assumption of positive lead time in the model. Second, we 
do not consider fixed cost and cost of switching production and maintaining regulatory 
ability to produce drugs, and our results may overestimate the benefit of producing drugs 
at public manufacturers. When considering fixed costs, the threshold values may change, 
but the qualitative properties of our model should remain the same. Future studies may 
consider possible fixed costs and verify the impacts on our main findings.   
In addition, we assume all parameters are known by all parties. However, it is 
possible that the parameters of cost, revenue, and/or yield rate are private information. 
Therefore, one extension to our study is to incorporate information asymmetry and 
provide further insights into possible changes in our findings. Moreover, we do not 
consider holding costs for the three parties. Our analysis may apply to the situation in 
which the drug does not require costly storage conditions, and the holding costs are 
negligible compared with other costs and revenue parameters. We also do not consider 
shortage costs for the manufacturer and the wholesaler. For example, the failure-to-
supply clauses in many contracts are very week, and often suppliers do not incur financial 
penalties if they fail to supply the contracted quantity to the buyer (Jia and Zhao, 2017). 
Future studies can extend our study to a richer setting by incorporating parameters for 
holding costs and/or shortage costs.  
There are other directions to extend this study. We consider two types of subsidies 
that are paid to the wholesaler. Future studies can consider more types of subsidies, such 
as the subsidies to private manufacturers, or subsidies to induce new manufacturers to 
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enter the market. Next, we assume all price parameters are exogenous because drug 
prices are highly regulated in many countries. Future analysis can include drug prices as 
decision variables, e.g., influential parties may have the power to affect drug prices 
directly or through discount/rebate. Moreover, we study the most vulnerable supply chain 
setting, which consists of only one private manufacturer and one wholesaler. Future 
studies can consider duopoly or more competitive settings to provide insights into 
different circumstances. 
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Chapter 5  
5 Conclusion 
In this thesis, I investigate several decision-making problems faced by health care 
decision-makers to manage drug supply and patient access to drugs in the presence of 
various uncertainties. Using a game-theoretic approach, I analyze the dynamics of the key 
decision-makers’ optimal decisions and the impact of these interactions on their 
performances. In the first essay, I compare the performance of two drug reimbursement 
policies between a payer and a pharmaceutical company to mitigate the uncertainties of 
new and expensive drugs. Different from previous studies, I incorporate several key 
aspects of the decision making challenge, such as the multiple decision-maker aspects, 
comparing a volume-based policy with a value-based policy, and capturing the 
pharmaceutical company’s strategic decision of its marketing efforts.  
 Next, using a supply chain management approach, I examine policies to mitigate 
drug shortages caused by supply uncertainties from hospitals’ and governments’ 
perspectives, respectively. In the second essay, I evaluate hospitals’ strategy of 
establishing an in-house manufacturer to mitigate drug shortages. I construct a multi-
period supply chain model consisting of a hospital and an external manufacturer that is 
subject to supply uncertainty. The hospital owns an in-house manufacturer and can 
procure the drug from the two manufacturing facilities. The hospital also has a second 
chance to make emergency production at the in-house producer. I capture the hospital’s 
procurement and production decisions, and the external manufacturer’s production 
decisions. First, I analytically characterize the optimal decisions of each party in a single 
period setting. Next, I analyze the hospital’s long-term inventory management policies in 
a multi-period setting using a heuristic. 
In the third essay, I study mitigating strategies for drug shortages from the 
governments’ perspective. This study distinguished from previous work in several 
aspects. I construct a pharmaceutical supply chain consisting of three decision-makers: a 
manufacturer, a wholesaler, and a government. I consider three strategies that can be 
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implemented by the government: 1) no intervention; 2)  a dual sourcing strategy, in 
which the government operates a public manufacturer; and 3) a subsidy strategy in which 
the government provides subsidies based on the wholesaler’s unit procurement cost or 
unit selling price. First, I analytically solve the optimal solutions in each model. Next, I 
analyze the government’s optimal policy and its impacts on the performance of the 
wholesaler and the manufacturer under different circumstances.  
 Managerial Insights 
The results of the first essay provide insights for health payers who are facing decisions 
between a volume-based reimbursement policy and a value-based reimbursement policy. 
I show that under some circumstances, none of the two policies can align the incentives 
of the two parties. This may lead to resistance from the misaligned party during the 
implementation and partially explain the lack of consensus between payers and 
manufacturers on the preferability of a risk-sharing agreement, which has been observed 
in reality (Bastian et al., 2015). Under some other circumstances, in contrast, a properly 
selected policy can be mutually preferred by the two parties, which may result in a 
smooth implementation. A policy implication is that neither policy is a universal solution 
that can be applied in all situations, and payers should carefully consider the trade-offs 
between different incentives and costs when making decision, rather than sticking to just 
one policy (e.g., to use a volume-based policy for ease of negotiation and 
implementation). 
 In the second essay, I show that the hospital’s optimal decision on whether to 
establish an in-house manufacturer should depend on the trade-offs between different 
parameters (e.g., the procurement/production costs, the shortage costs, and the reliability 
of the external manufacturers), rather than a simple cost consideration for the cheapest 
source. I show that the shortage amount can be reduced by the hospital’s in-house 
producer, which provides evidence for the value of establishing Civica Rx to mitigate 
drug shortages. The results may provide one explanation for the rapid growths of the 
company business: from providing 14 drugs to approximately 500 member hospitals in 
2018, to providing 40 drugs to over 1200 members hospitals in July 2020 (Civica Rx, 
2020). However, the results show that the external manufacturer is no better off under the 
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hospital’s dual sourcing practice, and the hospital may need to consider incentives to 
keep the external manufacturer from exiting the market. This consideration is in order to 
keep the multi-supplier situation for a more reliable pharmaceutical supply chain against 
supply uncertainties.  
The third essay provides insights into government interventions to mitigate drug 
shortages caused by supply uncertainties. I show that both the subsidy policy and the dual 
sourcing strategy can reduce the shortage amount compared with the status quo. 
However, the two strategies differ in several aspects. One difference is their ability to 
align the incentives of different parties. A subsidy strategy can align the incentives of the 
government, the wholesaler, and the external manufacturer, whereas a dual sourcing 
strategy cannot be mutually preferred by all three parties. Due to the competition with the 
public manufacturer, the external manufacturer is no better off under the government’s 
dual sourcing strategy compared with the status quo. Another difference between the two 
mitigating strategies is their ability to change the supply structure. Under a subsidy 
strategy, the supply chain remains a sole supplier situation which is vulnerable to supply 
disruptions. In contrast, a dual sourcing strategy adds a supplier, which eases the high 
market concentration and increases the reliability and resilience of the supply chain 
against supply disruptions. I also provide analysis for the government’s optimal policies 
under different circumstances, which has implications for policymakers regarding the 
optimal interventions to mitigate supply uncertainties. 
The three essays have some common insights regarding the decision-making 
challenges in a multi-decision-maker setting. First, the second and third essays show the 
importance of the trade-offs between different factors, rather than a simple cost 
consideration that favors the cheapest supplier. The two essays show that sourcing from 
the cheaper but unreliable supplier may result in inferior performance for the wholesaler 
and the government in the expected form (i.e., long-term average) when taking into 
consideration the reliability of the suppliers and the shortage cost due to the 
unavailability of the drug. Second, all three essays show that each policy candidate’s 
ability to align the incentives of different parties may depend on various circumstances. 
In the first essay, the payer and the pharmaceutical company may or may not prefer the 
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same reimbursement policy depending on the drug price and patient treatment eligibility. 
In the second essay, the external manufacturer always prefers a sole-sourcing situation, 
whereas the hospital may prefer to establish an in-house producer. In the third essay, a 
subsidy strategy is not always preferred by the three parties, since the government may 
prefer a dual sourcing strategy or not to intervene, depending on different situations. 
 Implications for COVID-19 
The three essays have important policy implications in the context of the unprecedented 
novel coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic. For example, new vaccines and drugs are 
being developed to prevent or treat COVID-19. Due to the public crisis nature of this 
pandemic, it is very likely that many government agencies and health authorities will 
cover the costs of vaccines and/or drugs for patients. My first essay may provide insights 
into payers’ decisions on selecting a reimbursement policy for the newly developed 
vaccines or drugs. For example, traditional vaccines and drugs require many years to go 
through the process of early development, multiple phases of clinical trials to confirm the 
efficacy and safety of the products. In contrast, vaccines and drugs for COVID-19 are 
expected to be developed within a very short time period. Therefore, the effectiveness of 
the drugs and vaccines for COVID-19 may be highly uncertainty. On the other hand, due 
to the possible multiple waves of the pandemic, the sales volume of the drugs for 
COVID-19 may be highly uncertain. Payers should carefully weigh the risks and benefits 
of different products and select a risk-sharing agreement to mitigate uncertainties.  
In addition, many pharmaceutical products are undergoing or are expected to 
experience shortages, due to supply uncertainties at overseas suppliers during COVID-19 
(Blank, 2020; Hahn, 2020; Rees, 2020; Russell, 2020). For example, the FDA has 
identified 20 medicines that sole source the finished drug products or the active 
pharmaceutical ingredients from oversea manufacturers, which are significantly affected 
by this pandemic (Hahn, 2020; Russell, 2020). The pandemic revealed the vulnerability 
of the current pharmaceutical supply chains in many countries, and reconstructions of the 
existing systems are required. My second and third essays provide insights into the 
reconstruction towards more reliable and resilient pharmaceutical supply chains.  
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Many policymakers and experts believe that it is important to increase the 
diversity of supply sources (in different geographic regions, if possible), as risk 
management measures for drug suppliers (Linton and Vakil, 2020). This coincides with 
the dual-sourcing concept discussed in the two essays. The two essays show that it is 
crucial to trade-off the benefits and risks of cheaper but unreliable sources with more 
expensive but more reliable sources. Due to the for-profit nature of many drug 
manufacturers, it is difficult to rely on them to manage drug suppliers and mitigate 
shortages. The two essays analyze strategies which can be implemented by two types of 
key stakeholders in mitigating drug shortages: hospitals and governments, which provide 
theoretical foundations for them to design and implement interventions of drug shortages 
in reality. It is also crucial for stakeholders to consider the advantages and disadvantages 
of the shortage mitigating strategies and take a long-term perspective when moving 
towards supply chain reconstructions in a post-COVID-19 world. 
We originally initiated essays 2 and 3 to investigate drug shortages. But recent 
events during the COVID-19 pandemic also indicated that our results apply to equipment 
shortages, such as personal protective equipment (PPE) and lab testing equipment. Many 
PPE and lab equipment require higher production costs at domestic manufacturers than 
oversea suppliers. But the equipment has a large impact on frontline worker’s safety and 
patient welfare, i.e., the shortage cost is high. Therefore, governments and hospitals 
should help make additional productions or provide financial supports to mitigate the 
equipment shortages and better defeat the pandemic, 
 Limitations and Future Research 
The three studies establish the foundation for several important decision-making 
challenges faced by health care decision-makers to manage drug supply and patient 
access to drugs. I made several limiting assumptions to make the models tractable, and 
there are multiple directions for future extension. In the first essay, I compare two types 
of risk-sharing contracts. Future studies can consider other types of contracts that are 
implemented in reality. In the second essay and third essay, I focus on drug shortages 
caused by supply uncertainties at the manufacturing facilities. Future studies can 
incorporate other causes, such as demand uncertainties, manufacturers’ strategic 
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decisions on holding inventories, natural disasters, and unavailability of API from upper 
stream suppliers. Because low drug price is one important underlying factor for drug 
shortages, future studies may also analyze whether pricing agreement can solve the drug 
shortage problems (i.e., whether increase drug price may mitigate drug shortages).  In the 
third essays, I consider a single-period setting, mainly due to the number of decisions and 
decision-makers: I capture five decisions made by the three decision-makers. Future 
analysis may extend the study to a multi-period setting and analyze the model with 
reasonable simplifications, numerical analysis, or heuristics. Another direction to extend 
the third essay is to include more government interventions into consideration. 
The three essays also share some common assumptions that may be relaxed in 
future studies. For example, in all three essays, I assume all parameters are known to all 
parties. However, it is possible that one or more parties possess private information 
regarding some parameters. Future research can incorporate information asymmetry to 
analyze the impact of this change on the model results. Second, drug prices are 
considered as exogenous parameters in all three essays. This is mainly because drug 
prices are highly regulated in many countries and jurisdictions and cannot be easily 
influenced by any party. One possible extension is to model drug price as a decision for 
one party or as a result of a negotiating process among multiple parties depending on the 
situation.  
In addition, it will be insightful to conduct case studies to estimate the parameters 
using real-world data and verify the results of the analytical models. This is very 
challenging for the first essay due to the confidential nature of the details of many drug 
reimbursement schemes. For the second and third essays, as more information becomes 
available in the future, one can estimate the model parameters for specific drugs and 
verify the model results.  
Finally, it will be useful to conduct interviews with policymakers, health care 
practitioners, and other key stakeholders to verify the model setting and understand the 
key trade-offs in reality – what makes it difficult to make the decision (i.e., choose the 
right risk-sharing agreement, and choose the right strategy to mitigate drug shortages). 
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The model frameworks in this dissertation can be revised based on the feedback from the 
key stakeholders to capture additional factors and their interrelationship, as well as 
additional decision makers and their decisions. The results should also be communicated 
with the stakeholders to validate the findings of analytical models and help inform the 
decision-making in reality.   
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Appendices  
Appendix A: Essay 1  
Derivation of the optimal solutions  
With the assumption of uniform distribution, the total sales and total health benefit are 
given by 𝑞 = 1 − (𝑦 −𝑚 + 𝜖) and 𝑏 =
1−(𝑦−𝑚+𝜖)2
2
.  
As uniform distribution has boundaries, there are two cases:  
(1): 𝑦 −𝑚 − 𝜖
_
> 0, i.e., the lowest value for the actual treatment eligibility is positive. 
(2): 𝑦 −𝑚 − 𝜖
_
≤ 0, i.e., the lowest value for the actual treatment eligibility is zero 
(actual treatment eligibilities with 𝑦 −𝑚 + 𝜖 < 0 are out of the defined boundary for 𝜖 
and therefore the values for them are zeros). 
Case 1. (𝒚 −𝒎− 𝝐
_
> 𝟎, i.e., 𝒎 < 𝒚 − 𝝐
_
): 
The expected totals sales and the expected total health benefit are 𝑄 = 1 +𝑚 − 𝑦 and 
𝐵 =
1
6
(3 − 𝜖
_
2 − 3(𝑦 − 𝑚)2). 
1 - a. PVA: 
With the assumption 𝑥 = 𝑄, the rebate occurs when 𝑝(𝑞 − 𝑥) = −𝑝𝜖 > 0, i.e., when 𝜖 <
0.Thus, 𝑆𝑃𝑉𝐴 = ∫ 𝑝(𝑞 − 𝑥)𝑔(𝜖) ⅆ𝜖
0
−𝜖
_ =
𝑝𝜖
_
4
. The manufacturer’s payoff is concave 
(
𝑑2𝜋𝑀
𝑃𝑉𝐴
𝑑𝑚2
= −2𝑘 < 0). The first derivative of 𝜋𝑀
𝑃𝑉𝐴 with respect to 𝑚 is 
𝑑𝜋𝑀
𝑃𝑉𝐴
𝑑𝑚
= 𝑝 −
2𝑘𝑚 + 𝑐𝑀.The first order necessary condition for 𝑚
𝑃𝑉𝐴∗ is 
𝑑𝜋𝑀
𝑃𝑉𝐴
𝑑𝑚
= 0. With the 
condition for case i, the optimal marketing effort is shown in  Table A. 1. The two 
parties’ optimal payoffs are calculated by plugging in 𝑚𝑃𝑉𝐴∗ and shown in  Table A. 1.  
1 - b. CER: 
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The rebate occurs when (𝑝 + 𝑐𝑃 + 𝑎𝑃
𝐶𝐸𝑅)𝑞 − 𝜆𝑏 > 0, i.e., when 𝜖 ≤ 𝜖𝐶𝐸𝑅 =
2(𝑝+𝑐𝑃+𝑎𝑃
𝐶𝐸𝑅)
𝜆
− 1 +𝑚 − 𝑦. We compare 𝜖𝐶𝐸𝑅 with the boundaries of 𝜖 and obtain three 
cases: 
(a) 𝜖𝐶𝐸𝑅 < −𝜖
_
; (b) −𝜖
_
 ≤  𝜖𝐶𝐸𝑅 ≤ 𝜖
_
; (c) 𝜖𝐶𝐸𝑅 > 𝜖
_
.  
1 - b - i.  𝝐𝑪𝑬𝑹 < −𝝐
_
  
The condition for this case is 𝑚 < 1 − 𝜖
_
+ 𝑦 +
2(𝑝+𝑐𝑃+𝑎𝑃
𝐶𝐸𝑅)
𝜆
. The rebate never occurs and 
thus 𝑆𝐶𝐸𝑅 = 0. The optimal values are solved with the same manner and shown in Table 
A.2. 
1 - b - ii.  −𝝐
_
 ≤  𝝐𝑪𝑬𝑹 ≤ 𝝐
_
  
The condition for this case is 1 − 𝜖
_
+ 𝑦 +
2(𝑝+𝑐𝑃+𝑎𝑃
𝐶𝐸𝑅)
𝜆
< 𝑚 < 1 + 𝜖
_
+ 𝑦 −
2(𝑝+𝑐𝑃+𝑎𝑃
𝐶𝐸𝑅)
𝜆
.  
The expected rebate is 𝑆𝐶𝐸𝑅 = ∫ ((𝑝 + 𝑐𝑃 + 𝑎𝑃
𝐶𝐸𝑅)𝑞 − 𝜆𝑏)𝑔(𝜖) ⅆ𝜖
𝜖𝐶𝐸𝑅
−𝜖
_
=
(2(𝑝+𝑐𝑃+𝑎𝑃
𝐶𝐸𝑅)−(1−𝑚−𝜖
_
+𝑦)𝜆)2((2+𝑚+𝜖
_
−𝑦)𝜆−(𝑝+𝑐𝑃+𝑎𝑃
𝐶𝐸𝑅))
12𝜖
_
𝜆2
. The optimal values are solved with 
the same manner and shown in Table A.2. 
1 - b - iii.  𝝐𝑪𝑬𝑹 > 𝝐
_
  
The condition for this case is 𝑚 > 1 + 𝜖
_
+ 𝑦 −
2(𝑝+𝑐𝑃+𝑎𝑃
𝐶𝐸𝑅)
𝜆
.  The rebate is 𝑆𝐶𝐸𝑅 =
∫ ((𝑝 + 𝑐𝑃 + 𝑎𝑃
𝐶𝐸𝑅)𝑞 − 𝜆𝑏)𝑔(𝜖) 𝑑𝜖
𝜖
_
−𝜖
_
= (𝑝 + 𝑐𝑃 + 𝑎𝑃
𝐶𝐸𝑅)(1 + 𝑚 − 𝑦) −
1
6
(3 − 𝜖
_
2 −
3(𝑦 − 𝑚)2)𝜆. The optimal values are solved with the same manner and shown in Table 
A.2. 
Case 2 (𝒚 −𝒎− 𝝐
_
≤ 𝟎, i.e., 𝒎 ≥ 𝒚 − 𝝐
_
): 
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The expected totals sales and the expected total health benefit are given by 𝑄 = 1 −
(𝑦+𝜖
_
−𝑚)2
4𝜖
_  and 𝐵 =
1
2
−
(𝑦+𝜖
_
−𝑚)3
12𝜖
_  when 𝑦 −𝑚 + 𝜖 > 0, 𝑄 = 1 and 𝐵 =
1
2
 when 𝑦 −𝑚 +
𝜖 ≤ 0. 
2 - a. PVA: 
The expected rebate is  
𝒑(𝒎+𝝐
_
−𝒚)(𝒚−𝒎+𝝐
_
)𝟐
𝟖𝝐
_
𝟐
  when 𝒚 −𝒎+ 𝝐 ≤ 𝟎, and 
𝒑(𝒚+𝝐
_
−𝒎)𝟒
𝟔𝟒 𝝐
_
𝟑
 when 𝒚 −
𝒎+ 𝝐 > 𝟎, and the total expected rebate is the sum of the two quantities. The optimal 
values are solved with the same manner and shown in Table A. 1. 
 
2 - b. CER:  
With similar procedure in other cases, we solve the optimal values and conditions for this 
case which are shown in Table A. 2. 
Table A. 1: Optimal solutions for a PVA 
 Optimal solutions  
𝑚𝑃𝑉𝐴1∗ a 
min {𝑦 − 𝜖
_
,
1
2𝑘
(𝑝 − 𝑐𝑀)} 
  
𝑚𝑃𝑉𝐴2∗ min{𝑦 + 𝜖
_
,
max{0, 𝑦 − 𝜖
_
, (−4 32 3⁄ 𝑐𝑀𝑝𝜖
_
2 + 2 32 3⁄ 𝑝2𝜖
_
2 + 1632 3⁄ 𝑘𝑝𝜖
_
3 − 3𝑝𝜖
_
(𝜙𝑃𝑉𝐴)1 3⁄ + 3𝑝𝑦(𝜙𝑃𝑉𝐴)1 3⁄ − 2 31 3⁄ (𝜙𝑃𝑉𝐴)2 3⁄ ) (3𝑝(𝜙𝑃𝑉𝐴)1 3⁄ )⁄ }} 
  
𝜋𝑃
𝑃𝑉𝐴1∗ 1
6
(3 − 𝜖
_
2 − 3 (𝑦 − 𝑚𝑃𝑉𝐴∗)2)𝜆 − (𝑝 + 𝑎𝑃
𝑃𝑉𝐴 + 𝑐𝑃)(1 − 𝑦 + 𝑚
𝑃𝑉𝐴∗) +
𝑝𝜖
_
4
 
  
𝜋𝑃
𝑃𝑉𝐴2∗ 
(
1
2
−
(𝑦 − 𝑚𝑃𝑉𝐴∗ + 𝜖
_
)3
12𝜖
_ )𝜆 − (𝑝 + 𝑎𝑃
𝑃𝑉𝐴 + 𝑐𝑃)(1 −
(𝑦 − 𝑚𝑃𝑉𝐴∗ + 𝜖
_
)2
4𝜖
_ ) +
𝑝(𝑦 − 𝑚𝑃𝑉𝐴∗ − 3𝜖
_
)2(𝑦 − 𝑚𝑃𝑉𝐴∗ + 𝜖
_
)2
64𝜖
_
3  
  
𝜋𝑀
𝑃𝑉𝐴1∗ 
(𝑝 − 𝑐𝑀)(1 − 𝑦 +𝑚
𝑃𝑉𝐴∗) − 𝑘(𝑚𝑃𝑉𝐴∗)2 −
𝑝𝜖
_
4
 
  
𝜋𝑀
𝑃𝑉𝐴2∗ 
(𝑝 − 𝑐𝑀)(1 −
(𝑦 − 𝑚𝑃𝑉𝐴∗ + 𝜖
_
)2
4𝜖
_ ) − 𝑘(𝑚𝑃𝑉𝐴∗)2 −
𝑝(𝑦 − 𝑚𝑃𝑉𝐴∗ − 3𝜖
_
)2(𝑦 − 𝑚𝑃𝑉𝐴∗ + 𝜖
_
)2
64𝜖
_
3  
a The optimal values with a superscript 1 is for case 1 (when  𝑚 ≤ 𝑦 − 𝜖
_
); the optimal values with a superscript 2 is for case 2 (when  𝑚 > 𝑦 − 𝜖
_
). 
b  𝜙𝑃𝑉𝐴 = 9𝑐𝑀𝑝
2𝜖
_
3 − 9𝑝3𝜖
_
3 − 18𝑘𝑝2𝜖
_
4 + 18𝑘𝑝2𝜖
_
3𝑦 +
1
48
√4(−24𝑐𝑀𝑝𝜖
_
2 + 12𝑝2𝜖
_
2 + 96𝑘𝑝𝜖
_
3)3 + (432𝑐𝑀𝑝
2𝜖
_
3 − 432𝑝3𝜖
_
3 − 864𝑘𝑝2𝜖
_
4 + 864𝑘𝑝2𝜖
_
3𝑦)2 
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Appendix B: Essay 2  
Proof of Lemma 3.1: 
The profit of the centralized system in stage 2 is given by: 
𝜋𝐶|𝐿𝐶 = 𝑟min{𝐷, 𝐿𝐶 + 𝑞𝐸} − 𝑐𝑀𝑥𝑀 − 𝑐𝑅𝑞𝑅 − 𝑐𝐸𝑞𝐸 − ℎ𝐶(𝐿𝐶 + 𝑞𝐸 −𝐷)
+
− 𝑠𝐻(𝐷 − 𝐿𝐶 − 𝑞𝐸)
+ 
There are two cases: 𝐷 ≤ 𝐿𝐶 + 𝑞𝐸, and 𝐷 > 𝐿𝐶 + 𝑞𝐸. 
- If 𝐷 ≤ 𝐿𝐶 + 𝑞𝐸, i.e., 𝑞𝐸 ≥ 𝐷 − 𝐿𝐶:  
𝜋𝐶|𝐿𝐶 = −(𝑐𝐸 + ℎ𝐶)𝑞𝐸 + (𝑟 + ℎ𝐶)𝐷 − 𝑐𝑀𝑥𝑀 − 𝑐𝑅𝑞𝑅 − ℎ𝐶𝐿𝐶 
Since the slope of 𝑞𝐸 is −(𝑐𝐸 + ℎ𝐶) < 0, 𝜋𝐶 is decreasing in 𝑞𝐸, and thus 𝑞𝐸 =
(𝐷 − 𝐿𝐶)
+ 
- If 𝐷 > 𝐿𝐶 + 𝑞𝐸, i.e., 𝑞𝐸 ≤ 𝐷 − 𝐿𝐶: 
𝜋𝐶|𝐿𝐶 = (𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻 − 𝑐𝐸)𝑞𝐸 + (𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻)𝐿𝐶 − 𝑠𝐻𝐷 − 𝑐𝑀𝑥𝑀 − 𝑐𝑅𝑞𝑅 
The slope of 𝑞𝐸 is 𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻 − 𝑐𝐸. 
• If 𝑐𝐸 < 𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻, then the slope of 𝑞𝐸 is positive, and 𝜋𝐶 is increasing in 𝑞𝐸 . Thus 𝑞𝐸 =
(𝐷 − 𝐿𝐶)
+. 
• If 𝑐𝐸 ≥ 𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻, then the slope of 𝑞𝐸 is negative and 𝜋𝐶 is decreasing in 𝑞𝐸. Thus 𝑞𝐸 =
0.∎ 
Proof of Proposition 3.1: 
Depending on the value of ?̃?𝐸
𝐶, there are two cases: 1. ?̃?𝐸
𝐶 = 0, if 𝑐𝐸 ≥ 𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻; 2. ?̃?𝐸
𝐶 =
(𝐷 − 𝐿𝐶)
+, if 𝑐𝐸 < 𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻. We solve each case as follows. 
1. ?̃?𝐸
𝐶 = 0, if 𝑐𝐸 ≥ 𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻 
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𝜋𝐶 = 𝑟min{𝐷, 𝑧𝐶 + 𝑞𝑅 + 𝑢 𝑘𝑀} − 𝑐𝑀𝑥𝑀 − 𝑐𝑅𝑞𝑅 − ℎ𝐶(𝑧𝐶 + 𝑞𝑅 + 𝑢 𝑘𝑀 − 𝐷)
+
− 𝑠𝐻(𝐷 − 𝑧𝐶 − 𝑞𝑅 − 𝑢 𝑘𝑀)
+
= 𝑟𝐷 − 𝑐𝑀𝑥𝑀 − 𝑐𝑅𝑞𝑅 − ℎ𝐶(𝑧𝐶 + 𝑞𝑅 + 𝑢 𝑘𝑀 − 𝐷)
+ − (𝑟
+ 𝑠𝐻)(𝐷 − 𝑧𝐶 − 𝑞𝑅 − 𝑢 𝑘𝑀)
+ 
We find the limit of 𝑢 and calculate the expected profit as follows 
𝛱𝐶 = 𝑟𝐷 − 𝑐𝑀𝑥𝑀 − 𝑐𝑅𝑞𝑅 − ℎ𝐶∫ (𝑧𝐶 + 𝑞𝑅 + 𝑢 𝑘𝑀 − 𝐷)
𝑏
𝐷−𝑞𝑅−𝑧𝐶
𝑥𝑀
𝑓(𝑢)𝑑𝑢
− (𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻)∫ (𝐷 − 𝑧𝐶 − 𝑞𝑅 − 𝑢 𝑘𝑀)
𝐷−𝑞𝑅−𝑧𝐶
𝑥𝑀
𝑎
𝑓(𝑢)𝑑𝑢 
The second order condition (SOC) 
𝜕2𝛱𝐶
𝜕𝑞𝑅
2
𝜕2𝛱𝐶
𝜕𝑥𝑀
2 − (
𝜕2𝛱𝐶
𝜕𝑞𝑅𝜕𝑥𝑀
)
2
= 0, which is non-conclusive. 
Therefore, we solve the interior solution and boundary solutions as candidates, and 
compare the profit with the candidate solutions to obtain the optimal solutions. 
By solving 
𝜕𝛱𝐶
𝜕𝑞𝑅
= 0 and 
𝜕𝛱𝐶
𝜕𝑥𝑀
= 0 simultaneously, we obtain the interior solutions: 𝑞𝑅 =
𝐷 − 𝑧𝐶 and 𝑥𝑀 = 0 (which is also a boundary solution at 𝑥𝑀 = 0); 
Another boundary solution is 𝑞𝑅 = 0, 𝑥𝑀 =
√ℎ𝐶+𝑟+𝑠𝐻(𝐷−𝑧𝐶)
√−2𝑎𝑐𝑀+𝑏(2𝑐𝑀+𝑏ℎ𝐶)+𝑎2(𝑟+𝑠𝐻)
= ?̂?𝑀 
We then compare the profit with the two candidate solutions: 𝛱𝐶(𝑞𝑅 = 𝐷 − 𝑧𝑐, 𝑥𝑀 =
0) ≤ 𝛱𝐶(𝑞𝑅 = 0, 𝑥𝑀 = ?̂?𝑀) iff. 𝑐𝑅 <
(
√ℎ𝐶+𝑟+𝑠𝐻√−2𝑎𝑐𝑀+𝑏(2𝑐𝑀+𝑏ℎ𝐶)+𝑎2(𝑟+𝑠𝐻)−𝑏ℎ𝐶−𝑎(𝑟+𝑠𝐻)
𝑏−𝑎
)
+
. 
2. ?̃?𝐸
𝐶 = (𝐷 − 𝐿𝐶)
+, if 𝑐𝐸 < 𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻. 
𝜋𝐶 = 𝑟min{𝐷, 𝐿𝐶 + (𝐷 − 𝐿𝐶)
+ } − 𝑐𝑀𝑥𝑀 − 𝑐𝑅𝑞𝑅 − 𝑐𝐸(𝐷 − 𝐿𝐶)
+
− ℎ𝐶 (𝐿𝐶 + (𝐷 − 𝐿𝐶)
+ − 𝐷)+ − 𝑠𝐻(𝐷 − 𝐿𝐶 − (𝐷 − 𝐿𝐶)
+)+
= 𝑟𝐷 − 𝑐𝑀𝑥𝑀 − 𝑐𝑅𝑞𝑅 − ℎ𝐶(𝑧𝐶 + 𝑞𝑅 + 𝑢 𝑘𝑀 − 𝐷)
+
− 𝑐𝐸(𝐷 − 𝑧𝐶 − 𝑞𝑅 − 𝑢 𝑘𝑀)
+ 
128 
 
After the transformation of 𝜋𝐶, it is easy to verify that we can obtain 𝜋𝐶 in this case from 
𝜋𝐶 in case 1 by replacing 𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻 (the coefficient of the last term) with 𝑐𝐸. Thus the 
optimal solutions could be obtained from case 1 by replacing 𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻 with 𝑐𝐸: 
𝛱𝐶(𝑞𝑅 = 𝐷 − 𝑧𝑐, 𝑥𝑀 = 0) ≤ 𝛱𝐶 (𝑞𝑅 = 0, 𝑥𝑀 =
√ℎ𝐶+𝑟+𝑠𝐶(𝐷−𝑧𝐶)
√−2𝑎𝑐𝑀+𝑏(2𝑐𝑀+𝑏ℎ𝐶)+𝑎2(𝑟+𝑠𝐶)
) iff 𝑐𝑅 <
(
√ℎ𝐶+𝑐𝐸√−2𝑎𝑐𝑀+𝑏(2𝑐𝑀+𝑏ℎ𝐶)+𝑎2𝑐𝐸−𝑏ℎ𝐶−𝑎𝑐𝐸
𝑏−𝑎
)
+
 . ∎ 
Proof of Lemma 3.2: Lemma 3.2 can be proved using the same procedure with Lemma 
3.1. ∎ 
Proof of Lemma 3.4 (the proof of Lemma 3.3 is a subcase in Lemma 3.4): 
Proof for ?̃?𝑴: 
- If 𝑞𝑀 ≤ 𝑧𝑀, the manufacturer’s expected profit is strictly decreasing in 𝑥𝑀, thus 𝑥𝑀 =
0. 
- If 𝑞𝑀 > 𝑧𝑀: 
   1. If 𝑞𝑀 < 𝑏𝑥𝑀 + 𝑧𝑀 (i.e., 
𝑞𝑀−𝑧𝑀
𝑘𝑀
< 𝑏), then  
𝛱𝑀|𝑧𝑀 = 𝑤(∫ (𝑢 𝑥𝑀 + 𝑧𝑀) 𝑓(𝑢)𝑑𝑢
𝑞𝑀−𝑧𝑀
𝑥𝑀
𝑎
+∫  𝑞𝑀𝑓(𝑢)𝑑𝑢
𝑏
𝑞𝑀−𝑧𝑀
𝑥𝑀
)− 𝑐𝑀𝑥𝑀
− ℎ𝑀∫  (𝑧𝑀 + 𝑢 𝑥𝑀 − 𝑞𝑀)𝑓(𝑢)𝑑𝑢
𝑏
𝑞𝑀−𝑧𝑀
𝑥𝑀
− 𝑠𝑀∫ (𝑞𝑀 − 𝑧𝑀 − 𝑢 𝑥𝑀) 𝑓(𝑢)𝑑𝑢
𝑞𝑀−𝑧𝑀
𝑥𝑀
𝑎
 
Since 
𝑑2𝛱𝑀
𝑑𝑥𝑀
2 = −
(𝑤+ℎ𝑀+𝑠𝑀)(𝑞𝑀−𝑧𝑀)
2
(𝑏−𝑎)𝑥𝑀
3 < 0, 𝛱𝑀 is concave in 𝑥𝑀.We solve the first 
order condition (FOC)  
𝑑𝛱𝑀
𝑑𝑥𝑀
=
(𝑤+ℎ𝑀+𝑠𝑀)(𝑞𝑀−𝑧𝑀)
2
2(𝑏−𝑎)𝑥𝑀
2 − 𝑐𝑀 −
2𝑏2ℎ𝑀+𝑎
2(𝑠𝑀+𝑤)
2(𝑏−𝑎)
= 0 to 
obtain 𝑥𝑀
∗ = 𝐴𝑀(𝑞𝑀 − 𝑧𝑀). We substitute 𝑥𝑀
∗  in the condition 
𝑞𝑀−𝑧𝑀
𝑘𝑀
< 𝑏 to 
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obtain 
1
𝐴𝑀
< 𝑏, which is equivalent to (𝑎 + 𝑏)(𝑠𝑀 + 𝑤) − 2𝑐𝑀 > 0.  
   2. If 𝑞𝑀 ≥ 𝑏𝑥𝑀 + 𝑧𝑀 (i.e., 
𝑞𝑀−𝑧𝑀
𝑥𝑀
≥ 𝑏), then  
𝛱𝑀|𝑧𝑀 = 𝑤(𝐸[𝑢]𝑥𝑀 + 𝑧𝑀) − 𝑐𝑀𝑥𝑀 − 𝑠𝑀((𝑞𝑀 − 𝑧𝑀 − 𝐸[𝑢]𝑥𝑀))
=
1
2
𝑥𝑀((𝑎 + 𝑏)(𝑠𝑀 + 𝑤) − 2𝑐𝑀) +
1
2
(−2𝑞𝑀𝑠𝑀 + 2(𝑠𝑀 + 𝑤)𝑧𝑀) 
• If (𝑎 + 𝑏)(𝑠𝑀 +𝑤) − 2𝑐𝑀 > 0, then 𝑥𝑀 =
𝑞𝑀−𝑧𝑀
𝑏
. However, 𝛱𝑀 (𝑥𝑀 =
𝑞𝑀−𝑧𝑀
𝑏
) ≤
𝛱𝑀(𝑥𝑀 = 𝐴𝑀(𝑞𝑀 − 𝑧𝑀). ), therefore this solution is not optimal. 
• If (𝑎 + 𝑏)(𝑠𝑀 +𝑤) − 2𝑐𝑀 < 0, 𝛱𝑀 is decreasing in 𝑥𝑀, thus 𝑥𝑀 = 0, this is also the 
proof for Lemma 3.2 and Assumption 3.1. ∎ 
 Proof of Lemma 3.5: 
(𝑤 + ℎ𝑀 + 𝑠𝑀) − (2(𝑏 − 𝑎)𝑐𝑀 + 𝑠𝑀𝑎
2 +𝑤𝑎2 + ℎ𝑀𝑏
2) = (1 − 𝑏2)(𝑤 + ℎ𝑀 + 𝑠𝑀) +
(𝑏 − 𝑎)((𝑏 + 𝑎)(𝑠𝑀 +𝑤) − 2𝑐𝑀) > 0 under the assumption that (𝑎 + 𝑏)(𝑠𝑀 +𝑤) − 2𝑐𝑀 > 0, 
thus, 𝐴𝑀 =
√𝑤+ℎ𝑀+𝑠𝑀
√2(𝑏−𝑎)𝑐𝑀+ 𝑠𝑀𝑎
2+𝑤𝑎2+ ℎ𝑀𝑏
2
> 1. ∎ 
Proof of Proposition 3.2: 
We skip the proof for Proposition 2.A and B, which are straightforward. We show the proof of 
Proposition 2.C. Depending on the best response function in step 3 and step 2, there are 4 cases as 
follows: 
 ?̃?𝑬  = 𝟎 if 𝒄𝑬 ≥ 𝒓 + 𝒔𝑯 ?̃?𝑬 = (𝑫 − 𝑳)
+ if 𝒄𝑬 < 𝒓 + 𝒔𝑯 
?̃?𝑀 = 0 if 𝑞𝑀 ≤ 𝑧𝑀 Case 1 Case 2 
?̃?𝑀 = 𝐴(𝑞𝑀 − 𝑧𝑀)  
if 𝑞𝑀 > 𝑧𝑀 
Case 3 Case 4 
The superscript is the index for the case number in the following proof. 
Case 1. ?̃?𝐸  = 0 and ?̃?𝑀 = 0 if 𝑐𝐸 ≥ 𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻 and 𝑞𝑀 ≤ 𝑧𝑀. The hospital’s random profit is as 
follows.  
𝜋𝐻
1 = 𝑟min{𝐷, 𝑧𝐻 + 𝑞𝑅 + 𝑞𝑀} − 𝑤𝑞𝑀 − 𝑐𝑅𝑞𝑅 − ℎ𝐻(𝑧𝐻 + 𝑞𝑅 + 𝑞𝑀 − 𝐷)
+
− 𝑠𝐻(𝐷 − 𝑧𝐻 − 𝑞𝑅 − 𝑞𝑀)
+ 
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There are two subcases:1.1. 𝑧𝐻 + 𝑞𝑅 + 𝑞𝑀 ≤ 𝐷; 1.2. 𝑧𝐻 + 𝑞𝑅 + 𝑞𝑀 ≥ 𝐷. 
1.1.𝑧𝐻 + 𝑞𝑅 + 𝑞𝑀 ≤ 𝐷, or 𝑞𝑅 + 𝑞𝑀 ≤ 𝐷 − 𝑧𝐻 
𝜋𝐻
11 = 𝑟(𝑧𝐻 + 𝑞𝑅 + 𝑞𝑀) − 𝑤𝑞𝑀 − 𝑐𝑅𝑞𝑅 − 𝑠𝐻(𝐷 − 𝑧𝐻 − 𝑞𝑅 − 𝑞𝑀)
= 𝑞𝑅(𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻 − 𝑐𝑅) + 𝑞𝑀(𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻 − 𝑤) + (𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻)𝑧𝐻 − 𝑠𝐻𝐷 
𝜋𝐻
11 is increasing in both 𝑞𝑅 and 𝑞𝑀 based on the assumption that 𝑐𝑅 , 𝑤 < 𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻. We 
compare the slope of 𝑞𝑅 and 𝑞𝑀, and obtain the optimal solutions as follows: 
𝑞𝑅 = 𝐷 − 𝑧𝐻  and 𝑞𝑀 = 0 if 𝑐𝑅 ≤ 𝑤; 𝑞𝑅 = 𝐷 − 𝑧𝐻 − 𝑧𝑀 and 𝑞𝑀 = 𝑧𝑀 
if 𝑐𝑅 > 𝑤. 
1.2.𝑧𝐻 + 𝑞𝑅 + 𝑞𝑀 ≥ 𝐷, or 𝑞𝑅 + 𝑞𝑀 ≥ 𝐷 − 𝑧𝐻 
𝜋𝐻
12 = 𝑟𝐷 − 𝑤𝑞𝑀 − 𝑐𝑅𝑞𝑅 − ℎ𝐻(𝑧𝐻 + 𝑞𝑅 + 𝑞𝑀 − 𝐷)
= 𝑞𝑅(−𝑐𝑅 − ℎ𝐻) + 𝑞𝑀(−𝑤 − ℎ𝐻) + 𝑟𝐷 + ℎ𝐻(𝐷 − 𝑧𝐻) 
𝜋𝐻 is decreasing in both 𝑞𝑅 and 𝑞𝑀, and by comparing the slope, we know that the 
optimal solutions for this case are the same as those in case 1.1. 
Case 2. ?̃?𝐸 = (𝐷 − 𝐿)
+ and ?̃?𝑀 = 0 if 𝑐𝐸 < 𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻 and 𝑞𝑀 ≤ 𝑧𝑀. 
Following similar steps, this subcase has the same optimal solution with case 1. 
Case 3. ?̃?𝐸 = 0 and ?̃?𝑀 = 𝐴𝑀(𝑞𝑀 − 𝑧𝑀) if 𝑐𝐸 ≥ 𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻 and 𝑞𝑀 > 𝑧𝑀. We substitute ?̃?𝑀 
to obtain 𝑦 = min{𝑞𝑀, 𝑢𝐴𝑀(𝑞𝑀 − 𝑧𝑀) + 𝑧𝑀}. We then generate 𝜋𝐻 as follows 
𝜋𝐻
3 = 𝑟min{𝐷, 𝑄1, 𝑄2} − 𝑤𝑦 − 𝑐𝑅𝑞𝑅 − 𝑠𝐻max{0, 𝐷 − 𝑄1, 𝐷 − 𝑄2}
− ℎ𝐻(min{𝑄1 − 𝐷,𝑄2 − 𝐷})
+
= 𝑟𝐷 − 𝑤𝑦 − 𝑐𝑅𝑞𝑅 − (𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻)max{0, 𝐷 − 𝑄1, 𝐷 − 𝑄2}
− ℎ𝐻(min{𝑄1 − 𝐷,𝑄2 − 𝐷})
+ 
Where 𝑄1 = 𝑧𝐻 + 𝑞𝑅 + 𝑞𝑀 and 𝑄2 = 𝑧𝐻 + 𝑞𝑅 + 𝑧𝑀 + 𝑢𝐴𝑀(𝑞𝑀 − 𝑧𝑀). 
There are two subcases: 3.1. 𝑄1 ≥ 𝐷; 3.2. 𝑄1 < 𝐷 . 
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3.1. 𝑄1 ≥ 𝐷, i.e., 𝑞𝑅 + 𝑞𝑀 ≥ 𝐷 − 𝑧𝐻 
𝜋𝐻 = 𝑟𝐷 − 𝑤𝑦 − 𝑐𝑅𝑞𝑅 − (𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻)max{0, 𝐷 − 𝑄2} − ℎ𝐻(min{𝑄1 − 𝐷,𝑄2 − 𝐷})
+ 
We find the limit for 𝑢 and calculate the expected profit as follows.  
𝛱𝐻
31 = 𝑟 𝐷 − 𝑤(∫ (𝑢𝐴𝑀(𝑞𝑀 − 𝑧𝑀) + 𝑧𝑀)
1
𝐴𝑀
𝑎
𝑓(𝑢)𝑑𝑢 + ∫ 𝑞𝑀
𝑏
𝐴𝑀
𝑓(𝑢)𝑑𝑢) − 𝑐𝑅𝑞𝑅
− (𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻)∫ (𝐷 − 𝑄2)
𝐷−𝑞𝑅−𝑧𝐻−𝑧𝑀 
𝐴𝑀(𝑞𝑀−𝑧𝑀)
𝑎
𝑓(𝑢)𝑑𝑢
− ℎ𝐻 ((∫ (𝑄2 − 𝐷)
1
𝐴𝑀
𝐷−𝑞𝑅−𝑧𝐻−𝑧𝑀 
𝐴(𝑞𝑀−𝑧𝑀)
𝑓(𝑢)𝑑𝑢 + ∫ (𝑄1 − 𝐷)
𝑏
1
𝐴𝑀
𝑓(𝑢)𝑑𝑢)) 
Where 𝑓(𝑢) =
1
𝑏−𝑎
 under the assumption that 𝑢~𝑈(𝑎, 𝑏). For the limit of 𝑢 in the above 
profit function: it could be easily verified that 
𝐷−𝑞𝑅−𝑧𝐻−𝑧𝑀 
𝐴𝑀(𝑞𝑀−𝑧𝑀)
≤
1
𝐴𝑀
; we solve for optimal 
𝑞𝑅 and 𝑞𝑀, and verify that 
𝐷−𝑞𝑅−𝑧𝐻−𝑧𝑀 
𝐴𝑀(𝑞𝑀−𝑧𝑀)
≥ 𝑎 under the optimal values for 𝑞𝑅 and 𝑞𝑀; we 
also solve for the case that 
𝐷−𝑞𝑅−𝑧𝐻−𝑧𝑀 
𝐴𝑀(𝑞𝑀−𝑧𝑀)
≤ 𝑎, and verify that this case is not optimal.  
Similar to the proof of Proposition 1, SOC = 0 which is non-conclusive. Thus, we solve 
for the interior solution and boundary solutions as candidates, and compare the profit to 
obtain the optimal solutions. 
Solve 
𝜕𝛱𝐻
32
𝜕𝑞𝑅
= 0 and 
𝜕𝛱𝐻
32
𝜕𝑞𝑀
= 0 simultaneously, we obtain interior solution: 𝑞𝑅 = 𝐷 − 𝑧𝐻 −
𝑧𝑀 and 𝑥𝑀 = 𝑧𝑀. This solution is not feasible, since 𝑥𝑀 − 𝑧𝑀 is showing in the 
denominator in the limit for u in 𝛱𝐻. However, we could use the profit function in Case 1 
𝛱𝐻
1 , which applies to the solution 𝑞𝑀 = 𝑧𝑀, to generate the profit for this interior 
solution, and compare it with other boundary solution. 
The only other boundary solution is when 𝑞𝑅 = 0: 𝛱𝐻
31 is concave in 𝑞𝑀 and solving 
132 
 
𝜕𝛱𝐻
32(𝑞𝑅=0)
𝜕𝑞𝑀
= 0 gives 𝑞𝑀 = 𝑧𝑀 +
√(𝑟+𝑠𝐻+ℎ𝐻)(𝐷−𝑧𝐻−𝑧𝑀)
√𝐴𝑀
2𝑎2(𝑟+𝑠𝐻−𝑤)+(2𝐴𝑏−1)(ℎ𝐻+𝑤)
. We compare 𝛱𝐻
31 under 
the two candidate solutions and obtain the optimal solution as follows. 
𝑞𝑅 = 𝐷 − 𝑧𝐻 − 𝑧𝑀, 𝑞𝑀 = 𝑧𝑀, if 𝑐𝑅 = 𝑐𝑅
32 ≤
√(ℎ𝐻+𝑟+𝑠𝐻)((2𝐴𝑀𝑏−1)(ℎ𝐻+𝑤)+𝑎
2𝐴𝑀
2(𝑟+𝑠𝐻−𝑤)−𝐴𝑀(𝑏ℎ𝐻+𝑎(𝑟+𝑠𝐻))
𝐴𝑀(𝑏−𝑎)
; 𝑞𝑅 = 0, 𝑞𝑀 = max {𝐷 − 𝑧𝐻, 𝑧𝑀 +
√(𝑟+𝑠𝐻+ℎ𝐻)(𝐷−𝑧𝐻−𝑧𝑀)
√𝐴𝑀
2𝑎2(𝑟+𝑠𝐻−𝑤)+(2𝐴𝑀𝑏−1)(ℎ𝐻+𝑤)
} otherwise. 
We also solve the optimal solution in case 3.2, and verify that 𝛱𝐻
31∗ ≥ 𝛱𝐻
32∗, i.e., case 3.2 
is never optimal, since it is dominated by case 3.1.  
Case 4. ?̃?𝐸 = (𝐷 − 𝐿)
+ and ?̃?𝑀 = 𝐴𝑀(𝑞𝑀 − 𝑧𝑀) if 𝑐𝐸 < 𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻 and 𝑞𝑀 > 𝑧𝑀. After 
substituting ?̃?𝐸 and  ?̃?𝑀, and some manipulation of the min and max functions, we have  
𝜋𝐻
4 = 𝑟𝐷 − 𝑤𝑦 − 𝑐𝑅𝑞𝑅 − 𝑐𝐸max{0, 𝐷 − 𝑄1, 𝐷 − 𝑄2}
− ℎ𝐻(min{𝑄1 − 𝐷,𝑄2 − 𝐷})
+ 
𝜋𝐻
4  could be obtained by replacing 𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻 in 𝜋𝐻
3  with 𝑐𝐸. Therefore, the optimal solution 
in case 4 could be obtained by replacing 𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻 in the optimal solution in case 3 with 
𝑐𝐸 . ∎ 
Proof of Proposition 3.3.a: 
- If 𝑐𝐸 ≥ 𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻:  
𝜕𝑐?̅?
𝜕𝑠𝐻
=
(𝑎𝐴𝐻√ℎ𝐻+𝑟+𝑠𝐻−√(ℎ𝐻+𝑟+𝑠𝐻)((2𝐴𝑏−1)(ℎ𝐻+𝑤)+𝑎2𝐴2(𝑟+𝑠𝐻−𝑤))
2
2𝐴𝐻(𝑏−𝑎)√ℎ𝐻+𝑟+𝑠𝐻√(ℎ𝐻+𝑟+𝑠𝐻)((2𝐴𝑏−1)(ℎ𝐻+𝑤)+𝑎2𝐴2(𝑟+𝑠𝐻−𝑤)
≥ 0; 
  
𝜕𝑐?̅?
𝜕𝑟
=
(𝑎𝐴𝐻√ℎ𝐻+𝑟+𝑠𝐻−√(ℎ𝐻+𝑟+𝑠𝐻)((2𝐴𝑏−1)(ℎ𝐻+𝑤)+𝑎2𝐴2(𝑟+𝑠𝐻−𝑤))
2
2𝐴𝐻(𝑏−𝑎)√ℎ𝐻+𝑟+𝑠𝐻√(ℎ𝐻+𝑟+𝑠𝐻)((2𝐴𝑏−1)(ℎ𝐻+𝑤)+𝑎2𝐴2(𝑟+𝑠𝐻−𝑤)
≥ 0; 
  
𝜕𝑐?̅?
𝜕𝑐𝐸
= 0 
- If 𝑐𝐸 < 𝑟 + 𝑠𝐻:  
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𝜕𝑐?̅?
𝜕𝑠𝐻
= 0;
𝜕𝑐?̅?
𝜕𝑟
= 0;
𝜕𝑐?̅?
𝜕𝑐𝐸
=
(𝑎𝐴𝐻√ℎ𝐻+𝑐𝐸−√(ℎ𝐻+𝑐𝐸)((2𝐴𝑏−1)(ℎ𝐻+𝑤)+𝑎2𝐴2(𝑐𝐸−𝑤))
2
2𝐴𝐻(𝑏−𝑎)√ℎ𝐻+𝑐𝐸√(ℎ𝐻+𝑐𝐸)((2𝐴𝑏−1)(ℎ𝐻+𝑤)+𝑎2𝐴2(𝑐𝐸−𝑤)
> 0. ∎ 
Proof of Lemma 3.6: 
By substituting the optimal solutions in 𝛱𝐻
∗ , we verify that 𝑠𝐻 is not showing in 𝛱𝐻
∗  in 
regions A,B and D in Figure 3.3, indicating that there is no shortage in those regions. In 
region C, the expected shortage amount could be obtained by computing the integral of 
the 𝑠𝐻 term:∫ (𝐷 − 𝑄2)
𝐷−𝑞𝑅−𝑧𝐻−𝑧𝑀 
𝐴𝑀(𝑞𝑀−𝑧𝑀)
𝑎
𝑓(𝑢)𝑑𝑢 =
(𝑞𝑅+𝑧𝐻+𝑧𝑀−𝐷+𝑎𝐴(?̂?𝑀−𝑧𝑀))
2
2𝐴𝑀(𝑏−𝑎)(?̂?𝑀−𝑧𝑀)
 . ∎  
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Appendix C: Essay 3 
All proofs are based on the assumption that 𝑢𝑀~𝑈(0,1), i.e., 𝑓(𝑢𝑀) = 1. 
Proof of Lemma 4.1: 
- If 𝑥𝑀 ≤ 𝑞𝑀: 
𝑞𝑀
𝑥𝑀
> 1 → 𝑢𝑀𝑥𝑀 < 𝑞𝑀 → min{𝑢𝑀𝑥𝑀, 𝑞𝑀} = 𝑢𝑀𝑥𝑀 
𝑌𝑀
𝐵 = ∫ 𝑢𝑀𝑥𝑀𝑓(𝑢𝑀)ⅆ𝑢𝑀
1
0
= 𝑥𝑀𝐸[𝑢𝑀] =
𝑥𝑀
2
 
𝛱𝑀
𝐵 = 𝑤𝑀𝑌𝑀
𝐵 − 𝑐𝑀𝑥𝑀 = (
𝑤𝑀
2
− 𝑐𝑀) 𝑥𝑀 
𝛱𝑀
𝐵  is linear in 𝑥𝑀, and the slope of 𝑥𝑀 is 
𝑤𝑀
2
− 𝑐𝑀. 
a. If 
𝑤𝑀
2
− 𝑐𝑀 < 0, i.e., 𝑤𝑀 < 𝑐𝑀: 𝛱𝑀
𝐵  is decreasing in 𝑥𝑀, and 𝑥𝑀 = 0 ∀ 𝑞𝑀, the 
manufacturer does not produce anything regardless of 𝑞𝑀. Therefore, we assume 𝑤𝑀 >
2𝑐𝑀 for the rest of the analysis.  
b. If 
𝑤𝑀
2
− 𝑐𝑀 < 0, 𝑖.e., 𝑤𝑀 < 𝑐𝑀: 𝛱𝑀
𝐵  is increasing in 𝑥𝑀 → 𝑥𝑀 = 𝑞𝑀. 
- If 𝑥𝑀 > 𝑞𝑀: 
𝑌𝑀
𝐵 = ∫ 𝑢𝑀𝑥𝑀𝑓(𝑢𝑀)ⅆ𝑢𝑀
𝑞𝑀
𝑥𝑀
0
+∫ 𝑞𝑀𝑓(𝑢𝑀)ⅆ𝑢𝑀
1
𝑞𝑀
𝑥𝑀
= 𝑥𝑀 [
𝑢𝑀
2
2
]
0
𝑞𝑀
𝑥𝑀
+ 𝑞𝑀[𝑢𝑀]𝑞𝑀
𝑥𝑀
1
= 𝑞𝑀 −
𝑞𝑀
2
2𝑥𝑀
 
𝛱𝑀
𝐵 = 𝑤𝑀𝑌𝑀
𝐵 − 𝑐𝑀𝑥𝑀 = 𝑤𝑀 (𝑞𝑀 −
𝑞𝑀
2
2𝑥𝑀
) − 𝑐𝑀𝑥𝑀 
The second order condition (SOC) of 𝛱𝑀
𝐵  is 
𝑑2𝛱𝑀
𝐵
𝑑 𝑥𝑀
2 = −𝑤𝑀
𝑞𝑀
2
𝑥𝑀
3 < 0: 𝛱𝑀
𝐵  is concave in 𝑥𝑀. 
Solve the first order condition (FOC) of 𝛱𝑀
𝐵 , 
𝑑𝛱𝑀
𝐵
𝑑 𝑥𝑀
=
𝑤𝑀
2
(
𝑞𝑀
𝑥𝑀
)
2
− 𝑐𝑀 = 0 → ?̃?𝑀
𝐵 (𝑞𝑀) =
𝛼𝑞𝑀, where 𝛼 = √
𝑤𝑀
2𝑐𝑀
 ∎ 
Proof of Proposition 3.1: 
It could be proved that 𝑞𝑀 < 𝑑 is not optimal. Therefore, the following proof is based on 
𝑞𝑀 > 𝑑. 
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𝑦𝑊
𝐵 = min{𝑑,min {𝑢𝑀𝑥𝑀, 𝑞𝑀} = min{𝑑, 𝑢𝑀𝑥𝑀} 
𝑌𝑊
𝐵 = ∫ 𝑢𝑀𝑥𝑀𝑓(𝑢𝑀)ⅆ𝑢𝑀
𝑑
𝑥𝑀
0
+∫ 𝑑𝑓(𝑢𝑀)ⅆ𝑢𝑀
1
𝑑
𝑥𝑀
= 𝑑 −
𝑑2
2𝑥𝑀
 
𝛱𝑊
𝐵 = 𝑝𝑌𝑊
𝐵 − 𝑤𝑀𝑌𝑀
𝐵 = 𝑝(𝑑 −
𝑑2
2𝑥𝑀
) − 𝑤𝑀 (𝑞𝑀 −
𝑞𝑀
2
2𝑥𝑀
) 
Substitute ?̃?𝑀
𝐵 (𝑞𝑀) = 𝛼𝑞𝑀: 
𝛱𝑊
𝐵 = 𝑝(𝑑 −
𝑑2
2𝛼𝑞𝑀
) − 𝑤𝑀𝑞𝑀 (1 −
1
2𝛼
) 
SOC of 𝛱𝑊
𝐵  is 
𝑑2?̃?𝑊
𝐵
𝑑 𝑞𝑀
2 = −
𝑑2𝑝
𝑎𝑞𝑀
3 < 0: 𝛱𝑊
𝐵  is concave in 𝑞𝑀 
Solve the FOC of 𝛱𝑊
𝐵 , 
𝑑?̃?𝑊
𝐵
𝑑 𝑞𝑀
=
𝑝
2𝛼
(
𝑑
𝑞𝑀
)
2
− 𝑤𝑀 (1 −
1
2𝛼
) = 0 →  𝑞𝑀
𝐵∗ = 𝜏𝑞𝑀, where 𝜏 =
√
𝑚
(2𝛼−1)𝑤𝑀
. ∎ 
 
Proof of Lemma 4.2: 
𝑆𝐵 = 𝑑 − 𝑌𝑊
𝐵 = (𝑑 −
𝑑2
2𝑥𝑀
) =
𝑑2
2𝑥𝑀
 
Substitute ?̃?𝑀
𝐵 (𝑞𝑀) = 𝛼𝑞𝑀 and 𝑞𝑀
𝐵∗ = 𝜏𝑞𝑀: 𝑆
𝐵∗ =
𝑑2
2𝑎𝜏𝑑
=
𝑑
2𝛼𝜏
. ∎ 
 
Proof of Proposition 4.2: 
a. 
𝜕𝑞𝑀
𝐵∗
𝜕𝑚
=
𝑑
2𝑚
√
𝑚
2𝛼−1
> 0; 
𝜕𝑞𝑀
𝐵∗
𝜕𝑤𝑀
=
𝛼𝜏𝑑
2𝑤𝑀(1−2𝛼)
< 0;  
𝜕𝑞𝑀
𝐵∗
𝜕𝑐𝑀
=
𝛼𝜏𝑑
2𝑐𝑀(2𝛼−1)
> 0 
b. 
𝜕𝑥𝑀
𝐵∗
𝜕𝑚
=
𝑎𝑑𝜏
2𝑚
> 0; 
𝜕𝑥𝑀
𝐵∗
𝜕𝑤𝑀
=
𝑑𝜏(√𝑤𝑀−√2𝑐𝑀)(√2𝑤𝑀−√𝑐𝑀)
4√2𝑐𝑀
2 𝑎(2𝑎−1)2
> 0; 
𝜕𝑥𝑀
𝐵∗
𝜕𝑐𝑀
=
−
√2𝑎𝑑𝜏(√𝑤𝑀−√2𝑐𝑀)(√2𝑤𝑀−√𝑐𝑀)
4𝑐𝑀
2 (2𝑎−1)2
< 0 
c. 
𝜕𝑆𝐵∗
𝜕𝑚
= −
𝑑
4𝑎𝑚𝜏
< 0; 
𝜕𝑆𝐵∗
𝜕𝑤𝑀
= −
𝜏𝑑(√𝑤𝑀−√2𝑐𝑀)
4𝑚𝑤𝑀
3
2
< 0;  
𝜕𝑆𝐵∗
𝜕𝑐𝑀
=
𝜏𝑑(√𝑤𝑀−√2𝑐𝑀)
4𝑚𝑐𝑀√𝑤𝑀
> 0 ∎ 
 
Proof of Lemma 4.3: 
It can be proved that 𝑞𝑀 + 𝑞𝐺 < 𝑑 is not optimal, therefore, the following proof is based 
on 𝑞𝑀 + 𝑞𝐺 ≥ 𝑑. 
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According to our assumption of the procurement rule in Model D, 𝑦𝑖
𝐷 as a function 𝑢𝑀 is 
summarized in Table C. 1. 
Table C. 1:  𝑦𝑖
𝐷 as a function 𝑢𝑀, 𝑖 ∈ {𝑀, 𝐺,𝑊} 
𝒖𝑴 ∈ [𝟎,
𝒅 − 𝒙𝑮
𝒙𝑴
] ∈ (
𝒅 − 𝒙𝑮
𝒙𝑴
,
𝒅 − 𝒒𝑮
𝒙𝑴
] ∈ (
𝒅 − 𝒒𝑮
𝒙𝑴
,
𝒒𝑴
𝒙𝑴
] ∈ (
𝒒𝑴
𝒙𝑴
, 𝟏] 
𝒚𝑴
𝑫  𝑢𝑀𝑥𝑀 𝑢𝑀𝑥𝑀 𝑢𝑀𝑥𝑀 𝑞𝑀 
𝒚𝑮
𝑫 𝑥𝐺 𝑑 − 𝑢𝑀𝑥𝑀 𝑞𝐺  𝑞𝐺  
𝒚𝑾
𝑫  𝑢𝑀𝑥𝑀 + 𝑥𝐺 𝑑 𝑑 𝑑 
 
We first obtain 𝑌𝑖
𝐵, 𝑖 ∈ {𝑀, 𝐺,𝑊}: 
𝑌𝑀
𝐵 = ∫ 𝑢𝑀𝑥𝑀𝑓(𝑢𝑀)ⅆ𝑢𝑀
𝑞𝑀
𝑥𝑀
0
+∫ 𝑞𝑀𝑓(𝑢𝑀)ⅆ𝑢𝑀
1
𝑞𝑀
𝑥𝑀
= 𝑞𝑀 −
𝑞𝑀
2
2𝑥𝑀
 
𝑌𝐺
𝐵 = ∫ 𝑥𝐺𝑓(𝑢𝑀)ⅆ𝑢𝑀
𝑑−𝑥𝐺
𝑥𝑀
0
+∫ (𝑑 − 𝑢𝑀𝑥𝑀)𝑓(𝑢𝑀)ⅆ𝑢𝑀
𝑑−𝑞𝐺
𝑥𝑀
𝑑−𝑥𝐺
𝑥𝑀
+∫ 𝑞𝐺𝑓(𝑢𝑀)ⅆ𝑢𝑀
1
𝑑−𝑞𝐺
𝑥𝑀
=
2𝑑(𝑥𝐺 − 𝑞𝐺) − 𝑥𝐺
2 + 2𝑥𝑀𝑞𝐺 + 𝑞𝐺
2
2𝑥𝑀
 
𝑌𝑊
𝐵 = ∫ (𝑢𝑀𝑥𝑀 + 𝑥𝐺)𝑓(𝑢𝑀)ⅆ𝑢𝑀
𝑑−𝑥𝐺
𝑥𝑀
0
+∫ 𝑑𝑓(𝑢𝑀)ⅆ𝑢𝑀
1
𝑑−𝑥𝐺
𝑥𝑀
=
2𝑑(𝑥𝐺 + 𝑥𝑀) − (𝑑
2 + 𝑥𝐺
2)
2𝑥𝑀
 
We then obtain the manufacturer and the government’s expected utility functions: 
𝛱𝑀
𝐷 = 𝑤𝑀𝑌𝑀
𝐷 − 𝑐𝑀𝑥𝑀 = 𝑤𝑀 (𝑞𝑀 −
𝑞𝑀
2
2𝑥𝑀
) − 𝑐𝑀𝑥𝑀 
𝛱𝐺
𝐷 = (𝑏 − 𝑝)𝑌𝑊
𝐷 + 𝑤𝐺𝑦𝐺
𝐷 − 𝑐𝐺𝑥𝐺 −  𝑠𝐺(𝑑 − 𝑦𝑊
𝐷 )  
= (𝑏 − 𝑝 + 𝑠𝐺)
2𝑑(𝑥𝐺 + 𝑥𝑀) − (𝑑
2 + 𝑥𝐺
2)
2𝑥𝑀
+ 𝑤𝐺
2𝑑(𝑥𝐺 − 𝑞𝐺) − 𝑥𝐺
2 + 2𝑥𝑀𝑞𝐺 + 𝑞𝐺
2
2𝑥𝑀
− 𝑐𝐺𝑥𝐺 −  𝑠𝐺𝑑 
SOC of 𝛱𝑀
𝐷  is 
𝑑2𝛱𝑀
𝐷
𝑑 𝑥𝑀
2 = −
𝑞𝑀
2 𝑤𝑀
𝑥𝑀
3 < 0: 𝛱𝑀
𝐷  is concave in 𝑥𝑀. 
SOC of 𝛱𝐺
𝐷 is 
𝑑2𝛱𝐺
𝐷
𝑑 𝑥𝐺
2 = −
𝑏−𝑝+𝑠𝐺+𝑤𝐺
𝑥𝑀
< 0: 𝛱𝐺
𝐷 is concave in 𝑥𝐺 . 
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Solve the FOC of 𝛱𝑀
𝐷  and 𝛱𝐺
𝐷 simultaneously,  
𝑑𝛱𝑀
𝐷
𝑑 𝑥𝑀
= 0 and 
𝑑𝛱𝐺
𝐷
𝑑 𝑥𝐺
= 0: ?̃?𝑀
𝐷 = 𝛼𝑞𝑀 and 
?̃?𝐺
𝐷 = (𝑑 − 𝛽𝛼𝑞𝑀)
+, where 𝛽 =
𝑐𝐺
𝑏−𝑝+𝑠𝐺+𝑤𝐺
 ∎ 
 
Proof of Proposition 4.3: 
We first obtain the wholesaler’s expected profit function: 
𝛱𝑊
𝐷 = 𝑝𝑌𝑊
𝐷 − 𝑤𝑀𝑌𝑀
𝐷 − 𝑤𝐺𝑌𝐺
𝐷
= 𝑝
2𝑑(𝑥𝐺 + 𝑥𝑀) − (𝑑
2 + 𝑥𝐺
2)
2𝑥𝑀
− 𝑤𝑀 (𝑞𝑀 −
𝑞𝑀
2
2𝑥𝑀
)
− 𝑤𝐺
2𝑑(𝑥𝐺 − 𝑞𝐺) − 𝑥𝐺
2 + 2𝑥𝑀𝑞𝐺 + 𝑞𝐺
2
2𝑥𝑀
 
Depending on the government’s best response function, there are two cases: 1. ?̃?𝐺
𝐷 = 0; 2. 
?̃?𝐺
𝐷 = 𝑑 − 𝛽𝛼𝑞𝑀. 
1. ?̃?𝐺
𝐷 = 0, if 𝑑 − 𝛽𝛼𝑞𝑀 < 0, i.e., 𝑞𝑀 >
𝑑
𝛽𝛼
 
In this case 𝑞𝐺 = 0: the wholesaler does not order from the government since it knows 
that the government will not produce anything. Substituting ?̃?𝑀
𝐷 = 𝛼𝑞𝑀, ?̃?𝐺
𝐷 = 0, and 
𝑞𝐺 = 0, the wholesaler’s expected profit function became 
𝛱𝑊
𝐷 = 𝑝
2𝛼𝑞𝑀 − 𝑑
2
2𝛼𝑞𝑀
− 𝑤𝑀 (𝑞𝑀 −
𝑞𝑀
2𝛼
) 
The SOC of 𝛱𝑊
𝐷  is  
𝜕2?̃?𝑊
𝐷
𝜕𝑞𝑀
2 =
𝑑2𝑝
𝑎𝑞𝑀
3 < 0: 𝛱𝑊
𝐷  is concave in 𝑞𝑀. 
Solve the FOC of 𝛱𝑊
𝐷 : 𝑞𝑀
𝐵∗ = 𝜏𝑞𝑀, where 𝜏 is the same as defined in Proposition 1. 
 
2. ?̃?𝐺
𝐷 = 𝑑 − 𝛽𝛼𝑞𝑀 (if 𝑑 − 𝛽𝛼𝑞𝑀 > 0, i.e., 𝑞𝑀 <
𝑑
𝛽𝛼
) 
Substituting ?̃?𝑀
𝐷 = 𝛼𝑞𝑀 and ?̃?𝐺
𝐷 = 𝑑 − 𝛽𝛼𝑞𝑀 , the wholesaler’s expected profit function 
became 
𝛱𝑊
𝐷 = 𝑝 (𝑑 −
1
2
𝛼𝛽2𝑞𝑀) − 𝑤𝑀 (𝑞𝑀 −
𝑞𝑀
2𝛼
) − 𝑤𝐺 (𝑞𝐺 +
(𝑑 − 𝑞𝐺)
2
2𝛼𝑞𝑀
−
1
2
𝛼𝛽2𝑞𝑀) 
We check the SOC of 𝛱𝑊
𝐷 : 
𝜕2𝛱𝑊
𝐷
𝜕𝑞𝑀
2 = −
(𝑑 − 𝑞𝐺)
2𝑤𝐺
𝛼𝑞𝑀
3 < 0 
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𝜕2𝛱𝑊
𝐷
𝜕𝑞𝐺
2 = −
𝑤𝐺
𝛼𝑞𝑀
< 0  
𝜕2𝛱𝑊
𝐷
𝜕𝑞𝑀
2
𝜕2𝛱𝑊
𝐷
𝜕𝑞𝐺
2 − (
𝜕2𝛱𝑊
𝐷
𝜕𝑞𝑀𝑞𝐺
)
2
= 0 
The SOC of 𝛱𝑊
𝐷  is not conclusive. After examining 𝛱𝑊
𝐷 , we conclude that there are two 
candidates of the optimal solutions: the boundary solution with 𝑞𝐺 = 0 and the boundary 
solution with 𝑞𝑀 = 0. Therefore, we solve the two candidates, and the candidate which 
maximizes 𝛱𝑊
𝐷  is the optimal solution 
• When 𝑞𝐺 = 0, 𝛱𝑊
𝐷  is concave in 𝑞𝑀, solve the 
𝜕?̃?𝑊
𝐷
𝜕𝑞𝑀
= 0 → 𝑞𝑀 = 𝜃𝑑, where 𝜃 =
√
𝑤𝐺
𝛼2𝛽2(𝑝−𝑤𝐺)+𝑤𝑀(2𝛼−1)
. 
• When 𝑞𝑀 = 0: 𝑌𝑊
𝐷 = 𝑑 −
1
2
𝛼𝛽2𝑞𝑀 = 𝑑, ?̃?𝐺
𝐷 = 𝑑 − 𝛽𝛼𝑞𝑀 = 𝑑, 𝑦𝐺
𝐷 =
min{𝑞𝑀, 𝑥𝐺} = min{𝑞𝑀, 𝑑}, 𝜋𝑊
𝐷 = 𝑝𝑑 − 𝑤𝐺min{𝑞𝑀, 𝑑} → 𝑞𝑀 = 𝑑.  
Next, we prove 𝜃 < 𝜏: 
𝑤𝐺
𝛼2𝛽2(𝑝−𝑤𝐺)+𝑤𝑀(2𝛼−1)
<
𝑝
(2𝛼−1)𝑤𝑀
 ⇔ 𝑤𝐺(2𝛼 − 1)𝑤𝑀 <
𝑝(𝛼2𝛽2(𝑝 − 𝑤𝐺) + 𝑤𝑀(2𝛼 − 1)) ⇔ −(𝑝 − 𝑤𝐺 )(𝛼
2𝛽2𝑝 + (2𝛼 − 1)𝑤𝑀) < 0. The last 
inequality always holds, thus 𝜃 < 𝜏. ∎ 
 
Proof of Proposition 4.4: 
a. Compare 𝛱𝑊
𝐷𝑎 vs. 𝛱𝑊
𝐷𝑏: 
𝛱𝑊
𝐷𝑎 − 𝛱𝑊
𝐷𝑏 =
𝑑(−𝑤𝐺 + 𝜃(𝑎
2𝛽2𝜃(−𝑝 + 𝑤𝐺) + 𝜃𝑤𝑀 + 2𝑎(𝑤𝐺 − 𝜃𝑤𝑀)))
2𝛼𝜃
 
 
Compare −𝑤𝐺 + 𝜃(𝑎
2𝛽2𝜃(−𝑝 + 𝑤𝐺) + 𝜃𝑤𝑀 + 2𝑎(𝑤𝐺 − 𝜃𝑤𝑀)) vs. 0: 
Plug in 𝛽, 𝜃 and 𝜏, the above expression became 2𝑤𝐺(−1 + 𝑎√
𝑤𝐺
𝑎2𝑐𝐺
2 (𝑝−𝑤𝐺)
(𝑏−𝑝+𝑠𝐺+𝑤𝐺)
2+(2𝛼−1)𝑤𝑀
) =
2𝑤𝐺𝛿2 
𝛿2 < 0 ⇔ 𝑎
2𝑤𝐺 − (2𝛼 − 1)𝑤𝑀 <
𝑎2𝑐𝐺
2(𝑝 − 𝑤𝐺)
(𝑏 − 𝑝 + 𝑠𝐺 + 𝑤𝐺)2
 
We check the sign of 𝑎2𝑤𝐺 − (2𝛼 − 1)𝑤𝑀:  
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𝑎2𝑤𝐺 − (2𝛼 − 1)𝑤𝑀 = 𝑎
2𝑤𝐺 − (2𝛼 − 1)𝑤𝐺 + (2𝛼 − 1)𝑤𝐺 − (2𝛼 − 1)𝑤𝑀
= (𝑎 − 1)2𝑤𝐺 + (2𝛼 − 1)(𝑤𝐺 − 𝑤𝑀) > 0 
 
the above equation become: 
𝑏 − 𝑝 + 𝑠𝐺 +𝑤𝐺 < 𝑎𝑐𝐺√
𝑝 − 𝑤𝐺
𝑎2𝑤𝐺 − (2𝛼 − 1)𝑤𝑀
 
⇔ 𝑠𝐺 < ?̅?𝐺
𝐷1 = 𝑎𝑐𝐺√
𝑝 − 𝑤𝐺
𝑎2𝑤𝐺 − (2𝛼 − 1)𝑤𝑀
+ 𝑝 − 𝑏 − 𝑤𝐺 
If 𝑠𝐺
𝑎𝑏 ≤ 0, i.e., 𝑐𝐺 < 𝑐𝐺
𝑎𝑏 =
𝑏−𝑝+wG
𝑎
√
𝑎2𝑤𝐺−(2𝛼−1)𝑤𝑀
𝑝−𝑤𝐺
: 𝑠𝐺
𝑎𝑏 > 0 always holds: 𝛱𝑊
𝐷𝑎 >
 𝛱𝑊
𝐷𝑏 
If 𝑐𝐺 > 𝑐𝐺
𝑎𝑏 
𝑠𝐺 < 𝑠𝐺
𝑎𝑏 ⇔ 𝛿2 < 0 ⇔  𝛱𝑊
𝐷𝑎 < 𝛱𝑊
𝐷𝑏 
𝑠𝐺 > 𝑠𝐺
𝑎𝑏 ⇔ 𝛿2 > 0 ⇔  𝛱𝑊
𝐷𝑎 > 𝛱𝑊
𝐷𝑏 
 
b. Compare 𝛱𝑊
𝐷𝑎 vs. 𝛱𝑊
𝐷𝑐: 
  
𝛱𝑊
𝐷𝑎 − 𝛱𝑊
𝐷𝑐 =
𝑑(𝑝𝜃(1 − 𝑎2𝛽2𝜏𝜃) + 𝜏(𝑎2𝛽2𝜃2 − 1)𝑤𝐺 + (2𝑎 − 1)𝜏(𝜏 − 𝜃)𝜃𝑤𝑀)
2𝑎𝜏𝜃
 
Compare 𝑝𝜃(1 − 𝑎2𝛽2𝜏𝜃) + 𝜏(𝑎2𝛽2𝜃2 − 1)𝑤𝐺 + (2𝑎 − 1)𝜏(𝜏 − 𝜃)𝜃𝑤𝑀 vs. 0: 
Plug in 𝛽, 𝜃 and 𝜏, the above expression became 2(𝑝
√
𝑤𝐺
𝑎2𝑐𝐺
2 (𝑝−𝑤𝐺)
(𝑏−𝑝+𝑠𝐺+𝑤𝐺)
2+(2𝛼−1)𝑤𝑀
−
𝑤𝐺√
𝑝
(2𝛼−1)𝑤𝑀
) = 2𝛿 
𝛱𝑊
𝐷𝑎 > 𝛱𝑊
𝐷𝑐 ⇔ 𝛿 > 0 ⇔ 𝑠𝐺 > 𝑠𝐺
𝑎𝑐 = 𝛼𝑐𝐺√
𝑤𝐺
(2𝛼−1)𝑤𝑀
+ 𝑝 − 𝑏 − 𝑤𝐺 
If ?̅?𝐺 < 0 (i.e., 𝑐𝐺 < 𝑐𝐺
𝑎𝑐 =
𝑏−𝑝+𝑤𝐺
𝑎
√
(2𝛼−1)𝑤𝑀
𝑤𝐺
) ⇔ 𝑠𝐺 > 𝑠𝐺
𝑎𝑐  always holds: 𝛱𝑊
𝐷𝑎 > 𝛱𝑊
𝐷𝑐 
If ?̅?𝐺 > 0 (i.e., 𝑐𝐺 > 𝑐𝐺
𝑎𝑐) 
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If 𝑠𝐺 > 𝑠𝐺
𝑎𝑐: 𝛱𝑊
𝐷𝑎 > 𝛱𝑊
𝐷𝑐 
If 𝑠𝐺 < 𝑠𝐺
𝑎𝑐: 𝛱𝑊
𝐷𝑎 < 𝛱𝑊
𝐷𝑐 
 
c. Compare 𝛱𝑊
𝐷𝑏 vs. 𝛱𝑊
𝐷𝑐: 
𝛱𝑊
𝐷𝑏 − 𝛱𝑊
𝐷𝑐 =
𝑑(𝑝 + 𝜏(−2𝑎𝑤𝐺 + (2𝑎 − 1)𝜏𝑤𝑀))
2𝑎𝜏
 
 
Compare 𝑝 + 𝜏(−2𝑎𝑤𝐺 + (2𝑎 − 1)𝜏𝑤𝑀) with 0: 
Plug in 𝛽, 𝜃 and 𝜏, the above expression became 2 (𝑝 − 𝑎𝑤𝐺√
𝑝
(2𝑎−1)𝑤𝑀
) = 2𝛿𝑏𝑐 
𝛿𝑏𝑐 < 0 ⇔ 𝑝 − 𝑎𝑤𝐺√
𝑝
(2𝑎 − 1)𝑤𝑀
< 0 ⇔ 𝑤𝐺 >
𝑝
𝑎𝜏
 
If 
𝑝
𝑎𝜏
> 𝑝, i.e., 𝑎𝜏 < 1  then 𝑤𝐺 >
𝑝
𝑎𝜏
 cannot hold. We compare 𝑎𝜏 vs. 1:𝑎𝜏 = 
𝑎√
𝑝
(2𝑎−1)𝑤𝑀
> 1 ⇔ 𝑝 >
(2𝑎−1)𝑤𝑀
𝑎2
⇔ 𝑚𝑤𝑀 >
(2𝑎−1)𝑤𝑀
𝑎2
⇔𝑚 >
(2𝑎−1)
𝑎2
.  
(𝑎 − 1)2 = 𝑎2 − 2𝑎 + 1 > 0 → 𝑎2 > 2𝑎 − 1 →
(2𝑎−1)
𝑎2
< 1 .Thus 𝑚 >
(2𝑎−1)
𝑎2
 always 
hold, and 
𝑝
𝑎𝜏
< 𝑝 always hold. Therefore:  
If 𝑤𝐺 ≤
𝑝
𝑎𝜏
: 𝛱𝑊
𝐷𝑏 ≥ 𝛱𝑊
𝐷𝑐 
If 𝑤𝐺 >
𝑝
𝑎𝜏
: 𝛱𝑊
𝐷𝑏 < 𝛱𝑊
𝐷𝑐. ∎ 
 
Proof of Lemma 4.4: 
Since 𝑝 = 𝑚𝑤𝑀, 𝜏
𝐵 can be rewritten as √
𝑝
(2𝛼−1)𝑤𝑀
. 𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑛, 𝜏𝑆𝑊 can be obtained from 𝜏𝐵 
by replacing the unit procurement cost (𝑤𝑀) by 𝑤𝑀 − 𝛾𝑤. 𝜏
𝑆𝑃 can be obtained from 𝜏𝐵 
by replacing the unit revenue (𝑝) by 𝑝 + 𝛾𝑝. ∎ 
 
Proof of Proposition 4.5: 
We first simplify 𝛱𝐺
𝑆 as follows: 
𝛱𝐺
𝑆 = (𝑏 − 𝑝)𝑌𝑊
𝑆 −  𝑠𝐺(𝑑 − 𝑌𝑊
𝑆 ) − 𝛾𝑤𝑌𝑀
𝑆 − 𝛾𝑝𝑌𝑊
𝑆
= (𝑏 − 𝑝 + 𝑠𝐺 − 𝛾𝑝)𝑌𝑊
𝑆 − 𝛾𝑤𝑌𝑀
𝑆 −  𝑠𝐺𝑑 
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Similar to the basic model, 𝑌𝑀
𝑆 = 𝑞𝑀 (1 −
𝑞𝑀
2𝑥𝑀
)  and 𝑌𝑊
𝑆 = 𝑑 (1 −
𝑑
2𝑥𝑀
). Then, 𝛱𝐺
𝑆 can be 
expressed as:  
𝛱𝐺
𝑆 = (𝑏 − 𝑝 + 𝑠𝐺 − 𝛾𝑝)𝑑 (1 −
𝑑
2𝑥𝑀
) − 𝛾𝑤𝑞𝑀 (1 −
𝑞𝑀
2𝑥𝑀
) −  𝑠𝐺𝑑 
• Model SW 
We substitute ?̃?𝑀
𝑆 , ?̃?𝑀
𝑆𝑊, and 𝛾𝑝 = 0 to obtain 𝛱𝐺
𝑆𝑊 as a function of 𝛾𝑤 
𝛱𝐺
𝑆𝑊(𝛾𝑤) = (𝑏 − 𝑝 + 𝑠𝐺)𝑑
(
 1 −
1
2𝛼√
𝑝
(2𝛼 − 1)(𝑤𝑀 − 𝛾𝑤))
 
− 𝛾𝑤𝑑√
𝑝
(2𝛼 − 1)(𝑤𝑀 − 𝛾𝑤)
(1 −
1
2𝑎
) −  𝑠𝐺𝑑 
The SOC of 𝛱𝐺
𝑆𝑊 is 
𝜕2?̃?𝐺
𝑆𝑊
𝜕𝛾𝑤
2 =
𝑑((𝑏−2𝑝+𝑠𝐺)(𝑤𝑀−𝛾𝑤)−3𝑝𝑤𝑀)
8𝛼(𝑤𝑀−𝛾𝑤)3𝜏𝑆𝑊
, which is not conclusive. We 
solve the interior solution and plug it back to the SOC to verify the concavity. 
By solving the FOC of 𝛱𝐺
𝑆𝑊,  
𝜕?̃?𝐺
𝑆𝑊
𝜕𝛾𝑤
=
𝑑((𝑏−2𝑝+𝑠𝐺)(𝑤𝑀−𝛾𝑤)−𝑝𝑤𝑀)
4𝛼(𝑤𝑀−𝛾𝑤)2tausW
= 0, we obtain the 
interior solution 𝛾𝑤
𝐼𝑁𝑇 =
𝑏−3𝑝+𝑠𝐺
𝑏−2𝑝+𝑠𝐺
𝑤𝑀 = 𝑤𝑀 − 𝛾𝑤, where 𝛾𝑤 =
𝑝𝑤𝑀
𝑏−2𝑝+𝑠𝐺
. 
If 𝑏 − 2𝑝 + 𝑠𝐺 < 0 (i.e., 𝑝 >
𝑏+𝑠𝐺
2
): 
𝜕?̃?𝐺
𝑆𝑊
𝜕𝛾𝑤
< 0, i.e., 𝛱𝐺
𝑆𝑊 is decreasing in 𝛾𝑤, thus 𝛾𝑤
∗ = 0. 
If 𝑏 − 2𝑝 + 𝑠𝐺 > 0 (i.e., 𝑝 <
𝑏+𝑠𝐺
2
):  
If 𝑏 − 3𝑝 + 𝑠𝐺 < 0 (i.e., 𝑝 >
𝑏+𝑠𝐺
3
): 𝛾𝑤
𝐼𝑁𝑇 < 0, and 𝛾𝑤
∗ = 0.  
If 𝑏 − 3𝑝 + 𝑠𝐺 ≥ 0 (i.e., 𝑝 ≤
𝑏+𝑠𝐺
3
): 𝛾𝑤
∗ = 𝛾𝑤
𝐼𝑁𝑇. We substitute 𝛾𝑤
𝐼𝑁𝑇 in the SOC to 
abtain 
𝜕2?̃?𝐺
𝑆𝑊
𝜕𝛾𝑤
2 = −
𝑑(𝑏−2𝑝+𝑠𝐺)
3
4𝛼𝑝2𝑤𝑀
2 √
𝑏−2𝑝+𝑠𝐺
(2𝛼−1)𝑤𝑀
< 0 to verify the concavity of 𝛱𝐺
𝑆𝑊.  
 
• Model SP 
We subsititute ?̃?𝑀
𝑆 , ?̃?𝑀
𝑆𝑃, and 𝛾𝑤 = 0 to obtain 𝛱𝐺
𝑆𝑃 as a function of 𝛾𝑝 
?̃?𝐺
𝑆𝑃(𝛾𝑝) = (𝑏 − 𝑝 + 𝑠𝐺 − 𝛾𝑝)𝑑
(
 
 
 
1 −
1
2𝛼√
𝑝 + 𝛾𝑝
(2𝛼 − 1)𝑤𝑀)
 
 
 
−  𝑠𝐺𝑑 
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The SOC of 𝛱𝐺
𝑆𝑃 is 
𝜕2?̃?𝐺
𝑆𝑃
𝜕𝛾𝑝
2 = −
𝑑(3(𝑏+𝑠𝐺)+𝑝+𝛾𝑝)
8𝑎(𝑝+𝛾𝑝)
2
𝜏𝑆𝑝
< 0: 𝛱𝐺
𝑆𝑃is concave in 𝛾𝑝. 
The FOC of 𝛱𝐺
𝑆𝑃 is 
𝜕?̃?𝐺
𝑆𝑃
𝜕𝑝
=
𝑑(𝑏+𝑠𝐺+(1−4𝛼)𝜏
𝑆𝑝(𝑝+𝛾𝑝))
4𝑎(𝑝+𝛾𝑝)𝜏𝑆𝑝
= 0 ⇔ 𝑏 + 𝑠𝐺 + (1 − 4𝛼𝜏
𝑆𝑝)(𝑝 +
𝛾𝑝) = 0. 
The above equation can be transformed to: −16𝛼2𝛤𝑝
3  + 𝐴𝛤𝑝
2 + 2𝐴 𝐵𝛤𝑝 + 𝐴𝐵
2 = 0, 
where 𝛤𝑝 = 𝑝 + 𝛾𝑝, 𝐴 = (2𝛼 − 1)𝑤𝑀 > 0, and  𝐵 = 𝑏 + 𝑠𝐺 > 0. The left-hand side of 
the equation is a cubit function of 𝛤𝑝, with a discriminant ∆= −64𝛼
2𝐴2(108𝛼2 +
𝐴𝐵3) < 0. Thus, the cubic function has a single root for 𝛤𝑝: 
  𝛾𝑝 =
1
48𝛼2
(𝐴 +
𝐴(𝐴+96𝛼2𝐵)
𝜑
+ 𝜑) 
where 𝜑 = 𝐴3 + 144𝛼2𝐴2𝐵 + 3456𝛼4𝐴𝐵2 + 192√3√𝛼6𝐴2𝐵3(𝐴 + 108𝛼2𝐵). 
Therefore, the interior solution of 𝛾𝑝 is 𝛾𝑝
𝐼𝑁𝑇 = 𝛾𝑝 − 𝑝. Taking into consideration the non-
negativity constraint of 𝛾𝑝, the optimal sotluion is  
𝛾𝑝
∗ = (𝛾𝑝 − 𝑝)
+
.∎ 
 
Proof of Proposition 4.6: 
We prove the case that 𝛾𝑤
∗ = 𝛾𝑤
𝐼𝑁𝑇, i.e., 𝑝 ≤
𝑏+𝑠𝐺
3
: 
𝜕𝛾𝑤
𝐼𝑁𝑇
𝜕𝑚
= −
(𝑏+sG)wM
2
(𝑏+sG−2𝑚wM)
2 < 0; 
𝜕𝛾𝑤
𝐼𝑁𝑇
𝜕𝑤𝑀
=
𝑏−3𝑝+sG
𝑏−2𝑝+sG
≥ 0; 
𝜕𝛾𝑤
𝐼𝑁𝑇
𝜕𝑏
=
𝑝𝑤𝑀
(𝑏−2𝑝+𝑠𝐺)
2 > 0; 
𝜕𝛾𝑤
𝐼𝑁𝑇
𝜕𝑠𝐺
=
𝑝𝑤𝑀
(𝑏−2𝑝+𝑠𝐺)
2 > 0. 
When 𝑝 >
𝑏+𝑠𝐺
3
, 𝛾𝑤
∗ = 0, and the derivative with respect to any parameter equals zero. ∎ 
Proof of Proposition 4.7: 
If 𝛱𝐺
𝑆∗ > 𝛱𝐺
𝐵∗, then 𝛾𝑤
∗ > 0. It can be easily verified that 𝜏𝑆∗ is increasing in 𝛾𝑤. 
Therefore, 𝑌𝑊
𝑆∗ = (1 −
1
2𝛼𝜏𝑆∗
)𝑑 and 𝑌𝑀
𝑆∗ = (1 −
1
2𝛼
) 𝜏𝑆∗𝑑 are increasing in 𝛾𝑤, and  
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𝑆𝑗∗ =
𝑑
2𝛼𝜏𝑆∗
 is decreasing in 𝛾𝑤. 𝛱𝑀
𝑆∗ can be rewritten as follows: 
𝛱𝑀
𝑆∗ = 𝑤𝑀 (1 −
1
2𝛼
) 𝜏𝑆∗𝑑 − 𝑐𝑀𝛼𝜏
𝑆∗𝑑 = 𝜏𝑆∗𝑑 (𝑤𝑀 (1 −
1
2𝛼
) − 𝑐𝑀𝛼)
= 𝜏𝑆∗𝑑 (
(2𝛼 − 1)𝑤𝑀 − 2𝛼
2𝑐𝑀
2𝛼
) 
Plug in 𝛼 = √
𝑤𝑀
2𝑐𝑀
: 𝛱𝑀
𝑆∗ = 𝜏𝑆∗𝑑 (
(2𝛼−1)𝑤𝑀−𝑤𝑀
2𝛼
) = 𝜏𝑆∗𝑑 (
(𝛼−1)𝑤𝑀
𝛼
). Because 𝛼 > 1, 
(𝛼−1)𝑤𝑀
𝛼
> 0 and  𝛱𝑀
𝑆∗ is increasing in 𝜏𝑆∗. 
If 𝛱𝑊
𝑆∗ < 𝛱𝑊
𝐵∗, then the wholesaler can receive the subsidy from the government, but use its 
optimal order quantity in Model B to get a profit 𝛱𝑊
𝐵∗. Knowing this reaction, the 
government will not provide any subsidy if the wholesaler prefers its profit in Model B. 
Therefore, if the government chooses to provide subsidy, then 𝛱𝑊
𝑆∗ ≥ 𝛱𝑊
𝐵∗. ∎ 
Proof of  
Proposition 4.8: 
If 𝛱𝐺
𝐷∗ > 𝛱𝐺
𝐵∗, (i.e., the government chooses a dual sourcing strategy), then the 
wholesaler has the option to procure the drug from either or both manufacturers. The 
following proof is based on the on the condition that a public manufacturer has been 
established (i.e., Model D is available for the wholesaler) 
• The wholesaler’s expected profit (𝛱𝑊
𝑗∗
) 
In Model D, the wholesaler moves first, and it will make the optimal procurement 
decisions to maximize its own profit. Since the wholesaler’s optimal profit in Model B is 
equal to its optimal profit under a private procurement plan in Model D, the wholesaler 
will be no worse off in a Model D than in Model B.  
• The shortage amount (𝑆𝑗) 
We first prove the shortage amount. Let 𝑆𝐷𝑎, 𝑆𝐷𝑏 and 𝑆𝐷𝑐 be the expected shortage 
amount if the wholesaler uses procurement plan a, b and c as indicated in Proposition 4.3, 
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respectively. Since 𝑆𝐷𝑐 > 0 and 𝑆𝐷𝑏 = 0, we know  𝑆𝐷𝑐 > 𝑆𝐷𝑏. Next, we compare 𝑆𝐷𝑎 
with 𝑆𝐷𝑐: 𝑆𝐷𝑎 < 𝑆𝐷𝑐, i.e., 
𝛼𝛽2𝜃𝑑
2
<
𝑑
2𝛼𝜏
⇔ 𝛼2𝛽2𝜃𝜏 < 1. Plug in 𝜃 and 𝜏, we have: 
𝛼2𝛽2√
𝑝
(2𝛼 − 1)𝑤𝑀
√
𝑤𝐺
𝛼2𝛽2(𝑝 − 𝑤𝐺) + (2𝛼 − 1)𝑤𝑀
< 1 ⇔ 𝛼4𝛽4𝑝 𝑤𝐺
< (2𝛼 − 1)𝑤𝑀(𝛼
2𝛽2(𝑝 − 𝑤𝐺) + (2𝛼 − 1)𝑤𝑀)
⇔ (𝛼2𝛽2𝑤𝐺 − (2𝛼 − 1)𝑤𝑀)(𝛼
2𝛽2𝑝 + (2𝛼 − 1)𝑤𝑀) 
Since 𝛼2𝛽2𝑝 + (2𝛼 − 1)𝑤𝑀 > 0, we check 𝛼
2𝛽2𝑤𝐺 − (2𝛼 − 1)𝑤𝑀. 
In the proof of Proposition 4.4.b, we have 𝛱𝑊
𝐷𝑎 > 𝛱𝑊
𝐷𝑐 iff 𝛿 > 0. We minipulate this 
condition as follows: 𝛿 = 𝑝√
𝑤𝐺
𝛼2𝛽2(𝑝−𝑤𝐺)+(2𝛼−1)𝑤𝑀
− 𝑤𝐺√
𝑝
(2𝛼−1)𝑤𝑀
> 0 ⇔
𝑝√
𝑤𝐺
𝛼2𝛽2(𝑝−𝑤𝐺)+(2𝛼−1)𝑤𝑀
> 𝑤𝐺√
𝑝
(2𝛼−1)𝑤𝑀
⇔ 𝑝2
𝑤𝐺
𝛼2𝛽2(𝑝−𝑤𝐺)+(2𝛼−1)𝑤𝑀
> 𝑤𝐺
2 𝑝
(2𝛼−1)𝑤𝑀
⇔
𝑝(2𝛼 − 1)𝑤𝑀 > 𝑤𝐺(𝛼
2𝛽2(𝑝 − 𝑤𝐺) + (2𝛼 − 1)𝑤𝑀) ⇔ 𝑝(2𝛼 − 1)𝑤𝑀 −
𝑤𝐺(𝛼
2𝛽2(𝑝 − 𝑤𝐺) + (2𝛼 − 1)𝑤𝑀) > 0 ⇔ −(𝑝 − 𝑤𝐺)(𝛼
2𝛽2𝑤𝐺 − (2𝛼 − 1)𝑤𝑀) >
0 ⇔ 𝛼2𝛽2𝑤𝐺 − (2𝛼 − 1)𝑤𝑀 < 0. Thus, if 𝛱𝑊
𝐷𝑎 > 𝛱𝑊
𝐷𝑐, then 𝑆𝐷𝑎 < 𝑆𝐷𝑐.  
If the wholesaler chooses a mixed procurement plan (plan a) or a public procurement plan 
(plan 𝑏), then the shortage amount in the implemented plan is less than that in a private 
procurement plan (plan c, which is the same as Model B). If the wholesaler chooses a 
private procurement plan, then the shortage amount is the same as it in Model B. 
Therefore, if the government chooses to operate a public manufacturer, then the 
wholesaler will choose the optimal procurement plan to maximize its own profit, and the 
shortage amount under the wholesaler ‘s optimal procurement plan is less than or equal to 
the shortage amount in Model B.  
• The wholesaler’s expected delivered quantity (𝑌𝑊
𝑗∗
) 
Since 𝑌𝑊
𝐷𝑐 = (1 −
1
2𝛼𝜏
)𝑑 < 𝑌𝑊
𝐷𝑏 = 𝑑, we know that if the wholesaler chooses plan a, 
then it delivered quantity in plan a is greater than that in plan 𝑐.  
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Next, we compare 𝑌𝑊
𝐷𝑎 with 𝑌𝑊
𝐷𝑐: 𝑌𝑊
𝐷𝑎 − 𝑌𝑊
𝐷𝑐 = (1 −
𝛼𝛽2𝜃
2
)𝑑 − (1 −
1
2𝛼𝜏
)𝑑 =
(
1
2𝛼𝜏
−
𝛼𝛽2𝜃
2
)𝑑. 𝑌𝑊
𝐷𝑎 > 𝑌𝑊
𝐷𝑐 iff 𝛼2𝛽2𝜃𝜏 < 1. As proved for the shortage amount, this 
condition holds if 𝛱𝑊
𝐷𝑎 > 𝛱𝑊
𝐷𝑐. Following the similar discussion in the proof for the 
shortage amount, we know that the wholesaler’s expected delivered quantity under its 
optimal procurement plan is greater than or equal to its expected delivered quantity in 
Model B.  
• The manufacturer’s expected delivered quantity (𝑌𝑊
𝑗∗
) 
𝑌𝑀
𝐷𝑐 = (1 −
1
2𝛼
) 𝜏𝑑 > 𝑌𝑀
𝐷𝑏 = 0. Next, we compare 𝑌𝑀
𝐷𝑎 with 𝑌𝑀
𝐷𝑐: 𝑌𝑀
𝐷𝑎 − 𝑌𝑀
𝐷𝑐 =
(1 −
1
2𝛼
) 𝜃𝑑 − (1 −
1
2𝛼
) 𝜏𝑑 = (1 −
1
2𝛼
)𝑑(𝜃 − 𝜏) < 0 (we prove that 𝜃 < 𝜏 in 
Proposition 4.3). Thus 𝑌𝑀
𝐷𝑎 < 𝑌𝑀
𝐷𝑐 always holds. Following the same discussion for the 
shortage amount, we know that the manufacturer’s expected delivered quantity under the 
wholesaler’s optimal procurement plan is less than or equal to the manufacturer’s 
expected delivered quantity in Model B. 
• The manufacturer’s expected profit (𝛱𝑀
𝑗∗
) 
𝛱𝑀
𝐷𝑐 > 𝛱𝑀
𝐷𝑏 = 0. Next, we compare 𝛱𝑀
𝐷𝑎 with 𝛱𝑀
𝐷𝑐: 𝛱𝑀
𝐷𝑎 − 𝛱𝑀
𝐷𝑐 =
𝑑(𝜃−𝜏)(𝛼−1)𝑤𝑀
2𝑎
. Since 
𝜃 < 𝜏 and 𝛼 > 1, 𝛱𝑀
𝐷𝑎 < 𝛱𝑀
𝐷𝑐 always holds. Following the same logic with the previous 
discussion, we know that the manufacturer’s expected profit under the wholesaler’s 
optimal procurement plan is less than or equal to the manufacturer’s expected profit in 
Model B. ∎ 
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